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ABSTRACT 
Advanced Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (ARAIM) is a new Aircraft Based 
Augmentation System (ABAS) technique, firstly presented in the two reports of the 
GNSS Evolutionary Architecture Study (GEAS). The ARAIM technique offers the 
opportunity to enable GNSS receivers to serve as a primary means of navigation, 
worldwide, for precision approach down to LPV-200 operation, while at the same 
time potentially reducing the support which has to be provided by Ground and 
Satellite Based Augmented Systems (GBAS and SBAS).  
Previous work analysed ARAIM performance, clearly showing the potential of this 
new architectures to provide the Required Navigation Performance down to LPV 200 
approach procedures. However, almost all of the studies have been performed with 
respect to fixed points on a grid on the Earth’s surface, with full view of the sky, 
evaluating ARAIM performance from a geometrical point of view and using nominal 
performance in simulated scenarios which last several days. Though, the operational 
configuration was not examined; attitude changes from manoeuvres, obscuration by 
the aircraft body and shadowing from the surrounding environment could all affect 
the incoming signal from the GNSS constellations, leading to configurations that 
could adversely affect the real performance.  
In this research, ARAIM performances in simulated operational configurations are 
presented. Four different algorithms were developed that integrate the ARAIM 
technique for performance prediction analysis. These algorithms could usefully be 
implemented: 
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• In the design of instrument approach procedures. The algorithms could be 
used to improve the procedure of the development of new instrument approaches, 
reducing time, effort and costs.  
• In the aircraft Flight Management Systems. The algorithms could support the 
pilots in the pre-flight briefing, highlighting possible integrity outage in advance and 
allowing them to select a different approach or making them aware of the need to 
utilise additional positioning systems. 
Increased awareness and better pre-flight planning could ultimately improve the 
safety of flights and contribute to the safe introduction of GNSS as a viable positioning 
method for instrument approach. 
The results showed that the aircraft attitude and the surrounding environment affect 
the performance of the ARAIM algorithm; each satellite lost generates a peak in the 
performance parameters that depends on the total number of satellites in view, their 
relative geometry and on the number of satellites lost at the same time. The main 
outcome of this research is the identification that the ideal scenario would be to have 
a tri-constellation system that provides at the same time high redundancy, reliability 
and increased safety margin. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
 
The stringent requirements imposed by the Civil aviation community on the levels of 
precision, integrity, continuity of service and availability, pushed the GNSS 
community to develop new solutions that could guarantee the required level of 
performances. In particular, the integrity and its impact on safety are one of the 
major drivers in the civil aviation domain, due to its capability of providing timely 
warnings to the user when the GNSS service is not available.  
The development of new constellations and the modernization of existing ones have 
increased the availability and the number of satellite-in-view, paving the way to new 
navigation algorithms and techniques and giving the chance to improve the 
navigation performances. At the same time, the increased number of satellites could 
reduce the support provided by the Ground Based Augmented System (GBAS) and 
Satellite Based Augmented Systems (SBAS). On the other hand, this means becoming 
GNSS dependant, since it seems to be the most reliable system for Positioning, 
Navigation and Timing (PNT) purpose.  
These enhanced future capabilities can enable GNSS receivers to serve as a primary 
means of navigation, worldwide, and have provided the motivation for the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) to form the GNSS Evolution Architecture Study (GEAS).  
This panel, formed in 2008, investigates the new GNSS-based architectures, with a 
focus on precision approach down to LPV-200 operations (Localizer performance 
with vertical guidance down to 200 feet). GEAS identified and defined a new 
technique as the most promising system, named ARAIM, Advanced Receiver 
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Autonomous Integrity Monitoring, an improved version of the current RAIM. The 
literature, produced through a series of studies, has analysed the performance of this 
new technique and has clearly shown the potential of ARAIM architectures to provide 
the Required Navigation Performance for LPV 200. 
 
  INNOVATE PROJECT BACKGROUND INTRODUCTION 
 
The current doctoral project has been developed within the INNOVATE research 
project and a brief presentation is provided in the following section. 
INNOVATE acronym stands for “the systematic INtegration of NOVel Aerospace 
TEchnologies” and it is European Union-funded Marie Curie Innovative Doctoral 
Programme (IDP) arose from the need for an integrated approach to the 
development and exploitation of technology within the aerospace engineering sector 
that aims to promote fundamental research, Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 1-3, 
but also to implement and support development and demonstration activities at TRL 
4-6, hereby addressing a significant gap identified both by government and industry. 
The INNOVATE team is formed by 13 Early Stage Researchers (ESRs) and each of us 
had the opportunity to undertake some fundamental research activities inside and as 
part of a world-leading research group, but also to bring these technologies and 
methods into a systems context, thus to think about development and, ultimately, 
demonstration. In other words, we had the opportunity to explore elements of base 
science, as individuals (as PhD students), in the group, and then to accelerate its use 
as part of a team project towards a paper demonstrator for an integrated air 
transport system (as research engineers, members of the INNOVATE Research Team). 
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The following section is an extract of the description of the INNOVATE programme, 
that briefly and fully summarises the objectives of the project. 
The design and operation of an aircraft as one integrated system is becoming an ever-
stronger requirement due to increased complexity, demands in performance and 
market pressures forcing the industry to better integrate its design, processes and 
operations to meet their targets. It is not sufficient to develop the vehicle in isolation. 
An overall strategy for developing integrated systems requirements to meet these 
demands is required and suitable training needs to be provided which allows in-depth 
technical studies combined with a global vision, inclusive of exploitation and 
operations, for air transportation. An overall, performing air transport solution needs 
to see the integration of aircraft and their operation and be looked at as a super-
system in its own right. 
INNOVATE’s aim is to train the next generation of highly skilled engineers and 
scientists able to understand, undertake and support state-of-the-art technological 
activities and challenges for the aero-sector in a multi-disciplinary environment 
(Figure 1.1). 
Individual research projects have delivered individual system concepts connected to 
innovations in propulsion, airframe, ground operations, navigation and 
communication technologies. 
The outcomes of the projects are a series of specific technological advances which 
links up to underpin a demonstrator integrating the benefits of the various research 
strands and embodying the system vision developed by the Early Stage Researchers 
(ESRs) engaged in the programme. 
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The objectives are to achieve the next stage technology demonstrator by: 
• Investigating technologies toward higher pressure-temperature cycles & the 
more electric engine (WP1);  
• Investigating drag reducing, electrical actuation & structural technologies 
(WP2);  
• Investigating technologies aimed at green ground and take-off operations 
(WP3);  
• Enhancing the reliability of GNSS & communication (WP4); 
•  Integration and virtual demonstrator (WP5); 
The IDP has therefore seen each research project interact with others and, to 
incorporate the progress of each activity and stress the integrated nature of the IDP 
vision, a demonstration work package, WP5, is programmed to which all ESRs has 
Figure 1-1 - Innovate Project Statement 
and Structure. 
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contributed. This work package integrates the various technologies developed by the 
group into physical demonstrators. 
WP6 included the dissemination and review of the work done but also the 
presentation of the prototypes defined in WP5. Dissemination involved workshops 
and attendance to professional shows and conferences. 
The ESRs were based at the University of Nottingham Institute for Aerospace 
Technology (IAT) and worked in close proximity with one another.  
Uniquely this project brought together students, academics and industrial partners 
from across academic disciplines and areas of the air transport domain to take on the 
challenge of the integrated air transport system. 
 
  RESEARCH PROJECT AIM AND OBJECTIVES 
 
GEAS Preliminary analysis clearly shows the potential of Advanced RAIM 
architectures to provide the Required Navigation Performance and achieve a global 
coverage of LPV-200 using, at least, two constellations. 
Almost all the previous analysis was performed by simply studying a constellation’s 
configuration with respect to fixed points on a grid on the Earth’s surface, with a full 
view of the sky, evaluating ARAIM performance from a geometrical point of view and 
using nominal performance in simulated scenarios lasting several days. 
However, aircraft flights can last for hours and on-board receivers don’t always have 
a full view of the sky. Attitude changes from manoeuvres, obscuration by the aircraft 
body and shadowing from the surrounding environment could all affect the incoming 
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signal from the GNSS constellations, leading to configurations that could adversely 
affect the real performance.  
For the above reason, the first main objective of this research project is to analyse 
the above-mentioned shadowing effects on the performance of the ARAIM technique 
when implemented and integrated with a predicted flight path using different 
combinations of three constellations (GPS, GLONASS and Galileo), considered as fully 
operational.  
The aim is to assess the capabilities of this new technique in operational 
configurations, how the use of multiple sources of position information benefits both 
the accuracy and integrity of the navigation system, in particular in situation in which 
the presence of obstacles could limit the access to a subset of these sources, and to 
provide an overview of the performances using different combinations of the 
constellations, highlighting the level of improvement and their limits, together with 
a recommendation of the minimum set to be used. 
The second main objective is to develop new and innovative algorithms that integrate 
the ARAIM technique for performance prediction analysis in operational 
configurations.  
The aim is to provide alternative concepts that could support other functions and 
processes, for example these algorithms may be implemented: 
 In the design and testing of instrument approach procedures. The algorithms 
could be used to improve the process of the development of new instrument 
approaches, reducing time, effort and costs. 
 In the flight planning and scheduling process. The algorithms could support 
airline planners and ATCs in the analysis of the integrity of a flight procedure, 
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and its related trajectory, and use the information as additional parameter for 
the definition of the optimal departure time. 
 In the aircraft Flight Management System. The algorithms could support the 
pilots in the pre-flight briefing, highlighting in advance possible integrity 
outage in nominal conditions and allowing them to select a different approach 
or making them aware of the need to utilise additional positioning systems, 
or in real-time as additional avionics system.  
Increased awareness and better pre-flight planning could ultimately improve the 
safety of flights and contribute to the safe introduction of GNSS as a viable positioning 
method for instrument approach. Additionally, Global Navigation Satellite Systems 
could reduce the amount of airspace needed by each airport, consequently reducing 
the amount of fuel used, the environmental footprint, dependence on ground 
navaids and potentially increasing the capacity of airports and coping with the 
increased demand for air travel. 
 
  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
The following research methodology is carried out in this thesis to meet the aims and 
objectives outlined in the previous section: 
 Review existing ARAIM algorithms 
 Define and simulate ARAIM operational configuration, using different 
airports and approach procedures. 
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 Define the integration of terrain database in the algorithm and the strategy 
to analyse its shadowing effect. 
 Analyse algorithm performances for the selected scenarios, comparing 
different combinations of the Global Navigation Satellite Systems in nominal 
conditions (single, dual and tri-constellation configurations with GPS, Galileo 
and GLONASS). 
 Using specifically developed tools, the ARAIM Performance on Predicted 
Aircraft Trajectory Tool (APPATT), analysis has been performed both on the 
short-term (ST), considering the effective duration of the trajectory for a set 
date and time, and on the long-term (LT), considering a range of days/weeks. 
 Based on the analysis of the performances, two new and innovative types of 
system that integrates ARAIM have been defined and use its prediction 
capability. 
 Test of the two new algorithms: 
- Flight path generator and modifier (FPG and FPM). This tool generates 
the aircraft path using the basic model described in the ICAO manual of 
design criteria in the implementation of RNP operational procedures 
(ICAO, 2009). 
The trajectory is then analysed by APPATT with the objective of 
evaluating its integrity performance considering the attitude. if it doesn’t 
satisfy the required navigation performance and it presents one or more 
integrity outages, the Flight Path Modifier (FPM) function tries to modify 
the trajectory in order to remove the integrity outages and satisfy the 
required navigation performance.  
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- The Near Real Time ARAIM Performance Prediction Tool (NRT APPT) 
provides a near real-time prediction computation of the parameters. The 
objective of this process is to develop a system that can be integrated 
into the Avionics of an aircraft/UAV and can provide timely warning to 
the user/pilot whenever the current aircraft configuration could lead to 
a dangerous situation.  
 
  THESIS OUTLINE 
 
Chapter 2 starts with an overview of GNSS use in civil aviation together with a simple 
and brief explanation of the navigation problem, how a position solution is computed 
and which factors affect its accuracy. Then it describes the general principle of 
integrity monitoring, its history and provides a wide overview of the different 
algorithms and techniques used in the field and presented in the literature, like RAIM 
and ARAIM. 
Chapter 3 describes in detail the ARAIM algorithm, how it works, the inputs and 
outputs (the integrity parameters defined by the protection levels) and the new tool 
developed and used in this research, the ARAIM Performance on Predicted Aircraft 
Trajectory Tool (APPATT). In this chapter, the functions used and integrated into the 
algorithm are presented, starting from the original MAAST, the MATLAB ARAIM 
Availability Simulation Tool (MAAST) a tool developed by Stanford University that is 
the basis of the APPATT, to the new functions and models that evaluate the 
shadowing effect of the aircraft attitude and terrain, highlighting how these functions 
have been modelled and implemented. 
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Chapter 4 provides an extensive analysis of approach procedures in the selected 
airports, using different configurations (single, dual and tri-constellations) and 
combinations of the GNSS constellations (GPS, Galileo and GLONASS). The chapter is 
divided into three main parts: a first one that gives a detailed introduction to the civil 
aviation procedures, their categorization and definition, the second one introduces 
one of the two versions of the APPATT algorithm, the Short-Term, that analyses the 
integrity of a single trajectory during its expected duration, trying to identify “weak 
spot” along the path and flagging them to the user. The third section introduces the 
second version of the APPATT, the Long-Term, that analyses the integrity of a 
trajectory within a predefined period of time (from hours to days), in order to identify 
possible integrity outages and to help the user in selecting the appropriate starting 
time to perform the flight. 
The Flight Path Generator and Modifier tools are introduced in Chapter 5; the concept 
behind these new functions is to introduce the integrity as new parameter in the 
design and optimisation of flight path. 
These two functions are designed to generate a trajectory based on the inputs 
provided by the user (a list of waypoints that defines the expected flight path), to 
analyse the integrity parameters using the APPATT ST and to attempt to modify the 
trajectory in order to satisfy the integrity requirements for the selected procedure. 
These two functions can be used as an intermediate step between the current 
procedures development and testing process, in which trajectories design is based 
on fixed waypoints where terrestrial navigational aids (NAVAIDs) may be located, and 
the introduction of GNSS based procedures, in which the trajectories will not be any 
longer based on static procedures but a more dynamic and flexible process might be 
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introduced that could further optimise them on a multi-aspects base (such as costs, 
environmental impact, safety and integrity). 
Chapter 6 presents and summarise the challenges of the integration of different 
technologies and explaining the final objectives of the WP4 Physical Demonstrator, 
developed in collaboration with other two INNOVATE researchers, and its research 
contribution to the INNOVATE WP5. The physical demonstrator integrates three 
technology/system demonstrators covering different areas of the operations related 
to the civil aviation field, such as: 
- Integration of ARAIM as new avionics system that supports pilots in safety-critical 
phase of flight by providing near real-time integrity performance prediction (the 
Near-Real-Time ARAIM Performance Prediction Tool or (NRT APPT). 
- Optimisation of the ground movement operations before take-off and after landing 
that could reduce delays and related costs that could affect airports with high level 
of flight traffic. 
- Analysis of human performances and psychophysical status of subjects ((e.g. pilots 
and ATCs) using physiology parameters (e.g. temperature and heart rate) to identify 
their level of tiredness and stress. 
Chapter 7 summarises the achieved results and proposes ideas to further develop the 
concepts and tools exploited in this research. 
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 INTEGRITY MONITORING, RAIM AND ARAIM ALGORITHM, 
PERFORMANCE BASED NAVIGATION AND LOCALIZER 
PERFORMANCE WITH VERTICAL GUIDANCE 
 
  INTRODUCTION TO GNSS 
 
The Global Satellite Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) are radio-navigation systems 
that allow users equipped with receivers to worldwide locate themselves in a 
predefined reference system through its set of coordinates (longitude, latitude and 
altitude), and to define the local time to high precision, using radio-signals 
transmitted from orbiting satellites. A GNSS system usually consists of a ground 
control segment, which tracks and monitors the health of each satellite in the 
constellation, and a network of 24-30 satellites homogeneously distributed in 
Medium Earth Orbits (MEO) or Geostationary orbits (GEO).  
Originally, the U.S. Department of Defence (DoD) developed the Global Positioning 
System (GPS) for military applications, but, nowadays, GNSS systems have a wide 
range of applications from the basic navigation purpose to transport and agriculture, 
search and rescue, energy, telecommunications and world finance. 
The increased interest in GNSS applications has pushed other countries to develop 
their own system, like the European Galileo system and the Chinese COMPASS that 
aim to be ready by the end of this decade, or to improve and modernize the existing 
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ones, such as the Russian GLONASS and the American GPS itself. At the time of 
writing, the status of the different constellation is the following: 
- GPS has 31 operational satellites (more than a nominal constellation) and 
the U.S. are already planning the future of the constellation, developing 
the new generation of satellites that will include new features, such as 
new civilian and military signals.  
- The European Galileo satellite system has 18 satellites in orbit, with four 
more on their way by the end of 2017.  
- GLONASS is back to the operational status, with 25 satellites in orbit. 
- The Chinses BeiDou system has 14 operational satellites in orbit. 
In the near future, more than 100 satellites will be available, together with an 
increase in diversity in the radio frequency spectrum due to the introduction of new 
signals that will mitigate the risks of interference. 
In this chapter, a quick overview of the fundamentals of GNSS and its use in civil 
aviation is presented, together with a simple and brief explanation of the positioning 
problem, how a position solution is computed and which factors affect its accuracy. 
The reader can refer to Hofmann-Wellenhof et al. (2008), Groves (2013b) and 
Paternostro (2008) for a detailed description of Global Navigation Satellite Systems.  
Then it describes the general principle of integrity monitoring, a bit of its history and 
it provides a wide overview of the different algorithms and techniques used in the 
field and presented in the literature, like RAIM and ARAIM. 
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2.1.1. FUNDAMENTAL OF GNSS 
GNSS is based on the emission of complex electromagnetic waves by a network of 
artificial satellites that are received by an appropriate instrumentation which tracks 
and interprets these signals and therefore it becomes possible to determine, in real 
time or in subsequent times, the distance between the satellites and the point where 
the instrumentation is located. 
The position of the points occurs with respect to a spatial reference system X, Y, Z 
with origin in the centre of the terrestrial mass (geocentric); these coordinates can 
be transformed into geographic coordinates and Cartesian coordinates of a local 
reference system. 
The level of accuracy achieved depends on several factors such as: 
• Measurement mode; 
• Point-to-satellite distance; 
• Characteristics of the receiver; 
• Relevant techniques; 
• Number and configuration of the satellites used. 
 
It is possible to obtain rough position estimates with an accuracy of meters in real 
time up to a millimetric accuracy but with a post-acquisition data processing. 
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The GNSS have three segments: 
 
1) Space segment: 
These are the satellites that send electromagnetic signals towards the earth; as 
mentioned before, each constellation consists of a certain number satellites, 
depending on its operational status, most of which are operative and others are back-
up ready to be activated in case one fails.  
For example, GPS currently counts 32 satellites in orbit placed on 6 circular orbits 
with a radius of about 26000 km, inclined 55 ° on the equatorial plane and spaced 60  
The main tasks of the satellites are: 
• Transmit and receive information from control stations; 
• Measure time with atomic clocks; 
• Perform orbital corrections according to the parameters assigned by the control 
stations. 
• Transmit information to users via electromagnetic signals; currently, there are 
several signals generated by the different constellation and the generation of the 
satellites. For example, for GPS, a total of four different signals are expected to 
become operational for civil use in the next years: L1 Coarse/Acquisition (C/A), L2C, 
L5 and L1C. The reader can find further information on the official GPS governmental 
website (GPS.GOV, 2017).  
 
The transmitted signals carry the navigation message that includes some of the 
information the receivers need to determine positions: 
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- location of the GNSS satellites, called the ephemerides, that provides a GNSS 
receiver with ephemeris information to calculate the coordinates of all the satellites 
in the constellation with an approximate accuracy of a couple of kilometres. 
- time of satellite transmission; 
- clock corrections, the ways the satellite can tell the receiver what time it is on-board. 
- health of the satellites on orbit 
- information about the ionosphere. The ionosphere is a layer of the atmosphere 
through which the GPS signals must travel to get to the user; hat atmospheric 
information will allow the receiver to make some corrections on the signal it receives 
from a specific satellite. 
 
2) Control segment: 
The control segment consists of: 
- A main control station (master control station, MCS) and an alternative main control 
station (alternate master control station); 
- Dedicated terrestrial antennas; 
- Dedicated control stations; 
 
These stations perform the function of monitoring the satellites, in order to 
determine their position, the synchronization error of the clocks and their operating 
status. Satellites tracking data obtained from monitor stations are used by MCS to 
compute the ephemeris, the parameters that allow determining the orbital position 
of the satellites, and the analytical models for the correction of the satellite clocks 
which are transmitted back to the satellites. 
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These ephemerides are actually predicted satellite positions broadcast within the 
navigation message that are transmitted from the satellites in real time.  
Upload is performed daily with new predicted orbital elements and transmitted every 
hour by the navigation message allowing the receivers to predict their position in the 
short-term time. They are therefore called "broadcast" (transmitted) or predicted. 
 
3) User segment: 
The user segment consists of all civil and military users equipped with at least one 
antenna and a receiver, capable of acquiring the signals emitted by the satellites. 
There are several types of receivers that differ in their technical characteristics, the 
strategy adopted in decoding the received signal and the precision they provide in 
positioning. 
All receivers are equipped with an oscillator (receiver clock) that produces a 
continuous electromagnetic signal similar to that received by the space segment, 
called precisely the replica. In order to carry out this operation simultaneously for 
each signal coming from different satellites, the receiver dedicates to each of them a 
different reception channel.  
 
2.1.1.1. GNSS MEASUREMENTS 
The signal sent by the satellites is picked up by the antennas of the receivers, which 
generate a replica within them, engaging the receiver for a few minutes after it is 
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switched on. The signal reproduced by the receiver oscillator is similar to the 
received one, aside for a phase shift in time (Figure 2-1). 
 
Figure 2-1 Example of transmitted signal, generated and phases shift. 
 
Using GPS signals, it is possible to perform two different types of measurements: 
 Pseudo-range 
 Carrier phase 
 
which have the same geometric content (satellite-receiver distance) but with 
different precision. 
The principle of pseudo-range observations is the measurement of the flight time Δt 
necessary for the satellite signal to reach the receiving station. Knowing the signal 
propagation speed c and measuring Δt, the satellite-receiver distance is given by the 
following relation: 
𝑑 =  𝑐 ∆𝑡      (2.1) 
The phase observations are based on the measurement of the number of cycles 
(phases φ) of the GPS signal necessary for transmission from the satellite to the 
receiver. Known the number of cycles it is possible to calculate the satellite-receiver 
distance: 
d= 
ϕ𝜆
2𝜋
      (2.2) 
where λ is the signal wavelength.  
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2.1.1.2. PSEUDO RANGE MEASUREMENTS 
The pseudo-range measurements are carried out on the carriers modulated by the 
codes and are based on the measurement of the flight time, i.e. the time interval 
between the transmission of the electromagnetic wave sent by the satellite and its 
arrival at the receiver. This measurement is obtained through the correlation of two 
signals: 
- the satellite signal arrived at the receiver 
- the identical signal generated by the receiver 
Once a GPS receiver is turned on, it picks up the signal from the satellites and 
generates the replica, knowing in advance the code that modulates it. These two 
signals are identical but out of phase over time, as the wave transmitted by the 
satellite has already travelled the satellite-receiver distance. 
The receiver is able to move the generated replica over time in order to obtain the 
maximum correlation with the signal transmitted by the satellite. 
The flight time will be nothing more than the displacement to be given to the replica 
to align it with the signal coming from the satellite. 
𝛥𝑡 = 𝑡𝑅 − 𝑡
𝑆     (2.3) 
In the previous equation we must consider the asynchronism of clocks, in fact in the 
GPS measurements there are three time scales: 
- GPS time, that is the atomic time taken as a fundamental reference; 
- the time scale of the satellite (in advance with respect to GPS time), 
determined by the oscillators on board; 
- the time scale of the receiver (in advance of the GPS time), determined 
by the receiver's clock. 
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The non-synchronism between the clocks causes the measured flight time (Δt) to be 
given by the following expression: 
Δ𝑡 = (𝑡𝑅(𝐺𝑃𝑆) − 𝑡𝐺𝑃𝑆
𝑆 ) − 𝛿𝑡𝑅 − 𝛿𝑡
𝑆    (2.4) 
Where: 
- subscript R stands for Receiver 
- subscript S stands for Satellite 
- δtR is the receiver clock offset 
- δtS is the satellite clock offset 
 
 
Figure 2-2 GPS time and satellite and receiver clock offsets 
 
Given the quality of the satellite clocks, all the atomic oscillators of the satellites can 
be considered synchronized with each other. 
The clocks of the receiver, normally quartz, are of inferior quality to those of the 
satellites, so the synchronization error is higher (around 1 ms, i.e. 10-3 s) and 
consequently also the error on the satellite distance- receiver is more than 300 km. 
This value is not acceptable, so it is necessary to estimate it at each epoch, 
introducing, as an additional unknown, the synchronization error of the clocks in the 
observation equation. 
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Taking into account synchronization errors, for each observation period the equation 
of the pseudo-range measurements is: 
𝑃𝑅
𝑆 = 𝑐 ∗ Δ𝑡𝑅
𝑆 = √(𝑋𝑆 − 𝑋𝑅) + (𝑌𝑆 − 𝑌𝑅) + (𝑍𝑆 − 𝑍𝑅) + 𝑐 ∗ (𝛿𝑡
𝑆 − 𝛿𝑡𝑅) = 𝑑𝑅
𝑆 +
𝑐 ∗ (𝛿𝑡𝑆 − 𝛿𝑡𝑅)          (2.5) 
Where: 
- PRS is the pseudo-range between the satellite S and receiver R 
- c is the speed of light 
- Δ tRS is the shift in time between the incoming satellite signal at the 
receiver and its replica. 
- (XS, YS, ZS) and (XR, YR, ZR) = satellite and receiver coordinates in the 
WGS84 reference frame 
- dRS is the direct distance between satellite and receiver 
- δtS is the clock offset between the GPS time and the satellite time 
- δ tR is the clock offset between GPS time and receiver 
 
Eq. (2.5) there are four unknowns, the receiver coordinates (X, Y, Z)R and the total 
clock offset (δtS − δtR), therefore, at least four different measurements (or 
pseudo-ranges) are required in order to compute a position fix. 
The system of equations that solves the mathematical problem can be generally 
expressed as: 
𝑦 = 𝐹(𝑥) + 𝑒      (2.6) 
Where: 
- y is the vector of the measurements 
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- F() is the generic term to define the function that related the 
measurements with the unknowns 
- x is the vector of the unknowns 
- e is the vector of measurement errors 
The last element, the vector of measurement errors, considers other factors, other 
sources of random errors and biases aside from the clock offsets, such as: 
- biases in the orbital parameters 
- atmospheric biases (tropospheric and ionospheric) 
- antenna offset 
- other nominal bias used to include non-Gaussian factors, usually 
introduced as a conservative Gaussian distribution displaced from the 
zero that can over-bound the real distribution. 
A different measurement model, often used in algorithms, that includes some of 
the previous errors can be represented as: 
𝑃𝑅
𝑆 = 𝑐 ⋅ 𝛥𝑡 = 𝑑𝑅
𝑆 + 𝑐 ⋅ (𝛿𝑡𝑆 − 𝛿𝑡𝑅)  + 𝛿𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑚 + 𝛿𝑑𝑛𝑜𝑚 (2.6) 
In which only the atmospheric effects (δdatm) and the nominal bias (δdnom) are 
considered since are the types of error sources always affecting the measurements. 
Additional information about errors can be found in the following sections.  
Eqs. (2.5) are non-linear and need to be inverted in order to find the unknown. The 
system is then linearized through the approximation of the function F(x) as: 
𝐹(𝑥) ≈ 𝐹(𝑥0) + 𝜕𝑥𝑇𝐹(𝑥0)(𝑥 − 𝑥0)   (2.7) 
and Eqs (2.5) become: 
?̂? = 𝐺?̂? + 𝑒      (2.8) 
Where: 
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- G is the geometry matrix given by ∂xTF(x0) 
- ŷ is the vector of incremental observation ∆𝑦 = 𝑦 − 𝑦𝑜 = 𝑦 − 𝐹(𝑥0) 
- x̂ is the vector of the unknown incremental parameters 
- e is the error vector modelled to have a normal distribution N(0,C), 
where C is a diagonal matrix which elements are the standard deviation 
of the observation expressed as: 
𝜎𝑖
𝑗 = √𝜎𝑈𝑅𝐴/𝑈𝑅𝐸
2 + 𝜎𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜
2 + 𝜎𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟2    (2.9) 
Where i is the satellite of the constellation j (GPS, Galileo, GLONASS) and the final 
value of the standard deviation will depend on the final utilization of the matrix C, 
since, as it will be presented in the section related to the ARAIM algorithm, two 
different matrices are computed, one for the integrity requirement and one for the 
accuracy and continuity, that will respectively make use of the User Range Error 
(URE) and User Range Accuracy (URA).  
 
2.1.1.3. CARRIER PHASE MEASUREMENTS 
The satellite-receiver distance can also be determined with phase measurements on 
the demodulated L1 and L2 carriers. The observation consists of the difference 
between the received carrier wave phase and the phase of a reference wave 
generated by the receiver at the instant of reception. 
By turning on a receiver at a certain time t0, a fraction of the phase φ is measured, 
indicated as Fr(φ, t0), given by the difference between the carrier transmitted by the 
satellite and the replica generated by the receiver, and a counter of whole cycles of 
phase, indicated as Int (φ, t0), which is incremented each time the fraction of the 
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phase changes from 2π to 0. This counter takes into account the relative motion 
between satellite and receiver. 
At a given epoch, the observation of phase φ consists therefore in the sum of the 
fractional phase and the count of the whole cycles: 
𝜙𝑚𝑖𝑠(𝑡) = 𝐹𝑟(𝜙, 𝑡0) + 𝐼𝑛𝑡(𝜙, 𝑡0, 𝑡)    (2.10) 
However, the number of integer cycles 𝑁𝑅
𝑆(𝑡0)  covering the satellite-receiver 
distance is not known. 
This unknown factor is called phase ambiguity. The total phase at a generic instant of 
time t is therefore: 
𝜙𝑡𝑜𝑡(𝑡) = 𝜙𝑚𝑖𝑠(𝑡) + 𝑁𝑅
𝑆(𝑡0) = 𝐹𝑟(𝜙, 𝑡0) + 𝐼𝑛𝑡(𝜙, 𝑡0, 𝑡) + 𝑁𝑅
𝑆(𝑡0) (2.11) 
 
Figure 2-3 Variation of the initial ambiguity 
 
The phase is then measured less than integer multiples of the cycle, like reading a 
clock in which only the second hand is working (the time read is without the minutes 
and hours). 
The satellite-receiver distance is given by the product of the number of carrier cycles 
for its wavelength: 
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dR
S = λϕtot(t) = λ Fr(ϕ, t0) + λ Int(ϕ, t0, t) + λ NR
S(t0)  (2.12) 
 
Taking into account the offsets of the receiver and satellite clocks, it is possible to 
write the observation equation for phase measurements at the time t as: 
𝜙𝑅
𝑆(𝑡) = −
𝑓
𝑐
 𝑑𝑅
𝑆 − 𝑓(𝛿𝑡𝑅 − 𝛿𝑡
𝑆) + NR
S(t0)   (2.13) 
Where: 
- 𝜙𝑅
𝑆(𝑡) is the phase at the time t 
- 
𝑓
𝑐
 is the ratio between the frequency f and the propagation speed of the 
wave  
- 𝑑𝑅
𝑆   is the satellite-receiver distance 
- δtS is the clock offset between the GPS time and the satellite time 
- δ tR is the clock offset between GPS time and receiver 
- NR
S(t0)  is the integer part of the phase ambiguity that is equal to the 
number of cycles incurred from the signal departure from satellite S to 
reception in receiver R at time t0. 
In the calculation of the unknowns of phase measurements, in addition to the 
geocentric Cartesian coordinates of the receiver, it is necessary to introduce also the 
initial ambiguity NR
S(t0) for each satellite which signal has been received. Because of 
these additional unknowns, phase measurements cannot be used alone for absolute 
positioning in real time. 
As long as the phase is received without interruption, for each observation session 
there is only one unknown ambiguity for each satellite-receiver pair. Having available 
observations related to different periods, it is possible to determine the value of 
NR
S(t0). 
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Whenever the receiver loses signal reception, the count of the number of whole 
cycles is renamed and a new unknown must be introduced, which takes into account 
the number of whole cycles covering the signal reception gap. This cycle jump is called 
cycle slip and is given by the difference: 
NR
S(ti+1) − NR
S(ti) ≠ 0    (2.14) 
Cycle slips are mainly determined by the following causes: 
- signal obstructions due to trees, buildings, low elevation of the satellites 
etc ... 
- low signal-to-noise ratio due to "bad atmospheric conditions" 
(ionosphere), multiple reflections of the signal 
- Oscillator malfunctions 
The phase measurements are therefore more precise than those of the pseudo-
range, but given a single receiver, they cannot be used for real-time positioning. If we 
compare the pseudo-range observation equations and the phase expressed in units 
of distance, we can make the following observations: 
A. they contain the same geometric content, i.e. the satellite-receiver 
distance (in the expression 𝑑𝑅
𝑆  the coordinates (X, Y, Z)R of the receiver 
are contained, i.e. the unknowns of the problem); 
B. the phase measurements contain an extra unknown, i.e. the phase 
ambiguity NR
S . 
To summarise, the mathematical model of the two different measurements can be 
expressed as 
C. Pseudorange: 
𝑃𝑅
𝑆 = 𝑑𝑅
𝑆 + 𝑐 ∗ (𝛿𝑡𝑆 − 𝛿𝑡𝑅)                       (2.15) 
D. Carrier Phase: 
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𝜆𝜙𝑅
𝑆(𝑡) = 𝑑𝑅
𝑆 − 𝑐 ∗ (𝛿𝑡𝑅 − 𝛿𝑡
𝑆) + 𝜆NR
S(t0)       (2.16) 
 
2.1.1.4. MEASUREMENT ERRORS 
As mentioned in the previous section, measurements are or might be affected by 
several error sources: 
- Pure instrumental biases. There is an empirical method to evaluate this 
type of error, depending on the technique used for the transmitted 
signal, that the error is 1-2% of the wavelength: 
 C/A code:  𝜎 ≅ 3 − 6𝑚 
 P (precision) code: 𝜎 ≅ 30 − 60𝑐𝑚 
 Carrier: 𝜎 ≅ 2 − 4𝑚𝑚 
- Systematic or model errors (biases) 
- Observation errors 
- Elaboration errors 
 
The following model errors are common to pseudo-range and phase measurements: 
• orbit biases 
• atmospheric biases (signal curvature, ionospheric biases, and tropospheric biases) 
•biases of clocks, due to the asynchronousness between atomic clocks, as discussed 
in the paragraph on pseudo-range measurements 
Characteristic only of phase measurements are: 
• biases of the ambiguity of the carriers 
• modelling of the antenna phase centre 
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A. ORBIT ERRORS 
The GPS positioning is based on the knowledge of the ephemeris of the satellites, 
from which their positions are derived. 
The ephemerides of the satellites are contained in the GNSS signal through the 
message. These ephemerides are called transmitted or broadcast and have been 
calculated by the master station based on observations collected previously, they are 
therefore predicted. The aforementioned ephemerides have a precision of the order 
of a few tens of meters. 
Since 1992, the Precise ephemerides, calculated by the IGS (International GNSS 
Service), are available on the basis of the observations 24/7 coming from a network 
of GNSS stations, distributed over the entire surface of the land. Given a generic day 
X, at least a week is required before the exact ephemerides are available for free via 
the Internet, as they derive from GPS observations made on the same day X. For this 
reason, the exact ephemerides cannot be used for real-time positioning. Their 
precision is of the order of some tens of centimetres; there are however less precise 
solutions (called Ultra-rapid and Rapid), but available in shorter times (even after a 
day). 
 
B. ATMOSPHERIC BIASES 
Atmospheric biases are due to the propagation of the signal through the atmosphere. 
The distance between satellite and receiver, measured with electromagnetic signals, 
differs from the straight geometric distance due to three atmospheric phenomena: 
1) curvature of the signal 
2) ionospheric bias 
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3) tropospheric bias 
 
In the observation equations, both of pseudo-range and carrier phase, the distance 
is considered rectilinear, while in reality it is not, so it is necessary to make 
appropriate corrections to the measured distance. 
 
1) Refraction errors 
Fermat's principle states that an electromagnetic wave in going from one point to 
another follows a curve that minimizes flight time. The path followed by the signal is 
defined by the integral: 
𝑠 =  ∫ 𝑛 ⋅  𝑑𝑠     (2.17) 
where it integrates along the entire signal path. 
If the signal propagates in the vacuum (n = 1), s would be equal to the geometric 
distance s0 measured along the straight line that connects the satellite to the 
receiver. 
𝑠0  =  ∫ 𝑑𝑠0     (2.18) 
The difference between s0 and s, calculated along the real path of the 
electromagnetic wave, gives the error due to the curvature of the electromagnetic 
signal. 
The effect of the curvature depends on the angle of elevation of the satellite, as 
shown in Table 2-1, and as it is very small for angles of above elevation of 15 ° -20 
and for this reason it can be neglected. 
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Table 2-1 Effect of the curvature when the elevation angle changes 
Elevation 
angle (°) 
(s-s0) 
(m) 
0 3.200 
2 0.415 
5 0.075 
10 0.019 
15 0.009 
20 0.005 
30 0.002 
40 0.001 
70 0.000 
 
2) Ionospheric biases 
The ionosphere is the part of the atmosphere that extends approximately between 
50 and 100 km of altitude, in which the ultraviolet solar radiation from the Sun causes 
the dissociation and ionization of the gaseous molecules present, determining a layer 
of free electrons. 
At the frequencies of the GNSS signal, the ionosphere is a dispersive medium, so that 
the electromagnetic waves of the GNSS signal that propagate in it have the speed 
that depends on their frequency. The dispersivity of a medium is determined by the 
interaction between the external field of the wave and the field of the electrically 
charged medium (in this case the ionosphere), due to the presence of dipole 
moments induced in the molecules and free electrons. When the atomic frequency 
of the medium and the frequency of the penetrating wave are close, we are 
witnessing the phenomenon of resonance, which generates the dependence of the 
propagation velocity from the wave frequency. 
The ionospheric bias is defined, respectively, for the pseudo-range and phase 
measurements, as follows: 
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𝛿𝑑𝑃
𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝑠 − 𝑠0 =
𝐶
𝑓2
∫𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑠    (2.19) 
𝛿𝑑𝜑
𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝑠 − 𝑠0 = −
𝐶
𝑓2
∫𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑠   (2.20) 
 
where: 
- C = 40.3 is a coefficient that contains all the constant parameters. 
- f is the frequency; 
- ne is the density of the electrons in the ionosphere expressed in 
[electrons / m³]; 
Eqs. (2.19) and (2.20) can be expressed as follow, for further details please refer to 
the material provided by IERS (2010): 
𝛿𝑑𝑃
𝑖𝑜𝑛 =
𝑠1
𝑓2
+
𝑠2
𝑓3
+
𝑠3
𝑓4
    (2.21) 
𝛿𝑑𝜑
𝑖𝑜𝑛 = −
𝑠1
𝑓2
−
𝑠2
𝑓3
−
𝑠3
𝑓4
   (2.22) 
Where 
- s1, s2 and s3 are the coefficients of the Ionospheric delay up to the third 
order that depend on ne, the magnetic field B and θ, the angle between 
the magnetic field B and the electromagnetic (EM) propagation 
Eqs. 2.21 and 2.22 show that the magnitude of the ionospheric disturbance is the 
same for both phase and code observations, but the effect is different: 
- the ionospheric delay on the code pseudorange is positive, associated to 
a decrease of the EM signal group velocity in the transionospheric 
propagation. 
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-  the ionospheric delay on the carrier phase is negative, indicating an 
increase of the phase velocity of the EM transionospheric signal 
propagation 
The delay, or the anticipation, suffered by the signal depends on the electronic 
density, for which it is difficult to find a satisfactory model able to take into account 
its variations over time. The concentration of free electrons in the ionosphere is 
strongly correlated to the altitude and, above all, to the activity of sunspots, 
therefore it presents seasonal and daily variations. 
The most effective method for reducing ionospheric influence is the use of signals 
with different frequencies. Combining simultaneous measurements with different 
frequencies allows to cancel the ionospheric effects up to order k − 1, where k is the 
number of different frequencies. 
An example is the combination of the L1 and L2 frequencies of the GPS system, which 
allows removing the first order term of the ionospheric delay, which accounts for 
more than 99.9% of the total delay, through a technique called ionospheric-free 
combination of observables:  
𝐿𝐶𝑃 =
𝑓1
2
𝑓1
2−𝑓2
2 𝑑𝑃1 −
𝑓2
2
𝑓1
2−𝑓2
2 𝑑𝑃2   (2.23) 
𝐿𝐶𝜑 =
𝑓1
2
𝑓1
2−𝑓2
2 𝑑𝜑1 −
𝑓2
2
𝑓1
2−𝑓2
2 𝑑𝜑2  (2.24) 
Where: 
- dPi and dϕi are the Pseudo-range and carrier phase observables from the 
two frequencies. 
This technique is implemented in the ARAIM technique that is going to be presented 
in the next chapter and that is used in this research. 
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And in the future, with Galileo and modernized GPS systems (broadcasting at three 
frequencies), the full correction can be extended to second order ionospheric terms 
too. 
3) Tropospheric biases 
The troposphere is the band of the atmosphere closest to the earth's surface. It 
contains 90% of the atmospheric mass and 75% of water vapour, which involves a 
pronounced refractivity and diffusion of the electromagnetic waves that propagate 
there. Above 30 km of altitude, the density of neutral atmospheric components is 
considerably reduced, so much so that the aforementioned phenomena can be 
neglected. In atmospheric gases, the refractivity is due to a displacement in the 
distribution of the constituents of the gases and therefore to the alignment of the 
polar molecules with the magnetic and electric field that propagates there. The major 
constituents of the atmosphere are electrically polar molecules, while the only 
important molecule presenting a magnetic moment is CO2. 
The effect of the neutral atmosphere on wave propagation is less than that 
introduced by the ionosphere, however, it creates more problems for two main 
reasons. 
First, the troposphere is not a dispersive means of radio waves up to frequencies of 
15 GHz, so there is no advantage in using two frequencies because the propagation 
of waves is independent of frequency. Secondly, there can be identified two 
components, a "dry", given by the molecules in which there is not a moment of 
permanent dipole, and a "wet", given by the water vapour. The water vapour has a 
polar nature, due to the great electronic affinity of the oxygen atom, which attracts 
the electrons to complete the orbital p at the second level of energy, thus inducing 
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an asymmetry in the electronic cloud, then a dipole that will oscillate under the effect 
of electromagnetic waves. 
The effect of the dry component can be modelled knowing the pressure on the 
surface, while the effect of the wet component depends on the atmospheric 
conditions along the entire path travelled by the signal, and these are not necessarily 
related to the conditions on the Earth's surface, but time and in space. In stable 
weather conditions, the water vapour content shows a regional correlation over 
horizontal distances of up to 30 km. 
In the case of longer baselines or less favourable weather conditions, the disturbance 
can be minimized by using standard models of the vertical refractive profile (e.g. 
Saastamoinen or Hopfield), using a standard atmosphere, or using meteorological 
data taken on the surface, or even by restoring the parameters. 
There is also a stochastic method, in which the contribution of the troposphere is 
estimated indirectly by looking at the difference between the experimental and 
theoretical data, and then minimizing it through the parameters that have been 
introduced. It is also possible to use strategies other than modelling, for example 
using water vapour radiometers, which observe the sky, allowing the determination 
of the water vapour content, thus giving a direct measure. 
It has been observed that signals from satellites that are low on the horizon are more 
delayed than those coming from higher satellites, so a stratagem commonly used to 
minimize atmospheric problems is to fix a cutting angle is to use only observations 
from satellites at an elevation angle greater than 10 - 15 degrees. 
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C. ANTENNA PHASE CENTRE 
The satellite-receiver distance measured with the GNSS has as its initial and final 
point the phase centres of the antennas, which are not precise geometric or 
mechanical points, but electromagnetic points, which vary both in function of the 
elevation and the azimuth of the satellites (point B in the figure below), that of the 
signal frequency, whereby the phase centre of the carrier L1 is different from that of 
the carrier L2. 
For each antenna the middle position of the phase centre is provided with respect to 
an established antenna point (point A in the figure), generally the point where the 
antenna is screwed to the antenna holder (ARP). 
 
Figure 2-4 Section of a receiver antenna and phase centres 
 
D. OBSERVATION ERRORS 
The observation errors common to the pseudo-phase and phase observations are as 
follows: 
1) Multipath 
2) Cycle slips 
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1) Multipath 
The GNSS signal does not always follow the direct satellite-receiver path, as during 
its journey it can undergo the phenomenon of multiple reflections by surfaces 
surrounding the antenna (metallic, water surfaces, buildings). In this case, the signal 
travels a distance longer than a few centimetres or becomes unrecognizable, thus 
increasing the signal/noise ratio of the observations. 
If the GNSS antenna is not moved, this effect repeats with the same characteristics 
until the satellite configuration changes, so by repeating the observation on 
consecutive days it is possible to determine its effects. 
To minimize the multipath effect, especially in precision positioning, appropriate 
antennas, such as choke-ring antennas, should be used, namely circular antennas 
formed by concentric rings spaced apart to reduce multipath, or antennas covered 
with appropriate materials. 
 
Figure 2-5 Example of Multipath 
2) Cycle slips 
The interruption in the acquisition of data due, for example, to the presence of 
obstacles along the path of the signal generates a jump in the count of the number 
of whole cycles, called cycle slip. 
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During data processing, there are various techniques, such as the differentiation of 
observations, the use of combinations of carriers, which allow to "repair" the cycle 
jumps. In cases where these jumps are too large, a new unknown is introduced, 
analogous to the initial phase ambiguity. 
 
E. SATELLITE GEOMETRY 
The position and the number of satellites vary continuously due to the orbital 
trajectories, generating various configurations more or less favourable. 
To measure the quality of the geometric configuration of the satellites, specific 
parameters have been defined, called DOP parameters that constitute an index of 
decrease in precision (the smaller the better). 
The DOP value is inversely proportional to the volume of the figure that is created by 
joining the centre of the antenna to the satellites being registered. 
When the satellites are 4, the figure is like an inverted pyramid (the more the 
satellites are distant from each other, the larger the volume of the figure will be and 
the lower the DOP value). 
 
Figure 2-6 Example of optimal (left) and not optimal (right) satellite geometry 
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There are several DOPs in relation to the type of coordinates: 
• PDOP: index of precision decrease in the three-dimensional determination of the 
point (X; Y; Z); 
• HDOP: index of precision decrease in the planimetric determination of the point (X, 
Y); 
• VDOP: index of precision decrease in the altimetric determination of the point (Z); 
• TDOP: index of precision decrease in the determination of the time. 
The PDOP and TDOP value combination are called GDOP (precision decrease in 
volumetric determination and time): 
𝐺𝐷𝑂𝑃 = √𝑃𝐷𝑂𝑃2 + 𝑇𝐷𝑂𝑃2   (2.25) 
The precision with which the points are defined with the GNSS depends on: 
1) Geometric configuration and number of satellites; 
2) Accuracy with which the receiver-satellite distance was measured. 
The level of precision that can be achieved in the positioning of points is linked to the 
number of satellites participating in the measurement session and their dislocation 
in the sky. 
As already mentioned, the smaller the value of the PDOP index the more accurate 
the observations will be; in any case it must not exceed the value of 7. 
 
Based on the error sources presented in the previous sections, the equation for the 
Pseudo-range and Carrier Phase observables can be written in a more complete form: 
- Pseudo-range:  
𝑃𝑅
𝑆 = 𝑐 ⋅ 𝛥𝑡 = 𝑑𝑅
𝑆 + 𝑐 ⋅ (𝛿𝑡𝑆 − 𝛿𝑡𝑅)  + 𝛿𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛿𝑑𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝 + 𝛿𝑑𝑜𝑟𝑏 + 𝛿𝑑𝑃𝐶𝑉 + 𝛿𝑑𝑚𝑢𝑙  
(2.26) 
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- Carrier Phase: 
 Φ𝑅
𝑆 = λ ⋅ ϕmis = 𝑑𝑅
𝑆 + 𝑐 ⋅ (𝛿𝑡𝑆 − 𝛿𝑡𝑅) + 𝑁𝑅
𝑆  + 𝛿𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛿𝑑𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝 + 𝛿𝑑𝑜𝑟𝑏 +
𝛿𝑑𝑃𝐶𝑉 + 𝛿𝑑𝑚𝑢𝑙       (2.27) 
 
2.1.2. GNSS FOR CIVIL AVIATION USE 
 
In 2003 the Imperial College Consultant Limited performed a study  for the Civil 
Aviation Authority (CAA) related to the level of safety that GPS could provide as main 
navigation system for civil aviation, since the interest for air travel worldwide was 
growing at a fast rate, exceeding the predictions, but this increment wasn’t matched 
by availability of capacity (CAA-Paper, 2003). An issue that the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO) already observed in the 80’s, highlighting that the air 
traffic control (ATC) systems wouldn’t have had the capability of managing this 
sudden growth in demand, instituting the Special Committee on Future Air 
Navigation Service (FANS) to analyse and design advanced navigation systems for civil 
aviation.  
For decades, inertial systems or radio navigation has been used as main navigation 
systems; in particular, radio navigation aids are used in commercial aviation, using 
visual cues or RF-based guidance systems for final approach and landing, such as VHF 
Omni-directional Radio Range (VOR), Distance Measuring Equipment (DME) or 
Instrumental Landing System (ILS). However, the maintenance and calibration 
needed to ensure continuous availability are the main drawbacks of these systems. 
The implementation of GNSS-based air navigation could reduce some of these 
disadvantages, allowing the introduction of curved or steep approaches for optimal 
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noise abatement as described by  Lüken et al. (2008), remarkably diminishing costs 
of ground systems and additionally improving airspace capacity, favouring smaller 
airports that could increase their traffic.  
In 2008, European organizations already started to address these challenges resulting 
in the definition of a collaborative project, named SESAR, to modernize the European 
airspace and air traffic management (ATM) (EC, 2004). The project aims to develop a 
new generation of technological system and components that will guarantee high-
performance air transport activities in the European skies. Satellite navigation is going 
to play an important role in overhaul and the operational, technical, economic and 
legal objectives of the use of multi-constellation and multi-frequency GNSS for 
Navigation applications in civil aviation are presented by EUROCONTROL (2008). A 
similar concept is getting implemented in the U.S., called Next Generation Air 
Transportation System (NextGen) (FAA, 2012). Both projects will enhance civil 
aviation capabilities and bring significant operational benefits, supporting the 
stringent requirements that will be needed by the new applications and operation 
expected in the near future. 
However, in the so-called Required Navigation Performance (RNP, see following 
sections for further details), a concept for civil aviation approved and explained in 
ICAO (1999) and  (2000), poses stringent requirements that GNSS requires to meet if 
meant to be used as the main navigation system for aviation. Accuracy, integrity, 
continuity of service and availability are the four parameters that are defined in the 
RNP for each phase of flight, described in the regulation as: 
a) Accuracy: this is the basic requirement for a navigation system and it is 
defined as the degree of conformance between an estimated or measured 
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value and its reference value, a true value or some agreed-upon standard 
value. More specifically, the accuracy is measured as the size of the bias or 
systematic error given by the difference between the mean value and the 
reference value. In GNSS the requirement is defined as the value aac for which 
95% of the positions calculated have an error equal or lower to that value: 
b) Integrity: it relates to the trustworthiness of the information provided by the 
navigation system and includes the ability of the navigation system to detect 
and warn in time the user (within a given period defined as time-to-alert, TTA) 
when some system anomaly results in unacceptable navigation accuracy.  
Integrity risk, or probability of hazardous misleading information P(HMI), is 
the probability that the navigation position error exceeds the alert limit and 
that event is not detected. There are two types of loss of integrity, when a 
fault is not detected or when the detection occurs, but the system fails to alert 
the user within the required TTA. 
c) Continuity: it is defined as the capability of the system to perform its function 
of providing a navigation output with the specified level of accuracy and 
integrity without non-scheduled interruptions during the intended period of 
operation, assuming that navigation accuracy and integrity are provided at 
the start of the operation. 
d) Availability: it is the percentage of time during which the navigation system 
is available for use, considering all the outages, and provides to the user 
reliable information (a reliable information must meet the accuracy, integrity 
and continuity specifications). 
In Table 2-2,  the RNP for the different flight phases are summarised: 
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Table 2-2 GNSS Aviation Operational Performance Requirements (CAA-Paper, 
2003). 
Operation 
Accuracy 
95% 
Integrity 
Continuity 
(1-risk) 
Availability 
  
Integrity 
(1-risk) 
Alert 
Limit 
Time-
to-
Alert 
  
Oceanic 12.4 nmi 1-10-7/hr 
12.4 
nmi 
2 min 1-10-5/hr 
0.99 to 
0.99999 
En-route 2.0 nmi 1-10-7/hr 2.0 nmi 1 min 1-10-5/hr 
0.99 to 
0.99999 
Terminal 0.4 nmi 1-10-7/hr 1.0 nmi 
30 
secs 
1-10-5/hr 
0.99 to 
0.99999 
NPA 220 m 1-10-7/hr 0.3 nmi 
10 
secs 
1-10-5/hr 
0.99 to 
0.99999 
APV I 
220 m (H) 
20 m (V) 
1-2x10-7/ 
approach 
0.3 nmi 
(H) 
50m (V) 
10 
secs 
1-8x10-6/ 15 
secs 
0.99 to 
0.99999 
APV II 
16 m (H) 
8 m (V) 
1-2x10-7/ 
approach 
40 m 
(H) 
20 m 
(V) 
6 sec 
1-8x10-6/ 15 
secs 
0.99 to 
0.99999 
CAT I 
16 m (H) 
4.0 to 6.0 
m (V) 
1-2x10-7/ 
approach 
40 m 
(H) 
10-15 m 
(V) 
6 sec 
1-8x10-6/ 15 
secs 
0.99 to 
0.99999 
CAT II 
6.9 m (H) 
2.0 m (V) 
1-10-9/15 
sec. 
17.3 m 
(H) 
5.3 m 
(V) 
1 sec 
1-4x10-6/ 15 
secs 
0.99 to 
0.99999 
CAT III 
6.2 m (H) 
2.0 m (V) 
1-10-9/15 
sec. 
15.5 m 
(H) 
5.3 m 
(V) 
1 sec 
1-2x10-6/ 30 
sec (H) 
1-2x10-6/ 15 
sec (V) 
0.99 to 
0.99999 
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The addition of sources of position information, in forms of new or betters signal, 
better geometry or removal of failure modes, benefits both the accuracy and integrity 
of the system. In section 2.2, few examples of sources are presented of which design 
and quality determine the level of improvement in the integrity performance 
necessary to satisfy the requirement, however defining their costs as well. Kovach 
(1998)  considers continuity as the most difficult parameter to satisfy and so the 
major driver of the costs, determined by the failure rate of the satellite hardware. He 
states that two options are possible: 
1) Use much more reliable components. 
2) Increase the number of satellites, that helps to improve at the user level 
the capability of detecting and excluding the erroneous data. 
Each parameter represents and covers the risk of events that could lead to 
unreasonable error in the estimated position: 
a) Accuracy: risk of a system error that could generate a position failure 
b) Integrity: risk of a latent system failure 
c) Continuity: risk of an unexpected loss of the capability of providing a position 
fix determined by a failure detection 
d) Availability: risk that the requirements of the other three parameters are 
expected to not be satisfied during a specific operation 
However, the four parameters are tightly correlated and a navigation algorithm 
cannot be simply optimised with respect to a specific parameter. 
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 INTEGRITY MONITORING AND PREDICTION 
 
The overall objective of the integrity monitoring is to evaluate the state of the system 
and its safe use through the quantification of the possibility of using data affected by 
errors. Ober (2003) provides a detailed explanation and description of the integrity 
monitoring concept and this section tries to provide a basic understanding of some 
of the described notions. In his thesis, he states that a system is safe to use when: 
1) It is physically in good shape 
2) It operates correctly within its specifications 
3) It is trustworthy 
The first condition is not sufficient to guarantee the safe use of the collected data, 
while it is a required condition for the second and third ones. The correct operation 
of the system within its specifications is a sufficient condition for its trustworthiness, 
however, is not a necessary condition since the system can still be trustworthy 
outside the area of specification but it must not be used by definition (subsystems 
usually monitor and alert the users in this case). For the previous reasons, 
trustworthiness is considered the best choice as “loose” definition of integrity for 
navigation systems (Ober, 2003). 
Integrity has been recognised as key safety parameter within the RNP and its 
definition can be associated with the following parameters: 
- Alert Limit: it is the maximum error tolerance, above which an alert 
needs to be raised  
- Time to Alert (TTA): maximum allowed time between the detection of an 
integrity event and the warning to the user. 
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- Integrity Risk: Probability of exceeding the alert limit. 
- Protection level: Statistical bound derived from the Integrity Risk. In 
navigation, it is usually divided in Vertical and Horizontal Protection 
Levels (VPL and HPL) that together define the region within which the 
true position is expected to be contained (Figure 2-7).  
 
Figure 2-7 Integrity Protection Levels. 
 
Integrity events can be divided into different categories depending on the values 
assumed by the position error (PE), protection level (PL) and alert limit (AL), described 
in the Stanford Diagram in Figure 2-8: 
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Figure 2-8 Integrity events as defined in the Stanford Diagram (Ober, 2003). 
 
The diagram characterises two different regions, above the diagonal line, in which 
the PL succeeds in covering the PE, and below the line, in which the PL fails in covering 
the PE, for a total of four main events: 
- the system is in nominal operation when the PE is smaller than the PL 
that is in turn smaller than the AL 
- the system is unavailable when the PL is higher than AL, in this case the 
system raises an alert to the user that must not use it. 
- Misleading operations when PE is higher than PL. In this case, since the 
position error cannot be measured, the system does not generate an 
alert and the information provided might not correspond to the real 
status, therefore possibly providing misleading information on the true 
position. In this situation, the system shouldn’t be used but no alert is 
provided to the user. 
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- Hazardously Misleading Information when the PE exceeds not only the 
PL, but also the AL, leading to a possibly dangerous situation. Also in this 
case, the system does not provide any alert and it is considered available.  
The last two events are defined Integrity Failures, when an event lasts longer than 
the TTA without providing an alert and they are the most critical situation due to the 
fact that the system is considered available while the position errors exceed the 
requirements, possibly leading to a hazardous situation. 
For the above reasons, the real-time monitoring of the integrity performance 
parameters is an important but, at the same time, very challenging task. 
However, real-time monitoring is often supported and complemented by 
performance prediction, a different task based on models and conservative 
assumptions that could bring two advantages: 
- Prediction of the expected performances of the system.  
- Prediction of the expected performances during a future operation. 
Both the outcomes rely on the models used for the measurements and position-
estimation algorithm. 
This research focuses on the second advantage, demonstrating how the prediction 
capability of ARAIM algorithm can be implemented and used in the future of the 
aviation, integrating effects in the models that could consistently affect the 
performances of the system. 
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 REVIEW OF CURRENT INTEGRITY MONITORING TECHNIQUES  
 
As mentioned in the previous sections, integrity is a safety-critical parameter in GNSS 
applications, usually expressed in terms of ‘maximum deviation from the true 
position, given a certain amount of probability, that indicates the level of 
trustworthiness of the position solution provided by the system’ (InsideGNSS, 2013), 
an information that must be timely delivered to users to avoid hazardous situations. 
There are three different methods that provide integrity, for further details the 
reader can refer to the text by Hofmann-Wellenhof et al. (2008). One method is the 
Space-Based Augmentation System (SBAS), a network of monitoring stations, which 
positions are well-defined, that covers the area of interest and is connected to a 
master control station that elaborates the errors that affect the position estimate to 
compute the corrections that uplinks to a geostationary satellite from where they are 
distributed to users. Examples of implemented SBASs are the U.S. Wide Area 
Augmentation System (WAAS) the covers most of the countries in North America, the 
European GNSS Navigation Overlay System (EGNOS) for the European continent, the 
Multi-Functional Satellite Augmentation System (MSAS) in Japan and the GPS Aided 
Geo Augmented Navigation (GAGAN) in India, while Russia is realising a WAAS-
compatible SBAS called System for Differential Corrections and Monitoring (SDCM). 
SBAS integrity message improves the accuracy of the position estimation from five to 
less than one meter and additionally the updated rate of the message is sufficiently 
small to satisfy the time-to-alert (TTA) requirement (e.g. it is six seconds for LPV-200 
approach). SBAS supports a wide range of operations, from en-route to terminal area 
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navigation, non-precision approach and vertically aided approaches down to LPV-
200.  
A second method is the Ground-Based Augmentation System (GBAS), in which 
ground monitoring stations are placed near the airports and transmit correction 
message directly to the users through RF links. The corrections are computed as the 
difference between the accurate and well-known position of the station against the 
position provided GNSS receivers placed in proximity to the station. GBAS accuracy 
level reaches values lower that one meter, with an update rate of the message of 0.5 
seconds, allowing it to satisfy the TTA for every type of precision approach.  
SBAS and GBAS are very powerful systems, their capabilities include a high 
computational power that allows them to satisfy the stringent requirements of the 
most demanding approach procedure, in particular, the TTA. At the same time, the 
TTA requirement of providing timely warning to the users (down to few seconds) and 
the related computational power drive the architecture of these system making them 
very complex and expensive facilities. 
A third way is to integrate the integrity function at the user’s equipment level, called 
Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM). This method is based on a self-
consistency check of the received measurements and its efficiency is totally 
dependent on the redundancy of information. The history, development and 
evolution of RAIM algorithms will be further analysed in the next section since they 
are the basis of this research project. 
These three systems, SBAS, GBAS, and RAIM, have all the capability of monitoring the 
integrity of the information provided by the GNSS, however, their level of 
performances differ considerably.  
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Nowadays, GBAS is the only system that meets the requirements for the most 
demanding approach categories (down to CAT-III), but this system is rarely enforced 
in airports, due to the higher level of complexity of the ground infrastructure that the 
other systems do not have (e.g. an SBAS station might cover more than one airport). 
Additionally, SBAS systems are developing new capabilities that will bring them to 
support the integrity function for a new type of approach, named LPV-200 that 
provides vertical guidance down to a decision height of 200 feet. 
Instead, RAIM algorithms are only certified as auxiliary navigation in some phases of 
the flight (such as en-route and terminal area) and for lateral guidance during 
approach (LNAV), as stated in FAA (2007a), satisfying the minimum operational 
performance standards for global positioning system/satellite-based augmentation 
system for airborne equipment  (RTCA/DO-229D, 2006). 
However, the development and renewal of GNSS constellations being deployed and 
the implementation of dual-frequency signals will increase the quantity and type of 
signals used in positioning systems, opening the way to new capabilities, such as 
upgraded versions of SBAS as well as improved RAIM algorithms (Speidel et al., 2013). 
 
  RAIM AND ARAIM LITERATURE REVIEW AND DESCRIPTION 
 
2.4.1. RECEIVER AUTONOMOUS INTEGRITY MONITORING (RAIM) LITERATURE 
REVIEW 
RAIM techniques are based on a statistical detection theory that allows answering to 
two fundamental hypothesis-testing questions: 
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a) Has a failure occurred? 
b) Which satellite is affected? (one of the main hypothesis of RAIM is that there 
can be only one affected measurement per epoch)  
If the GNSS integrity monitoring system is used as an auxiliary navigation system, it is 
sufficient to answer to only the first question, since it is supposed that it possible to 
switch to the complementary system in case of a detected failure. Instead, if GNSS is 
the main and only system, the second question is required to be addressed and 
answered, because the faulty measurement and the related satellite must be 
identified and excluded from the computation, in this way the aircraft can proceed 
safely with an uncontaminated GNSS solution. However, the identification of the 
faulty satellite is far more trivial than simply determine that a fault is occurred and a 
good number of redundant measurements might be necessary. 
To estimate the aircraft position, four satellites are necessary in order to compute 
the unknowns of the system, three for the user location and one for the user clock 
offset; However, to implement the fault detection, at least five measurements are 
needed and six or more to identify the satellite and to isolate/exclude it. Groves, 
(2013a) lists four techniques for faults detection and correction: 
- Fault Detection (FD) simply detects a fault and warns the user. 
- Fault Detection and Recovery (FDR) detects when the fault has occurred and 
attempts to recover the navigation solution. 
- Fault Detection and Isolation (FDI) detects and identify the faulty 
measurement and removes it from the navigation solution. 
- Fault Detection and Exclusion (FDE) detects and identify the faulty satellite 
and removes it from the computation of the navigation solution until the 
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ground segment clear it or if the following satellite measurements, after a 
predefined time, pass a consistency check test. 
Generally, modern RAIM algorithms include the following functions: 
1. Detection of faulty satellites (and exclusion/isolation/ recovery depending on 
the technique implemented, as described in the previous paragraph): 
- Using a discriminator called test statistics and knowing enough about the 
likely noises in the system and their interaction with the test statistic, the 
relationship between the test statistic and the faulty measurement can be 
statistically described.  
- Establishing the fault-free limit, called detection threshold, typically based on 
the false alert probability specified for that particular application. The fault-
free limit is rarely exceeded by the observed test statistic if no faults are 
present. 
- Comparing the test statistic with the detection threshold and declare that the 
fault is present if the test statistic exceeds the limit. 
- If a fault is detected, attempt exclusion 
2. Compute the Horizontal and Vertical Protection Levels (HPL and VPL) defined 
as the minimum position errors (HPE and VPE) that have to be detected with 
the required probabilities of false alert and missed detection.  This function is 
also called RAIM availability and this research focuses on this specific function, 
demonstrating how the prediction capability of ARAIM algorithm can be 
implemented and used in the future of the aviation, integrating effects in the 
models that could consistently affect the performances of the system. 
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The development of RAIM techniques started in the latter half of the 1980s, with the 
term of “self-contained” methods and the acronym RAIM appeared for the first time 
in 1987 in an article published by Kalafus (1987) and then officially recognised from 
the aviation community. 
Two different approaches to RAIM were presented at the ION meeting 1986: 
a) Recursive Scheme: typically a Kalman filter, in which both past and present 
measurements are used to compute the solution and the fault detection 
function is performed by monitoring the innovations. Additional information 
can be found in the article published by Brown and Hwang (1986). 
b) Snapshot Scheme: it only uses redundant measurements for the self-
consistency check. Please refer to Lee (1986) for further details. 
The former gives more accurate position estimation and is used to detect rapidly 
growing measurement errors, but it fails to catch slowly growing errors (soft failures 
or ramp type). Conversely, the snapshot scheme has the advantages of detecting soft 
failures and not making hypotheses on how the system reached its current state. 
 Perepetchai (2000) combines the two schemes using the output of the recursive 
scheme in the snapshot in order to improve the fault detection. 
Afterwards, the snapshot scheme has gained more acceptance that the other and 
several methods have been developed: 
1) Range Comparison Method. Described by Lee (1986), this method estimates 
the solution using n of the m available measurements (e.g. for the navigation 
solution n=4) and uses it to predict the remaining m-n measurements and 
then it computes their residuals (the difference between real and predicted 
measurements). If the residuals are small, the consistency check is passed and 
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“no failure” is declared. The main issue is to define the decision rule, a 
common way is to consider an equal probability density contour and if the 
noise has a Gaussian distribution, then the contour will be a closed 
hypersurface with m-n dimensions. This makes the rule conceptually simple, 
but awkward computationally: if the test statistic falls within the 
hypersurface, there is no fault, otherwise, the algorithm declares a failure. 
2) Least-squares Residual (LSR) Method. This method uses all the 
measurements to compute a least-squares estimate of the navigation 
solution and then calculate all the measurement residuals between the real 
and predicted measurements computed using the all-in-view solution. The 
sum of the squares of the residuals (SSE) represents the test statistic and it is 
compared against a detection threshold. If a fault is detected, the test statistic 
is computed for the m subsets of (m-1) satellites, the subset with the 
minimum value is the position solution with the faulty satellite excluded,  A 
full description of the LSR method can be found in the articles published by 
Parkinson and Axelrad (1988), Parkinson et al. (1996), Perepetchai (2000)  and 
in the book by Groves (2013a). 
3) Parity Method. There are two main parity methods described by Sturza  
(1988), Brenner  (1990) and Graas and Farrell (1993). The base of the two 
methods is to compute the parity vector p through a linear transformation on 
the measurement vector y. 
Sturza (1988) uses as test statistic for simple detection, the squared 
magnitude of the p vector, which has been demonstrated to be equal to the 
SSE of the LSR methods, so the detection method turns out to be the same. 
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Brenner (1990) forms an identification test statistic through the Householder 
transformation that optimizes the error visibility for each satellite, in order to 
improve the identification of the faulty satellite. 
4) Maximum Residual (MR) Method. Kelly (1996b,  1997) applies the Maximum 
Residual Method, a technique used in statistics community for data outlier 
detection and identification, to RAIM. This method calculates the residuals 
through a likelihood ratio test and compares the maximum with a detection 
threshold. The main advantage of the MR method is that is able to perform 
detection and identification in one step. Kelly (1996a) demonstrated the 
mathematical equivalence of the MR method with the Parkinson’s LSR 
method, the Sturza’s and Brenner’s Parity methods. 
5) Solution Separation (SS) Method.  Brown and McBurney (1987) present a 
different and more heuristic method from the previous ones developed.  The 
main assumption of the method is that no more than one satellite has failed 
(in the next session will be presented an evolution of this technique that 
allows to detect and exclude more than one failure at a time). If n satellites in 
view, n different calculation of the position solution can be made, each 
excluding a different satellite. The differences between each subset are then 
formed and either the largest difference or the scalar average of the all the 
differences is compared against a threshold. If the considered quantity 
doesn’t pass the test, a failure is declared. 
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2.4.2. RAIM CONCEPT DESCRIPTION 
 
In Section 2.1 a brief description of the positioning problem has been presented and 
summarised in Eqs. (2.4), in this section, the integrity side of that equations is quickly 
introduced, a highly detailed description can be found in the work done by Imparato 
(2016). The navigation solution is essentially an estimation problem of finding the 
unknown x given a set of measurement y within predefined bounds and a certain 
probability: 
?̂? = 𝑓(𝑦)     (2.28) 
Where: 
- x̂ is the position estimation 
- f() is the estimation function 
- y  is the statistical distribution of the measurements that belongs to the 
admitted region ΩϵRm 
that satisfy: 
𝑃(𝑥 − 𝑥 ∉ Ω𝐴𝐿) ≤ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑞   (2.29) 
Where ΩAL is the region that bounds the true position, which borders are the Alert 
Levels. In the RAIM concept, the probability in (2.29) is the probability of Hazardous 
Misleading Information, or integrity risk, and Preq is the integrity risk requirement 
for a specific application (PHMI). The estimator needs to satisfy not only the 
condition on the integrity risk, but also the following one related to the continuity: 
𝑃(𝑦 ∉ Ω) = 𝑃𝐹𝐴 ≤ 𝑃𝐹𝐴
𝑟𝑒𝑞   (2.30) 
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Where PFA is the probability of False Alert; a False Alert is defined when the system 
discontinues the operation generating a warning to the user but without a real 
cause. The requirement on the probability is computed from the requirement on 
the continuity as: 
𝑃𝐹𝐴
𝑟𝑒𝑞 = 1 − 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑞    (2.31) 
Figure 2-9 summarises the basic process of RAIM: 
 
Figure 2-9 RAIM Main Process. 
 
The RAIM technique takes as input the parameters introduced in the previous 
sections with the main objective of evaluating the reliability and availability of the 
GNSS service, expressed in terms of three outputs: 
- Estimated Position (x) 
- Protection Levels (PL) 
- Alerts, if any occurred, to warn the user to not use the system 
The alerts are not only triggered by faults or errors in the incoming measurement, 
there is another factor that affects the integrity performances of the system that it is 
the satellite geometry; if it is too weak, the computed PLs could be larger than the 
Alert Levels. The integrity performances prediction capability of RAIM (ARAIM as 
well) algorithm and its geometry dependency are the features exploited in this 
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research that has the main goal of evaluating the effectiveness of these techniques 
in supporting the deployment of GNSS as primary system in the future of aviation. 
 
2.4.3. ADVANCED RAIM (ARAIM) HISTORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
As mentioned in the previous sections, an increased number of Global Navigation 
Satellite System (GNSS) satellites are expected to become operational over the next 
decade, paving the way to improved navigation capabilities and techniques as a result 
of the availability of multi-frequency civil signals, the deployment of new 
constellations (Galileo and COMPASS) and the modernization of the existing ones 
(GPS and GLONASS). These enhanced future capabilities can enable GNSS receivers 
to serve as a primary means of navigation worldwide and provided the motivation 
for Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to form the GNSS Evolution Architecture 
Study (GEAS) panel to investigate new GNSS-based architectures with a focus on 
precision approach down to LPV-200 operations. 
In the first report, the GEAS panel (2008) identified and made a first analysis of three 
different integrity architectures: 
1) The GNSS Integrity Channel (GIC). This system combines the GNSS Space 
System (the satellites) with a global Space Based Augmentation System (SBAS) 
that exploit the dual-frequency technology and associated to a regional 
ground-based monitoring network, that has the task of supplying the users 
with the integrity message and corrections. The main advantage of GIC it is 
that requires the lowest computational workload for the avionics with respect 
to the other concepts is that it. The main drawback is that the Ground system 
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has the burden of satisfying the TTA and providing timely alerts to users in 
case of hazards. 
2) The Relative RAIM (RRAIM). The on-board avionics autonomously monitors 
the integrity and compute the aircraft position, using the real-time 
measurements and a set of measurements validated by the Ground Systems 
that will be used for a predefined time (coasting period between two 
validated sets). The main advantage of RRAIM is that TTA requirements are 
less demanding relative to the GIC concepts because the data set can be used 
for minutes. The main drawbacks of this concept are that this system 
completely relays on the Ground system for the provision of the sets of 
measurement and the constellation geometry requirements are more 
stringent compared to GIC, but relatively relaxed respect to the last concept 
developed by the GEAS panel. 
3) The Absolute RAIM (ARAIM). The GEAS panel defined this integrity 
architecture as an enhanced version of the RAIM algorithm. The dual-
frequency measurement diversity would improve RAIM architecture by 
removing the large ionospheric errors affecting range measurements. ARAIM 
is almost autonomous, however, it still requires external support, with a key 
difference compared to the previous architectures, a higher level of 
independency. The Ground system provides the failure probabilities for the 
individual satellites and constellation together with a set of parameters (e.g. 
the user range accuracy, URA). ARAIM has the advantage of being less 
demanding concepts with respect to Ground support (integrity message rate 
and size), but it requires good constellations geometry, not only for the all-in-
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view solution, but also for the subsets that the algorithm generates to 
perform the fault detection and exclusion function. 
In the second report, GEAS (2010) identified the ARAIM (renamed Advanced RAIM) 
as the most promising system because it could reduce the cost of ground 
infrastructure and eliminate single points failure (e.g. interference at the monitoring 
station). In the document, GEAS has also defined the possible architecture, made 
assumptions and suggestions related to the Ground Monitoring, the data link and the 
information that should be provided through the integrity message, called Integrity 
Support Message (ISM). Moreover, it clearly stated the necessary performance 
requirements that ARAIM systems must satisfy to support LPV-200 capabilities; the 
following list resumes the most demanding requirements for GNSS systems: 
- 4m 95% accuracy requirement: the probability of a vertical error exceeding 4 
m must be below 5%. 
- The Probability of Hazardously Misleading Information (PHMI) is the 
probability that the position error (horizontal and vertical) exceeds the 
protection level (PL) for longer than the Time-to-Alert (TTA) and its value 
should be less than 2x10-7 per approach: 
𝑃𝐻𝑀𝐼 = ∑ 𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑃(𝑉𝑃𝐸 > 𝑉𝑃𝐿 𝑜𝑟 HPE > HPL|𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖) < 2 ∗ 10
−7
𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑠
       (2.32) 
-  15m Effective Monitoring Threshold (EMT) requirement: the probability of 
an undetected fault resulting in a vertical position error exceeding 15 m must 
be less than 10-5: 
𝑃(𝑉𝑃𝐸 > 15𝑚|𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡)𝑃(𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡) < 10−5  (2.33) 
76 
 
- 8x10-6 continuity requirement: an approach at a given location and future 
time can only be declared available if there is a probability below 8x10-6 of 
not being able to complete it (under normal condition). 
However, ARAIM performances depends on the assumption made on faults that 
could occur, their frequency and the process implemented for their mitigation, if at 
user or ground level (e.g. using a long latency Integrity Support Message); GEAS’s 
report includes a list of possible threats that could affect the system, dividing them 
into three different categories (a more detailed scheme can be found in (Appendix 
A): 
- Nominal faults: errors that are always present and whose magnitude is not 
expected to change 
- Narrow faults: faults that can affect each satellite independently and cause 
the pseudo-range error to grow well beyond the nominal behaviour 
- Wide Faults: faults that could cause a whole constellation to be faulted 
For these reasons, the EU/US Working Group C (WG-C) established a technical sub-
group, which main objective was to design a multi-constellation ARAIM concept that 
allows vertical guidance worldwide. The outcome of the WG-C (2012) subgroup  is 
the report that fully describes a preliminary multi-constellation ARAIM algorithm 
based on the Multiple Hypothesis Solution Separation method, one of the first 
algorithms to implement multi-constellation RAIM with the possibility of multiple 
simultaneous failures across the constellation, presented by Pervan et al. (1998) and 
also used by Ene (2007, 2009) and by Ene et al. (2008), in which the authors 
developed an ARAIM algorithm with real-time dual frequency L1-L2 GPS flight data. 
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Most of the literature produced afterwards is based either on the algorithms 
developed by Ene (2009), GEAS (2010), WG-C (2012) or Blanch et al. (2010). 
These preliminary analyses clearly show the potentialities of Advanced RAIM 
architectures of providing the Required Navigation Performance and achieving global 
coverage of LPV-200 using at least two constellations, confirmed by other related 
research performed by Choi et al. (2011a , 2012), El-Mowafy (2013) and Pham et al. 
(2013).  
Blanch et al. (2013d, 2011) analysed the algorithm performance in different 
constellation configurations (single, dual and tri-constellation), highlighted the 
critical elements and proposed new approaches or possible improvements that they 
applied in a further developed algorithm fully described in another paper (Blanch et 
al., 2012). 
More in general, the developed algorithms can be split into two groups, depending 
on which domain the consistency check is executed: 
- Range domain, that uses the Chi-square method presented by Brown and 
Chin (1998). Choi et al (2011b) use a modified Chi-square test, named 
Weighted Sum of the Squared Errors (WSSE) to perform the fault detection; 
Young and Surathu (2012) and Lee (2012) test the performance of a new Chi-
square test statistics for detecting four different type of Constellation-wide 
faults using two constellations. 
- Position Domain, that uses the Solution Separation Method developed by 
Brenner (1995), or the improved version Multiple Hypothesis Solution 
Separation that allows multiple fault detection (Pervan et al., 1998). 
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Other research groups focused on the development, improvement or optimization of 
some aspects of the ARAIM algorithm: 
a) Ground segment:  
- Walter et al. (2012) state that airborne ARAIM algorithms are comparatively 
mature and it is time to start investigating the architecture that should 
support the operations. They examine important components for different 
architectural choices, such as monitoring network size and density, how to 
provide the integrity information to the aircrafts and its latency, how to 
handle consistent faults and the methodology for demonstrating the 
integrity performance. 
- Milner et al. (2013) define a possible solution for the allocation of 
responsibility and risk between the ground segment and airborne segment. 
The authors proposed three different ISMs configuration with increasing 
amount of data transmitted and latency time. 
- While Blanch et al. (2013a) describe an architecture that minimizes the 
ground requirements by using a Long Latency ISM and outline a possible path 
to transition from current horizontal RAIM to ARAIM. 
- Martini et al. in (2013b), from the Institute of Communication and Navigation 
of German Aerospace Center (DLR), propose an architecture that provides 
the two different type of ISMs, a long-term one addressing nominal 
conditions and a short one to detect anomaly conditions, that aims to 
maximise the reuse of existing infrastructure and to provide the necessary 
robustness required. At the same time the DLR research group of Martini et 
al. (2013a) tested the proposed architecture with real data collected from 
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three different constellation (GPS, GLONASS and Galileo), in the presence of 
a source of interference, a GNSS repeater, and then tested the algorithm with 
data collected in flight together with ground reference data (Rippl et al., 
2014). 
 
b) Improved Fault Detection and Exclusion Function: 
- Young and Surathu (2012) present an FDE algorithm based on the parity 
space more computationally efficient than Solution-Separation methods. 
- Blanch et al. (2014) modify and complete the approach presented by Blanch 
et al.  (2012), presenting an FDE algorithm that in the presence of an 
unambiguous fault, the protection level is the same as if the excluded had 
not been included in the first place. 
- Spletter and Rippl (2011) describe a procedure to reintroduce the satellites 
removed from the computation, using an integrated self-health check or 
using a validated information provided by external systems. 
- Failure mode analysis: Validation of GNSS based applications, such as flight 
operations, needs a deep analysis of all the possible failure modes and how 
they affect the performances of the system and this process is called Failure 
Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA) 
- Walsh et al. (2004) provide a good summary of the complexity of the FMEA 
process, the issues in the evaluation of the impact of the failures on the 
performances and the current gaps in the process. 
- Ioannides et al. (2005) present a new complete FMEA process for the 
validation of GNSS based flight operations that has the objective of assess 
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the performances in the presence of geometry, biases and nominal range 
errors using two new parameters: the ratio of the position error over the bias 
applied to the faulty satellite and the ratio of the bias applied to the faulty 
satellite over the test statistics contribution due to the bias. The authors 
generate a model that correlates geometry to the Probability of Missed 
Detection, Probability of False Alarm and Accuracy. The model proved to 
reduce the complexity of the validation process for GNSS based flight 
operations. 
c) Optimization of the performance: 
- Milner and Ochieng (2010) present an algorithm based on the MHSS 
technique that allows computing the Protection Levels 10-20% lower than 
standard algorithms. 
- Blanch et al. (2013b) provide an algorithm that optimises the allocation of 
the integrity and continuity over the fault modes with the objective of 
minimizing the Protection Levels. 
- Jiang and Wang (2014) define a new procedure to compute the VPL; the 
authors show that the new method is more reliable and efficient, in terms of 
computational effort, increasing ARAIM availability from 32-38% to 74% with 
GPS and from 43%-44% to 85% with Galileo. 
- Walter et al. (2014) describe methods for reducing the total number of 
subsets to be evaluated, neglecting many of the less likely scenarios and 
simplifying the overall user airborne algorithm. 
- Lee (2013) provides a different approach to detect a consistent constellation-
wide fault, the Earth Orientation Parameter fault. 
81 
 
- Another problem addressed in the work by Feng et al. (2006a, 2006b) and 
Feng and Ochieng (2005) is how to reduce the computational burden of the 
FMEA process. RAIM performance analyses are based on simulations that use 
large spatial and temporal sampling intervals in order to reduce the number 
of computations to be performed for a single area or trajectory but with the 
disadvantage of reducing the accuracy of the results and increasing the risk 
of missing critical points or moments. The authors present three different 
ways to reduce the computational workload and at the same time to improve 
the accuracy of the results. The first algorithm by Feng et al. (2006a) presents 
a different approach in the definition of the data sample points; instead of 
being defined by a set grid, the authors propose to generate the sample 
points from the intersection of the satellite coverage boundaries and the 
Earth surface. The algorithm is capable of defining the different areas and 
identifying the number of satellites in view within them, along the 
boundaries and the intersection points, highlighting what the authors call 
RAIM-holes. RAIM holes are areas, boundaries or points that do not have 
sufficient satellite coverage in order to satisfy the minimum requirement for 
consistency checks (minimum 5 satellites) or FDE function (minimum 6 
satellites). The second algorithm by Feng et al. (2006b) addresses the 
problem of sampling intervals in a dynamic scenario (e.g. an aircraft 
trajectory) by analysing the spatial-temporal correlation characteristic of 
both the satellite geometry and the measurement errors to optimally reduce 
the number of samples to analyse. The algorithm proved to reduce the 
computational workload and demonstrated the ability of capture areas of 
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potential risk to integrity that could have been missed by standard grid-based 
schemes. The third one by Feng and Ochieng (2005) uses the resolved orbital 
errors to estimate an approximate worst user location at the first step on a 
spherical model of the Earth and then uses an iterative transformation 
process to estimate the location on a selected ellipsoid model. In this work, 
the worst user location depends on the satellite orbit errors and it is 
considered a key parameter for the evaluation of the integrity of the Galileo 
data.  
d) Effects of assumptions: most of the simulations and test are performed 
making assumptions on the performance of the single constellations since 
there are no real data to evaluate them yet. 
- Phelts et al. (2014) analyse the effects of nominal signal deformation 
measurements, analysis technique and results previously used for GPS and 
SBAS on ARAIM performance. 
- Macabiau et al. (2014) aim to determine the size of the nominal biases 
affecting the user measurements, the capacity of the ground segment to 
provide pertinent values and the impact on the ARAIM performance. 
 
e) Comparison with other techniques and algorithm: 
- Jiang and Wang (2011) compare ARAIM with RRAIM, showing that RRAIM, in 
general, provides better results but at the same time introduces complexity, 
increased computation burden and some other critical issues. 
- Kropp et al. (2011) compare three integrity algorithms using different error 
over-bounding models and constellation configurations: 1) Galileo Integrity 
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Concept (GIC) 2) ARAIM and 3) Multiple Weighted RAIM. The first two 
algorithms showed a 100% availability over the whole world grid using the 
integrity requirement for the LPV-200 procedures, while the latter showed 
lower performance and higher sensitivity to the assumptions made. 
- Cezon et al. (2013) compare ARAIM algorithm with a new technique, called 
Isotropy-Based Protection Level, which makes no assumption on the 
statistical behaviour or the size of individual measurements errors. It is a 
simple and robust solution to the multi-constellation integrity problem, 
without the need of a specific ground segment, as claimed by its developers. 
The results show that the performances of IBPL are similar to ARAIM for the 
selected scenarios. 
- Su et al. (2012) show the results of an ARAIM algorithm developed by Thales 
Alenia Space Deutschland, named PORIMA, that uses IGS ultra-rapid GPS 
satellite orbit as additional ground monitoring information and tested on 
two-data years continuous data. 
- Pullen et al. (2013) show how the GPS modernization could improve the 
performance of a GPS standalone user performance and integrity, without 
the need of a multi-constellation configuration. 
The issue of multiple satellite faults, narrow and wide faults, stimulated the 
development of alternative RAIM algorithms, called Inter-Constellation Comparison 
Methods (ICC RAIM) and two of them deserve to be mentioned, but for further details 
see the related references: 
- Optimally Weighted Average Solution (OWAS) method, published by Lee et 
al. (2005). The navigation solution of this method is not a full-set solution, 
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but a weighted average of the two respective solutions from the two 
constellations, where the weights are optimally chosen to minimize PLs 
- Novel Integrity-Optimized RAIM (NIORAIM), published by Hwang and Brown 
(2006 and  2008). It uses a numerical ad hoc iterative search method to 
generate (in an offline processing) a multi-dimensional look-up table that is 
used to determine the PLs via interpolation (in online processing). 
 
2.4.4.  ADVANCED RAIM ALGORITHM DESCRIPTION 
 
ARAIM technique is still in the development phase, new functions, features and 
optimization have presented at the conferences in the last years (e.g. a new FDE 
algorithm presented by Blanch et al. (2014)), while, at the same time, it is now 
undergoing through the experimental phase. The following section explains part of 
ARAIM algorithm functions developed and described by GEAS in the second report 
(2010), implemented in the MATLAB ARAIM Availability Simulation Tool (MAAST) 
(presented in Par. 3.3) and used in this research, even though it has been reckoned 
that some of the functions are not optimal (e.g. the error models and probability 
allocations are too conservative). Other functions, such as the Chi-Square test, the 
fault detection and exclusion or the computation of the integrity and accuracy after 
the detection of a fault, are not considered, since the main purpose of this research 
is to analyse the algorithm prediction performance in nominal conditions and 
evaluate the influence of other factors that might reduce the reliability of the system.  
As mentioned in the previous section, ARAIM technique, compared to RAIM, has the 
following additional features: 
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- Multi-constellation, to increase the number of redundant measurements 
- Multi-frequency, to remove the first order component of the ionospheric 
delay 
- Multiple faults detection capability (Blanch et al., 2011, Blanch et al., 2012, 
Blanch et al., 2013c, Brown and McBurney, 1987). 
Additionally, the technique is based on an algorithm also developed by Stanford 
University, named Multiple Hypothesis Solution Separation (MHSS) (Blanch et al., 
2007, Ene, 2009). 
 
F. MULTIPLE HYPOTHESIS SOLUTION SEPARATION (MHSS) 
This section presents the Multiple Hypothesis Solution Separation method, for 
additional information refers to the papers by Blanch et al. (2007), Ene (2007), Pervan 
et al. (1998) and the PhD thesis by Ene (2009). 
The real-time integrity monitoring function usually includes a fault-detection (FD) 
function, and possible exclusion or isolation (FDE or FDI), however, in order to 
uncover faults, they need to be characterised and modelled, a difficult task due to 
their random nature. For this reason, a probabilistic conservative approach is used, 
through Gaussian distributions with correlated maximum biases that over-bound 
them. In a system that deals with multiple sources of measurements, each source 
could be affected by an error and more than one source could be it at the same time. 
In terms of number, if there are n pseudo-ranges, there are 2n different cases of 
failure, also known as error model states or hypothesis, including single and multiple 
failures and the nominal case (or null hypothesis), in which the system does not 
present any failure. 
86 
 
For each single failure state, an a priori probability of failure is associated (Pap,i, where 
i is the i-th state), while multiple-failures state is computed by multiplying their a 
priori probabilities: 
𝑃𝑎𝑝,𝑡𝑜𝑡 = ∏ 𝑃𝑎𝑝,𝑖(= 𝑃𝑎𝑝 
𝑚  𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙)𝑚1  (2.34) 
Where m is the number of simultaneous faults. 
For ARAIM performance prediction, two types of a priori probability of failure are 
considered: 
- Single Satellite a priori probability of failure Psat 
- Single Constellation a priori probability of failure Pconst 
The analysis of all the possible combination of failure modes, composed by subsets 
of satellites or constellations, might require a considerable amount of computational 
power that clearly increase exponentially with the number of measurements n, 
though of satellites, involved. To reduce the number of subsets to be analysed by the 
algorithm, two parameters have been introduced: the maximum number of failed 
satellites (Nsat,max) and constellation (Nsat,const). Each subset has its probability given 
by (2.34) and the value decreases with the increase of the number of failures m, 
reaching eventually values that can be neglected and only the subsets that have a 
probability higher than a defined threshold are considered in the computation. 
𝑁𝑠𝑎𝑡,𝑚𝑎𝑥 =
(∑ 𝑃𝑠𝑎𝑡,𝑘
𝑁𝑠𝑎𝑡
𝑘=1 )
𝑚
𝑚!
> 𝑃𝑠𝑎𝑡,𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒   (2.35) 
With m < Nsat − 3 − Nconst 
The Nsat,max value is found iteratively and it will define the number of subsets will be 
considered in the computation and Table 2-3 (see work by Blanch et al. (2012) for 
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further details), provides examples of the relationship between Nsat,max, the a priori 
probability of failure and the number of satellite in view. 
 
Table 2-3 Nsat,max dependency from Pap and the number of satellite in view. 
Psat/Nsat 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 
10-5  1 1 1 1 2 2 2 
10-4  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
5x10-4  2 3 3 3 3 3 3 
10-3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 
 
However, the discarded subsets still need to be considered in the algorithm, since 
even though they are not analysed, the sum of all the probabilities of the not 
monitored modes has to be removed from the allocated probability used for the 
computation of the protection levels (see Eq. (2.36)): 
𝑃𝑠𝑎𝑡,𝑛𝑜𝑡_𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑑 =
(∑ 𝑃𝑠𝑎𝑡,𝑘
𝑁𝑠𝑎𝑡
𝑘=1 )
𝑁𝑠𝑎𝑡,𝑚𝑎𝑥+1
(𝑁𝑠𝑎𝑡,𝑚𝑎𝑥+1)!
  (2.36) 
A similar process is performed to compute the maximum number of constellations 
that can fail at the same time. The ARAIM algorithm is designed for multi-
constellation configuration and it is capable of detecting a single constellation 
failure, but only if in the computation more than one constellation is included, 
otherwise the constellation fault is not detectable. If only one constellation is used 
in the analysis, the value of Pconst needs to be set lower than the thresholds, 
otherwise, there is a high chance that the algorithm will generate an error, warning 
the user that is not possible to detect a constellation failure. First of all, the 
probability of no constellation is computed as: 
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𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡,𝑛𝑜𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 = ∏ (1 − 𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡,𝑘)
𝑁𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡
𝑘=1   (2.37) 
Then, since Nconst,max depends on Nconst, if there are more than three constellations 
available and the following relationship is valid: 
1 − 𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡,𝑛𝑜𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 − 𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡,𝑛𝑜𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 ∑
𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡,𝑘
1−𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡,𝑘
𝑁𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡
𝑘=1 > 𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡_𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑  (2.38) 
The maximum number of failed constellations is two, otherwise the algorithm is 
going set one as maximum value. 
As for the satellites faults, removing some of the possible combinations from the 
computation requires to remove the probability of the unmonitored ones from the 
budget allocated for the computation of the protection levels: 
For:  
Nconst,max = 1 
𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡,𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑑 = 1 − 𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡,𝑛𝑜𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 − 𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡,𝑛𝑜𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 ∑
𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡,𝑘
1−𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡,𝑘
𝑁𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡
𝑘=1  (2.39) 
Nconst,max = 2 
𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡,𝑛𝑜𝑡_𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑑 = 1 − 𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡,𝑛𝑜𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 (1 + ∑
𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡,𝑘
1−𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡,𝑘
𝑁𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡
𝑘=1 ) −
𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡,𝑛𝑜𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 ∑
𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡,𝑘1
1−𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡,𝑘1
𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡,𝑘2
1−𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡,𝑘2
𝑘1<𝑘2  (2.40) 
The last term in (2.40) takes in to account the different combination of the two 
constellations. 
Once the maximum number of satellites and constellations is determined, it is 
possible to define the number of error models or hypothesis that the algorithm will 
deal with: 
𝑁ℎ𝑦𝑝 = ∑ (
𝑁𝑠𝑎𝑡
𝑖
)
𝑁𝑠𝑎𝑡,𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑖=1 + ∑ (
𝑁𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡
𝑗
)
𝑁𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡,𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑗=1  (2.41) 
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At this point, it is possible to generate all the required subsets and an example is 
shown in Table 2-4, in which a configuration with two constellations and ten satellites 
is used: 
 
Table 2-4 Example of subsets with Nsat =10, Nconst = 2, Psat = 10-5 and Pconst= 10-4, 1 
indicates that the satellite is included in the subset, 0 that is not included. 
 GPS1 GPS2 GPS 3 GPS 4 GPS 5 Gal1 Gal2 Gal3 Gal4 Gal5 
Sub#0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Sub#1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Sub#2 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Sub#3 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Sub#4 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Sub#5 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Sub#6 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
Sub#7 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 
Sub#8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 
Sub#9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
Sub#10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Sub#11 
(GPS) 
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Sub#12 
(GAL) 
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
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The first subset is the all-in-view or null hypothesis subset, subset from #1 to #11 
each one excludes a single satellite at a time, while the last two subsets are the single 
constellation subset, used to evaluate if a failure occurred at constellation level. 
For each subset, except for the null hypothesis or the fault-free mode, it is then 
required to compute the overall probability of occurrence, generating an a priori 
Probability Mass Function (PMF): 
P(Hi) = Pfault,i    (2.42) 
With i = 0, 1, …, Nhyp 
Each subset of a priori probability is given by: 
- For single (or multiple) satellite fault: 
𝑃𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡,𝑖 = ∏ 𝑃𝑠𝑎𝑡,𝑗𝑗𝜖𝑖     (2.43) 
With i ≤ ∑ (Nsat
k
)
Nsat,max
k=1  
- For single (or multiple) constellation fault: 
𝑃𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡,𝑖 = ∏ 𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡,𝑗𝑗𝜖𝑖    (2.44) 
With i > ∑ (Nsat
k
)
Nsat,max
k=1  
 
G. POSITION ESTIMATION AND SOLUTION SEPARATION TEST 
The basic principle of the navigation problem has been already presented in par2.2. 
In this section, the main functions of the ARAIM will be further explained and 
summarised in the following steps, as described by Blanch et al. (2012) : 
 Covariance Matrices. The first step of the ARAIM algorithm is the computation 
of the Covariance Matrices for the two error models (Cint for integrity and Cacc 
for accuracy model) using the signal errors and biases characterisation of each 
satellite: 
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Cint(i,i) = σ2URA,i + σ2tropo,i + σ2user,i   (2.45) 
Cacc(i,i) = σ2URE,i + σ2tropo,i + σ2user,i    (2.46) 
Where: 
 
Table 2-5 Signal Error Description. 
Name Description 
σURA,i 
Standard deviation of the clock and ephemeris error of satellite i used 
for integrity 
σURE,i 
Standard deviation of the clock and ephemeris error of satellite i used 
for accuracy and continuity 
σtropo,i Tropospheric delay of satellite i, function of its elevation angle 
σuser,i 
User contribution to the error budget function of satellite i elevation 
angle 
  
 Computation of All-in-view Position Solution. Using a weighted least-squares 
estimation: 
 Δx = (GTWG)-1 GT W ΔPR    (2.47) 
Where: 
Table 2-6 Weighted Least-Square Elements. 
Name Description 
Δx Corrections of the receiver position and clock states 
G 
Geometry Matrix in East North Up coordinates with a clock component 
for each constellation 
W Weighting matrix defined as C-1int 
92 
 
Name Description 
ΔPR 
Vector of pseudo-range measurements minus the expected ranging 
values based on the location of the satellites and the position solution 
given by the previous iteration 
 
 Fault-tolerant positions and associated standard deviation and biases. For 
each of the k subsets, the algorithm computes the position solution xk, 
evaluates the differences with the all-in-view position solution x0 (also known 
as solution separation method) and determines the standard deviations and 
the test thresholds. 
Δxk = xk – x0 = (Sk– S0)y    (2.48)   
Where  
Sk= (GTWk G)-1 GT Wk             (2.49) 
- y: vector of pseudo-range measurements minus the expected range for an all-
in-view position. 
- Wk is the weighting matrix of the k-th Hypothesis in which the element 
corresponding to the satellite removed from the subset has been replaced by 
a zero (the measurement coming from that satellite has no weight in the 
position estimation). 
The variances of xk,q (where index q = 1, 2 and 3 designate the East, North and Up 
components respectively) are given by: 
σ2k, q = (GT W k G)-1q,q    (2.50) 
The nominal biases of the position solutions x k,q are given by: 
b k,q = Σi | S k,q,i | bnom,i    (2.51) 
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The variances of the differences Δx k,q are given by: 
σ2ss k,q = eTq (S k – S 0)Cacc (S k – S 0)T eq  (2.52) 
in which eq denotes a vector whose qth entry is one and all others are zero  
 Solution Separation Threshold. Each fault mode has three solution separation 
threshold tests, one for each coordinate. They are defined by: 
Tk,q = Kfa,q σss,k,q   (2.53) 
Where: 
𝐾𝑓𝑎,1 = 𝐾𝑓𝑎,2 = 𝑄
−1 (
𝑃𝑓𝑎_ℎ𝑜𝑟
4𝑁ℎ𝑦𝑝
)  (2.54) 
𝐾𝑓𝑎,3 = 𝑄
−1 (
𝑃𝑓𝑎_𝑣𝑒𝑟
2𝑁ℎ𝑦𝑝
)   (2.55) 
- Q-1(p): it is the (1-p)-quantile of a zero-mean unit-variance Gaussian 
distribution 
- PFA: continuity budget allocated to disruptions due to false alert (distributed 
to the Vertical and Horizontals components). 
- 
Pfa_hor
Nhyp
: continuity budget allocated for each hypothesis. The budget is equally 
shared between the number of hypotheses, a concept already proved to be 
inefficient by Blanch et al. (2012), since some of the failure modes might have 
a higher probability to occur compared to the others. 
The Protection Levels can be computed only if the following relation is valid for all k 
and q: 
𝜏𝑘,𝑞 =
|𝑥𝑘,𝑞−𝑥0,𝑞|
𝑇𝑘,𝑞
≤ 1   (2.56) 
If any of the tests fail, in the full version, the algorithm must attempt the exclusion of 
the fault. 
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 Computation of the Protection Levels (PL). Vertical Protection Level (VPL) and 
Horizontal Protection Levels (HPL) are the solutions of the following 
equations: 
2𝑄 (
𝑉𝑃𝐿 − 𝑏0,3
𝜎0,3
) + ∑ 𝑃𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡,𝑘𝑄 (
𝑉𝑃𝐿 − 𝑇𝑘,3 − 𝑏𝑘,3
𝜎𝑘,3
)
𝑁ℎ𝑦𝑝
𝑘=1
= 𝑃𝐻𝑀𝐼_𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡 (1 −
𝑃𝑠𝑎𝑡,𝑛𝑜𝑡_𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑑 + 𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡,𝑛𝑜𝑡_𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑑
𝑃𝐻𝑀𝐼_𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡 + 𝑃𝐻𝑀𝐼_ℎ𝑜𝑟
) 
  (2.57) 
2𝑄 (
𝐻𝑃𝐿𝑞 − 𝑏0,𝑞
𝜎0,𝑞
) + ∑ 𝑃𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡,𝑘𝑄 (
𝐻𝑃𝐿𝑞 − 𝑇𝑘,𝑞 − 𝑏𝑘,𝑞
𝜎𝑘,𝑞
)
𝑁ℎ𝑦𝑝
𝑘=1
=
1
2
𝑃𝐻𝑀𝐼_ℎ𝑜𝑟 (1 −
𝑃𝑠𝑎𝑡,𝑛𝑜𝑡_𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑑 + 𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡,𝑛𝑜𝑡_𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑑
𝑃𝐻𝑀𝐼_𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡 + 𝑃𝐻𝑀𝐼_ℎ𝑜𝑟
) 
  (2.58) 
with q = 1 and 2 for HPLq. The final HPL is given by: 
𝐻𝑃𝐿 = √𝐻𝑃𝐿1
2 + 𝐻𝑃𝐿2
2     (2.59) 
- PHMI: total integrity budget from the requirements, shared between the HPL 
and VPL. 
- Psat/const,not_monitored: removes from the PHMI budget the probability of the 
unmonitored fault modes. 
- Pfault,k: prior probability of fault in subset k per approach 
Eqs. (2.57) and (2.58) cannot be solved to directly compute VPL and HPL, an iterative 
process is required (see the paper by Blanch et al. (2012) for further details) 
 Accuracy, Fault-free position error bound and effective monitor threshold. 
Finally, the other two parameters are computed: the accuracy and the 
Effective Monitoring Threshold.  
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𝜎𝑣,𝑎𝑐𝑐 = √𝑒3
𝑇𝑆0𝐶𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑆0
𝑇𝑒3   (2.60) 
EMT = maxk (Tk,3)    (261) 
 
 
Figure 2-10 Summary of the ARAIM algorithm. 
 
 
 PERFORMANCE BASED NAVIGATION AND LOCALIZER PERFORMANCE WITH 
VERTICAL GUIDANCE-200 
 
Before the 1990’s, conventional routes were defined and based on specific and 
certified ground navigation aids, using large protection areas and separation criteria 
between aeroplanes due to the limited accuracy of those systems, such as VOR/DME, 
NDB and ILS. Aircrafts were forced to fly over the waypoints in the proximity of which 
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the ground aids were located (Figure 2-11). The main drawback of this process was 
that it wasn’t easy to upgrade the systems or to introduce new type of technologies, 
limiting the flexibility and the possibility of implementing new design and concepts 
that soon lead to a saturation of the air traffic. 
 
Figure 2-11 Conventional Routes Using Ground Aids (Airbus, 2015). 
 
With the introduction of GPS for civil use, its performances immediately 
demonstrated the potentiality of the system in the aviation field, however, its design 
did not allow for a direct integration into the Instrument Flight Rules (IFR). 
In the 1990’s, The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) recognised that the 
impediments generated by the regulations inhibited the industry to enhance the 
aircraft capabilities and the advancement of the civil aviation, for this reason, it 
examined and established a new standard of navigation, the Performance Based 
Navigation (PBN). 
The main difference between the conventional routes and PBN is that the latter are 
focused on the level of performance required rather than a specific equipment. This 
was a tremendous innovation that completely transformed the concept behind the 
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design of the processes and procedure for the airspace, using the performances 
rather than the system as driving feature.  
As presented in the previous sections, PBN requirements relate to the four 
parameters (accuracy, integrity, continuity and availability), but they take also into 
account the capability of the operators, the flight crew knowledge and the global 
safety performance of the system. 
The main advantage of PBN is the flexibility in the design of routes, arrival and 
departure procedures, allowing tighter separations and protection areas, giving the 
possibility of making more direct routes and the capability to airports of managing 
the continuous increase in traffic. 
The second main advantage is that new navigation technologies can be more easily 
implemented, since the procedure requirements are based on the performances of 
the overall system and not on the system itself. 
The PBN procedures are divided in two categories, distinguished by the capability of 
the system of providing or not on-board performance monitoring and alerting: 
- Area Navigation (RNAV), defined by ICAO as “a method of navigation which 
permits aircraft operation on any desired flight path within the coverage of 
ground-based or space-based navigation aids or within the limits of the 
capability of self-contained aids, or a combination of these” (Figure 2-12 Area 
Navigation Procedure). The introduction of “space-based navigation aids”, 
such as GNSS, allows defining waypoints using coordinates (latitude and 
longitude) of a generic point that is not correlated to a ground navaid.  
RNAV procedures are usually associated to a number that represents the 
lateral accuracy of the system that has to be achieved 95% of the time during 
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the flight (e.g. RNAV 10 used for En-Route phases requires a lateral accuracy 
of ±10 nm). 
 
Figure 2-12 Area Navigation Procedure (Airbus, 2015). 
 
 
- Required Navigation Performance (RNP), defined by ICAO as “navigation 
specification based on area navigation that includes the requirement for 
performance monitoring and alerting”.  As for the RNAV procedures, RNPs are 
associated to a number that defines two limits, the accuracy and the 
containment (the latter is two times the accuracy limit and it needs to be 
achieved 99.999% of the flight time, e.g. RNP 4 used for En-route phases 
requires a lateral accuracy of ±4 nm and a containment limit of ±8 nm,  Figure 
2-13) 
 
Figure 2-13 Accuracy and Containment limits for a RNP procedure (Airbus, 2015). 
 
 
Figure 2-14 summarises and provides some examples of the PNB procedures 
categorization and Figure 2-15 shows the operational difference between RNAV, 
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in which the use of geographical waypoints represented an enhancement 
compared to the conventional navigation shown in Figure 2-11 Conventional 
Routes Using Ground Aids, giving more flexibility and reducing the required 
airspace, and RNP procedures that include an on-board performance monitoring 
and alerting system, optimise the use of the airspace through the containment of 
the flight path within a “tunnel” and introduce curved paths in the design. 
 
Figure 2-14 Graphical overview of PNB categorization (Airbus, 2015). 
 
 
 
Figure 2-15 Operational difference between RNAV and RNP (Airbus, 2015). 
 
100 
 
The institution of PBN procedures lead to an optimization of the 3D trajectories that 
brought many benefits: 
- Increased Airspace Capacity and safety, that lead to an improvement in the 
sequencing (arrival time more predictable), an easier management of the 
crossing of different flight paths and so less effort for Air Traffic Controllers 
(ATC) in deconflicting them (Figure 2-16). 
- Increase in airport access; better sequencing and predictability of the flights 
allow an increase of the traffic. 
- Efficiency and Environmental impact; the flexibility and higher accuracy of 
PBN procedures support the design of more direct routes and the 
implementation of Continuous Descent Operations (CDO) that reduce the 
flown distances (Figure 2-17), the fuel burn (CDO saves around 200kg of fuel 
compared to conventional arrival trajectories, Figure 2-18) and therefore 
reducing the environmental impact in terms of CO2 emissions and noise 
pollution. 
  
Figure 2-16 Difference in Arrival Routes between Conventional and RNP 
Operations (Airbus, 2015). 
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Figure 2-17 Example of Reduction of Flown Distance between Conventional 
(orange) and RNP (yellow) operations (Airbus, 2015). 
 
 
 
Figure 2-18 Difference Between Conventional Arrival Descent Profile (top) and 
Continuous Descent Operation (bottom) (Airbus, 2015). 
 
 
For each category (RNAV and RNP), the Navigation Specification defines the set 
of requirements that aircrafts and crew members need to satisfy in order to 
support PNB operations: 
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- Performances (accuracy, integrity, continuity and availability) that the system 
is required to satisfy in order to perform a specific procedure. 
- Functionalities that the system is required to have in order to achieve the 
predefined performances 
- Navigation Sensors that the system is required to have installed 
- Requirements required to the aircrew to achieve the performances. 
 
2.5.1. APPROACH PROCEDURE AND LOCALIZER PERFORMANCE WITH VERTICAL 
GUIDANCE (LPV) REVIEW 
 
As described in the previous sections, RNP are specified for each phase of the flight 
and, between all of them, the approach phase is the most demanding and important 
in terms of integrity requirements. 
Figure 2-19 shows some examples of the requirements for the different types of 
approaches, such as the Minimum Descent Altitudes (MDA, a specified altitude below 
which the approach must be discontinued without the required visual reference) and 
the Alert Limit (AL). Current regulations allow GPS to only support Lateral Navigation 
(LNAV) approaches, while for other types it is necessary the support of other 
navigation aids. 
103 
 
 
Figure 2-19 Summary of types of approach procedures and related Minimum 
Descent Altitudes and Alert Level (Walter et al., 2008). 
 
The introduction of ARAIM could allow the use of GNSS for the more demanding 
approach and additionally the use of Optimized Profile Descent (OPD), also known as 
Continuous Descent Approach (CDA), instead of the conventional stair-step 
approach, that requires a higher workload to the pilots and ATM. Two different types 
of CDAs are currently utilized, standard (3° descent angle) and steep (>4.5° descent 
angle), implemented in few airports worldwide. They possess two main advantages 
compared to conventional approaches: 
- minimize noise pollution 
- reduce fuel consumption. 
Within the SESAR project, approach procedures with new features (e.g. steeper 
glide slopes) have been designed and tested with the main objective of 
implementing in the future more efficient trajectories that reduce noise impact 
and fuel consumption without impacting airports traffic. As an example, 
Heathrow airport tested for six months steep approaches using RNAV GNSS 
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procedures without being fitted with a GBAS system and finding a significant 
reduction of noise pollution in the surrounding areas (SESAR, 2016).  
 
Figure 2-20 Approach Procedure Categories (Unknown, 2015). 
 
Figure 2-20 shows the ICAO classification of the Approach procedures, divided in 
three main categories: Non-Precision Approach (NPA), Approaches with Vertical 
Guidance (APV) and Precision Approach (PA). 
- Non-Precision Approach (NPA) only supports lateral navigation but not 
vertical guidance, giving information on the aircraft lateral deviation (left or 
right) with respect to the runway direction; it includes conventional 
procedures that utilise ground equipment like Localizer (LOC), Non-
Directional Beacon (NDB), VHF Omni Directional Range (VOR), Distance 
Measuring Equipment (DME) to bring the aircraft to a point where the pilot 
can see the runway and perform a visual landing, but it also includes GNSS-
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based RNAV approaches like Localizer Performance (LP) and Lateral 
Navigation (LNAV). The navigation systems provide  
- Approach with Vertical Guidance (APV) supports both lateral and vertical 
guidance, however without satisfying the more stringent requirements 
defined for the last category, Precision Approach. For this category, vertical 
guidance is enabled by barometric altimeter (LNAV/VNAV) and GNSS-based 
systems (e.g. SBAS for LPV), guiding the aircraft along a predefined glidepath.  
- Precision Approach (PA), as for APV, supports both lateral and vertical 
guidance enabled by ground landing systems like Instrument Landing System 
(ILS), Precision Approach Radar (PAR), Microwave Landing System (MLS) and 
GBAS. Precision approaches are in turn divided in categories and defined by 
the Decision Altitude/Height and the Runway Visual Range (RVR): 
Table 2-7 Precision Approach Categories. 
PA category DA/H RVR (minimum) Visibility 
CAT I 60m (200ft) 550m 800m 
CAT II 60 m< DA/H < 30m  350m  
CAT IIIA DA/H < 30m or No 
DA/H 
200m  
CAT IIIB DA/H >15m or No 
DA/H 
200m < RVR < 50m  
CAT IIIC No DA/H No limitation  
 
The different approaches are enabled by the implemented systems and 
infrastructures that can be different for each airport, depending on their capabilities 
and strategy, due to the fact that each system requires continuous or periodic 
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maintenance and calibration that might be too expensive for airports with limited 
traffic. Localizer performance with vertical guidance (LPV) is currently the most 
precise GNSS-based RNP procedures implemented, but only through the support of 
SBAS. This category of approach has similar requirements as CAT I instrument landing 
systems (ILS), such as a decision height of 200ft (equivalent to around 60m) and a 
minimum visibility of 800m.  
As presented in the previous chapters, ARAIM aims to become an Approved 
Navigation System down to LPV-200 approach (Localizer Performance with Vertical 
Guidance, decision height of 200 feet and visibility of ½ mile). The first LPV-200 
approaches have already been implemented in airports around the world with the 
support of SBAS (e.g. USA and Europe) bringing numerous benefits that could be 
further enhanced with the implementation of ARAIM: 
- Reduced support from other ground systems (e.g. ILS) and reduced delays due 
to their malfunctioning or maintenance. 
- Optimised trajectory, lower fuel consumption and reduced environmental 
impact 
- Increased availability and capability of airports 
enabling a further reduction of the ground systems effort and costs. For these 
reasons, this research analysed the integrity performances of ARAIM implemented 
to LPV-200 procedures, for which the requirements are summarised in Table 2-8. 
Table 2-8 Integrity Requirements for LPV-200 Approach Procedures. 
 
HAL VAL 
Accuracy 
(vertical component) 
EMT 
Alert Level [m] 40 35 1.87 15 
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 ARAIM PREDICTION TOOL 
 
  INTRODUCTION 
 
As mentioned in the first chapter, one of the main objectives of the research is to 
investigate critical aspects to safe aircraft operations in GNSS restricted access 
situations, to analyse the possible use ARAIM as a safe and reliable method of 
autonomous integrity augmentation system and integrate it in systems and processes 
(e.g. into the flight management system (FMS)). 
ARAIM is the technology that the GNSS community is aiming to develop and make 
operational by the end of this decade putting a lot of effort into it, demonstrated by 
the conspicuous number of papers and performed researches presented in the 
literature review in the previous chapter. These analyses show the interest of the 
scientific community but also of national and international organisation (such as FAA, 
CAA, Eurocontrol, ESA, EU and many other), in the development, finalisation and 
implementation of this new technique in Civil Aviation. Today, RAIM is an approved 
Navigation System only for Lateral Navigation (LNAV) in En-route, Terminal and Non-
precision approach flight phases and its performance predictions are mandatory if 
GPS is used to solely satisfy RNAV requirements (FAA, 2007a). The main 
disadvantages of this technique are that at the current stage it implements only one 
constellation (GPS), uses a single frequency configuration and can detect only one 
fault at a time, limiting the performance. The new technique aims to become an 
Approved Navigation System down to LPV-200 approach (Localizer Performance with 
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Vertical Guidance, decision height of 200 feet and visibility of ½ mile) in order to 
reduce the ground systems effort; its strengths are the use of multiple constellations, 
dual frequency and multiple fault detection capability. For these reasons, ARAIM has 
been selected as topic of this research; the technique has reached a good level of 
maturity and the analyses and studies have demonstrated its capabilities, advantages 
and strengths but also some weaknesses that need to addressed and analysed; one 
of the aims and main objectives of this research is to develop a system that satisfies 
the future needs for the Civil Aviation. The final objective of the first phase of this 
research was to evaluate the influence of the attitude of the aircraft on the ARAIM 
performances, since previous ARAIM performance analyses were performed on 
selected points on the Earth surface, with full view of the sky (no obstacles that can 
shadow satellites). 
This chapter describes in detail the ARAIM algorithm, how it works, the inputs and 
outputs (the integrity parameters defined by the protection levels) and the new tool 
developed and used in this research, the ARAIM Performance on Predicted Aircraft 
Trajectory Tool (APPATT). In this chapter, the functions used and integrated in the 
algorithm are presented, starting from the original MAAST, the MATLAB ARAIM 
Availability Simulation Tool (MAAST) a tool developed by Stanford University that is 
the basis of the APPATT, to the new functions and models that evaluate the 
shadowing effect of the aircraft attitude and terrain, highlighting how these functions 
have been modelled and implemented. 
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  COORDINATES FRAMES AND ROTATIONS 
 
3.2.1. COORDINATE TRANSFORMATION AND ROTATION MATRICES 
 
The computation of the integrity performance within the aircraft Navigation systems 
requires the knowledge of absolute and relative position and velocity (state vector) 
of different elements, such as the GNSS satellites and the aircraft itself, additionally 
involves the use of several reference frames and the related coordinate 
transformation. GNSS receivers first estimate the position and velocity of the 
satellites in the orbital perifocal frame based on the orbital parameters provided by 
the YUMA almanacs (they will be described in the next sections). The state vector is 
then transformed to a conventional geographic coordinate system, the Earth-
Centered-Earth-Fixed (ECEF) reference. This system rotates with the Earth body, 
allowing an easy conversion to Cartesian coordinates of geographical points 
expressed in term of latitude, longitude and altitude. Having both satellites and 
locations coordinates expressed in a common Cartesian system allows a 
straightforward computation of the lines of sight (LoS) between each location with 
all the satellites of the constellations, in particular, the unit vector of each line of sight 
is computed. However, the LoS unit vectors expressed in ECEF do not allow to 
evaluate which satellite is above the local horizon of the user’s location and so in view 
in the GNSS receiver reference frame, they need to be transformed to an appropriate 
ground or local reference frame, also referred as Local Vertical Local Horizon. Two 
examples of these coordinate systems are the East- North-Up (ENU), used to describe 
measurements/observations relative to a control frame located on the ground, such 
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as control towers, and the North-East-Down (NED), used to describe 
measurements/observations from the aircraft intrinsic axes. The original ARAIM 
algorithm transforms the LoS unit vectors from the ECEF to ENU frame, evaluates 
their elevation angles and discard the satellites with negative values (below the local 
horizon). In this research, two more transformations have been introduced: 
- From ENU to NED frame 
- From NED to Body reference frame 
The latter transformation allows evaluating the shadowing effect of the aircraft 
attitude. In the following sections, a quick description of the different reference 
frames and the mathematical formulas for the transformation are provided. 
 
A. REFERENCE FRAMES 
- Perifocal reference frame 
A non-inertial frame used to define a coordinate system within an orbit. The 
origin of the system is the focus of the orbit in which the celestial body is located, 
the xy plane coincides with the orbital plane, with the x-axis pointing towards to 
the periapsis, the z perpendicular to the orbital plane in the direction of the 
satellite’s angular momentum and the y-axis completing the right-hand set of co-
ordinate axis (Figure 3-1) 
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Figure 3-1 Perifocal reference frame of an orbit (adcsforbeginners, 2015). 
 
 
 
- Earth-Centered-Earth-Fixed reference frame 
A non-inertial reference frame fixed to the Earth body and rotating with it. The 
origin of the system is the center of the Earth and the equatorial plane 
corresponds to the XY plane with the X axis directed toward the intersection 
between the equatorial plane and the reference Meridian (0° Greenwich 
Meridian), the Z-axis passing through the international reference pole (True 
North or the instantaneous Earth rotation axis) and the Y completing the right-
handed set of coordinate systems (Figure 3-2) 
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Figure 3-2 Earth-Centered-Earth-Fixed Reference Frame (ECEF) (Airdata, 2017). 
 
- East-North-Up (ENU) reference frame 
This non-inertial reference frame is location dependent, the origin is centred in 
the location itself (defined by the geographical coordinates latitude ϕ and 
longitude λ), the xy plane is the tangent plane to the geoid at the location point, 
with the x-axis pointing East (along the local Parallel), the y-axis pointing North 
(along the local Meridian) and the z-axis perpendicular to the xy plane pointing 
upwards (Figure 3-3) 
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Figure 3-3 Example of East-North-Up (ENU) Reference Frame for a generic location 
(λ, ϕ) (Wang, 2013). 
 
- North-East-Down (NED) reference frame 
Another non-inertial reference system that is location dependent, usually used 
in Aerospace applications as a reference system to describe the aircraft attitude. 
The origin is centred with the centre of mass of the aircraft with the xy plane 
being tangent to the equipotential surface to the geoid. The x-axis points North 
(parallel to the local Meridian), the y points Eastward (along the local Parallel) 
and the z-axis is perpendicular to the xy plane pointing downwards (Figure 3-3) 
 
- Aircraft Body reference frame 
A non-inertial reference frame fixed to the aircraft body. The origin is centred in 
the aircraft centre of mass., the x-axis is directed along the aircraft longitudinal 
axis towards its nose, the z-axis is along the aircraft vertical axis towards the 
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upward direction and the y-axis along the aircraft lateral axis completing the 
right-handed set of coordinate systems (Figure 3-4). The rotations around the 
body axes also define the attitude angles roll, pitch and yaw, respectively to the 
x, y and z axes. 
 
Figure 3-4 NED and Body Reference Frames. 
 
 
B. CARTESIAN REPRESENTATION OF VECTOR 
Cartesian representation of a vector can be found in texts by Curtis (2013) and 
Colasurdo (2010). A vector can be represented in different Cartesian frames. Given 
two coordinate frames a [X,Y,Z] and b [x,y,z] oriented differently in space, with 
orthogonal unit vectors Xa , Ya , Za  and xb , yb , zb  ( 1a , 2a , 3a  and 1b , 2b , 3b  in a 
generic coordinate system), a vector v

 can be represented with respect to any of the 
systems a and b. 
This is written as: 
𝑣 = ∑ 𝑣𝑎,𝑖?̂?𝑖
3
𝑖=1  and 𝑣 = ∑ 𝑣𝑏,𝑖?̂?𝑖
3
𝑖=1   (3.1) 
where: 
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𝑣𝑎,𝑖 = 𝑣 ∙ ?̂?𝑖 and 𝑣𝑏,𝑖 = 𝑣 ∙ ?̂?𝑖    (3.2) 
are the coordinates of v

 in a and b respectively. The relation between the two 
vectors va and vb in frames a and b is given by the following calculation: 
𝑣𝑎,𝑖 = 𝑣 ∙ ?̂?𝑖 = (𝑣𝑏,1?̂?1 + 𝑣𝑏,2?̂?2 + 𝑣𝑏,3?̂?3) = ∑ 𝑣𝑎,𝑗(?̂?𝑖 ∙ ?̂?𝑗)
3
𝑗=1  (3.3) 
The coordinate transformation from b to a is given by: 
𝑣𝑎 = 𝐴𝑎𝑏𝑣𝑏     (3.4) 
where: 
𝐴𝑎𝑏 = {?̂?𝑖 ∙ ?̂?𝑗}    (3.5) 
is the rotation matrix from a to b. The elements of the rotation matrix are called the 
direction cosines. 
 
C. PROPERTIES OF THE ROTATION MATRIX 
In this section, a few properties of the rotation matrix will be listed. For more details 
on these properties refer to the paper by Egeland and Gravdahl (2002). 
The rotation/transformation matrix from b to a can be found in the same way as from 
a to b by interchanging a and b in the expressions which gives: 
𝐴𝑏𝑎 = {?̂?𝑗 ∙ ?̂?𝑖}    (3.6) 
The rotation matrix is orthogonal and satisfies: 
𝐴𝑏𝑎 = (𝐴𝑎𝑏)
−1 = (𝐴𝑎𝑏)
𝑇   (3.7) 
 
 
D. EULER ANGLES 
The orientation between a rigid body [x,y,z] and a fixed reference frame [X,Y,Z] can 
be represented as the composition of three consecutive elemental rotations, the 
order of which is important, about the axes of one of the two reference frames.  
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Figure 3-5 Representation of Euler Angles between two Reference Frames (X,Y,Z) 
and (x,y,z) (Brits, 2008). 
 
The angles that define the rotations are called Euler Angles and their combination 
generates in total 12 sets that can be divided in 2 different categories: 
- Proper or Classic Euler Angles, that use only two axes (symmetric: 3-1-3, 1-2-
1, 2-3-2, 1-3-1, 3-2-3, 2-1-2) 
- Tait-Bryan Angles, that uses all the three axes (1-2-3, 2-3-1, 3-1-2, 1-3-2, 3-2-
1, 2-1-3) 
The latter category is normally used in the Aerospace field, as for the Heading-
elevation-bank angles (Figure 3-6) and the yaw-pitch-roll angles (Figure 3-7), both 
usually denoted as (ϕ, θ, ψ). They are used to represent the position and orientation 
of aircrafts (and satellite as well) with respect to ground positions in a local or 
terrestrial reference frame, such as the North-East-Down (NED) and the East-North-
Up (ENU), presented in the previous section. 
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Figure 3-6 Heading-elevation-bank angles (Sempere, 2009).  
 
 
Figure 3-7 yaw-pitch-roll angles (Auawise, 2010). 
 
The rotations can also be divided in extrinsic and intrinsic, based on which of the two 
reference frames rotates respect to the other ([x,y,z] respect to [X,Y,Z] or vice versa). 
 
E. ELEMENTAL ROTATIONS 
Elemental rotations, which are rotation around a fixed axis, using Tait-Bryan Angles 
as parameters, are defined in the following way: 
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where x, y and z are the axes’ which the angles  ,   and    revolves around. 
As mentioned in the previous section, there are twelve possible sets of Euler angles, 
six symmetric and six asymmetric sets. 
In each label, the first (leftmost) integer denotes the first rotation axis. 
For example, the rotation matrix given by the set 3-2-1 is given by: 
     











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
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

ccscs
scsscsssccsc
sccssscssccc
AAAA xyz
  
       
       
123    (3.9) 
For additional information on Euler Angles and element rotations, the reader can 
refer to the texts by Curtis (2013) and Colasurdo (2010). 
 
 THE MATLAB ALGORITHM AVAILABILITY SIMULATION TOOL (MAAST) 
 
MAAST is a set of MATLAB functions developed by the University of Stanford 
for SBAS, RAIM and ARAIM availability analysis that is intended for use as a fast, 
accurate and highly customizable experimental testbed for algorithm development. 
The tool is open source and the original version and its related guides can be 
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downloaded from the University of Stanford website (Standford, 2014). The 
University of Stanford has also developed the ARAIM algorithm used in MAAST and 
it is based on the published paper by Blanch et al. (2012).  
The MAAST has the main objective of computing the four parameter indices of 
the reliability of the navigation solution provided by GNSS; these parameters are:  
 The Horizontal Protection Level (HPL),  
 The Vertical Protection Level (VPL),  
 The Accuracy  
 The Effective Monitoring Threshold (EMT).  
 
The tool takes as input: 
 A 2D map of the area of interest and density of the points on it to be analysed 
 The YUMA Almanac files. These contain the orbital parameters for each 
satellite of the constellation (GPS/Galileo/GLONASS). GPS YUMA almanacs are 
downloaded from the CelesTrak website (Kelso, 2015), which in turn are 
obtained from the US Coast Guard Navigation Center (NavCen, 1997). Galileo 
and GLONASS YUMA almanacs are provided with the MAAST and are based 
on the nominal constellation orbits. 
 The Required Navigation Performance (RNP). In order to use GNSS as the 
primary source for navigation in aviation, stringent requirements have to be 
met, the so-called Required Navigation Performance (RNP) for civil aviation, a 
concept endorsed by the ICAO (1999) and (2000). RNP are specified for the 
different flight phases in terms of the four parameters: accuracy, integrity, 
continuity of service and availability. 
120 
 
  
Table 3-1 Required Navigation Performance (ICAO, 2000). 
Operation 
Accuracy Integrity 
95% (2 σ) Alert Limit (4-5σ) 
TTA 
Vertical Horizontal Vertical Horizontal 
Oceanic 
N/A 
3.7 km or 
more 
N/A 
7.4 km or 
more 
1-5 min 
En-route 
Terminal 0.22-0.74 
km 
1.85-3.7 km 10-15 s 
NPA 
LNAV/VNAV 
20 m 
220 m 
50 m 
556 m 
10 s LPV 
16 m 40 m 
APV I 35 m 
APV II 8 m 20 m 
6 s LPV-200 
4 m 
35 m 
CAT I 10 m 
CAT II 
< 2.0 m < 6.9 m 5.3 m <15.5 m < 2 s 
CAT III 
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Operation 
Max Probabilities of Failure 
Availability 
Integrity (1-risk) Continuity (1-risk) 
Oceanic, En-route 
10-7/hr 10-4/hr 
10-2 to 10-5 
Terminal, NPA 
LNAV/VNAV 
1.2x10-7/ 150 s 4.8x10-6/ 15 s 
LPV 
APV I 
APV II 
LPV-200 
CAT I 
CAT II 
< 10-9/ 150 s < 4x10-6/ 15 s 
CAT III 
 
 Signal errors and biases characterisation. They can be specified for each 
satellite of the different constellation and expressed in terms of: 
- User Range Error (URE) and Signal-in-Space-Error for Galileo (SISE). 
- User-Range-Accuracy (URA) and Signal-in-space-accuracy, for Galileo (SISA). 
- Two levels of bias magnitudes for the range measurements: one is the 
magnitude of a bias in a nominal condition (bnom), used for the evaluation of 
accuracy and continuity, the other is the maximum bias magnitude used or 
the evaluation of integrity (bint). 
 Probability of failure for each satellite and constellation (Psat and Pconst). 
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 THE ARAIM PERFORMANCE ON PREDICTED AIRCRAFT TRAJECTORY TOOL 
(APPATT) 
 
For the purpose of this research, MAAST has been selected and modified in order to 
analyse the ARAIM performance along aircraft trajectories considering the 
shadowing effect of the aircraft attitude and surrounding environments. 
Based on the information provided by the researchers at the Stanford University, the 
algorithm in which MAAST is based was extensively reviewed by the bilateral EU- US 
working group that is developing the concept (WG-C).  In addition, the tool was cross-
checked against three other similar availability simulation tools (not been made 
publicly available), to make sure that the formulas were correctly implemented, 
developed by: 
- the University of the Federal Armed Forces UFAF (Dr Kropp’s thesis project will be 
available some time later in 2018) 
- DLR 
- ESA 
The newly developed algorithm, named APPATT, has the same objective as MAAST, 
to compute the four parameters indices of the reliability of the navigation solution 
provided by GNSS but with three main differences: 
- The tool takes two additional inputs with respect to the MAAST, txt files that 
include the trajectory (position and attitude) and terrain data (latitude, 
longitude and altitude) 
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- The tool compares the results of the integrity analysis computed including and 
not the shadowing effects of the aircraft attitude and surrounding 
environment, in order to highlight the differences. 
- The parameters are predicted for a specific point and time; they are not 
averaged values, but instantaneous, only valid for that well-defined 
configuration of the satellites constellations and signal errors and bias 
characterisation. 
The following sections will give a more detailed overview of the modified algorithm, 
the functions and processes that perform to compute the integrity performances of 
the selected trajectory. 
The overall tool is composed of several functions or sub-functions, each with a 
specific task, and Figure 3-8 summarises the overall flow chart of the APPATT 
algorithm. 
 
Figure 3-8 APPATT Scheme. 
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In this chapter, the first part is focused on the different elements and functions of the 
APPATT and an overview of the processes and algorithms integrated in the tool is 
provided, while the next chapter presents the selected scenario and related results. 
 
3.4.1. INPUT  
 
There is a primary function that is the main configuration function with which 
is possible to set up and select the inputs and the parameters needed for the ARAIM 
performance computation, summarised in Table 3-2 and Table 3-3. 
 
Table 3-2 Standard MAAST input. 
Parameter Definition 
URA and BIAS  
Standard deviation and bias of the clock and 
ephemeris error used for the computation of the 
integrity performance 
URE and Biascont 
Standard deviation of the clock and ephemeris used for 
the accuracy and continuity performance 
Psat and Pconst 
The a priori probabilities of failure per approach for 
the single satellite and constellation. 
PHMIvert and PHMIhor 
Integrity budget for the vertical and horizontal 
components 
Psat_thres and Pconst_thres  
Threshold for the integrity risk coming from 
unmonitored satellite and constellation faults 
Pfa  
Continuity budget allocated to disruptions due to false 
alert.  
Pfa_vert and Pfa_hor 
Continuity budget allocated to the vertical and 
horizontal mode 
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PLtol  Tolerance for the computation of the Protection Level 
PEMT  
Probability used for the calculation of the Effective 
Monitor Threshold 
HPL, VPL, EMT and 
accuracy  
The Thresholds Limits of the four ARAIM parameters 
for the specific phase of the flight (e.g. LPV-200 
approach). 
YUMA almanacs  
The input file for the constellation (single/dual/tri 
constellations configuration); the YUMA almanacs are 
categorized by week; therefore, it is necessary to select 
the suitable files for the trajectory that will be 
analysed. 
 
 
 
The new tool takes as additional input respect to the standard MAAST: 
Table 3-3 Additional APPATT input. 
Trajectory The input file for the trajectory 
treset 
Reset time (flight start time respect to the YUMA 
week time that starts every Sunday at 0:00) 
tint:  
Interpolation time (the trajectory files usually provide 
data every 5 seconds, but the data can be further 
linearly interpolated by using a user-defined time step) 
Environment Database 
High-resolution topographic data generated from 
NASA’s Space Shuttle Radar Topography Mission 
(SRTM) 
 
3.4.2. YUMA ALMANACS 
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The YUMA almanacs contain the elements of each GNSS satellite necessary to 
propagate the orbit of the satellite, such elements are presented in Table 3-4: 
 
Table 3-4 YUMA Almanacs Element Description (Kelso, 2015). 
Element Description 
ID Unique number (PRN) that defines the satellite (SV) 
Health Flag that sets the usability of the satellite 
(000=usable) 
Eccentricity (e) Amount by which an orbit deviates from a perfect 
circle. It is the distance between the foci divided by 
the length of the semi-major axis. 
Time of Applicability [s] A time tag indicating the number of seconds in the 
orbit when the almanac was generated. 
Orbital Inclination (i) [rad] Angle between the axis perpendicular to the orbital 
plane and the Earth rotation axis. 
Rate of Right Ascension 
(Ω)̇  [rad/s] 
Rate of change in the measurement of the angle of 
right ascension as defined in the Right Ascension 
mnemonic. 
Square Root of Semi-Major 
Axis (√𝒂) [m] 
This is defined as the measurement from the centre 
of the orbit to either the point of apogee or the 
point of perigee. 
Right Ascension (Ω0) at 
Time of Almanac (TOA) 
[rad] 
Right Ascension is an angular measurement on the 
equatorial plane from the vernal equinox to the 
point where the spacecraft crosses the 
fundamental plane while moving in the northerly 
direction 
Argument of Perigee [rad] An angular measurement along the orbital path 
measured from the ascending node to the point of 
perigee, measured in the direction of the SV's 
motion. 
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Mean Anomaly [rad] Angle (arc) travelled past the longitude of 
ascending node (value = 0±180 degrees).  
af0 [s] SV clock bias in seconds. 
af1 [s/s] SV clock drift in seconds per seconds. 
Week GPS week (0000–1023), every 7 days since 1999 
August 22. 
 
The YUMA almanac includes the six classical orbital elements that fully define an orbit 
(size, shape, direction and orientation) and the position of the satellite on it: 
1) Eccentricity (e) 
2) Semi-major axis (a) 
3) Inclination (i) 
4) Longitude of the Ascending Node (Ω) 
5) Argument of perigee (ω) 
6) True Anomaly (ν), substituted by the Mean Anomaly (M) in the almanac 
 
Figure 3-9 Orbital Elements (GSC-EUROPA, 2017). 
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From the orbital elements, it is possible to compute the satellite state vector (position 
[X,Y,Z] and velocity [Vx, Vy, Vz]) in the ECEF reference frame applying the algorithm 
that will be presented in Par. 3.4.5. 
 
3.4.3. AIRCRAFT TRAJECTORY  
 
The aircraft trajectory file is a text file generated by the RNAV Validation Tool (RVT) 
software developed by the DW International Ltd (now NavBlue); it is a desktop 
application, developed for EUROCONTROL, to help procedure designers in the ground 
validation of new or modified Radio Navigation (RNAV) Standard Instrument 
Departures (SIDs) and Standard Terminal Arrival Routes (STAR). Ground validation is 
a key step between the design and the implementation of RNAV procedures (Figure 
3-10).  
One of the RVT software features is the simulation of the aircraft dynamics along the 
defined trajectory. After each simulation, the software generates an output file in 
which the flight path is defined in terms of waypoints, providing information related 
to position, attitude, velocity and aircraft performance such as: 
- Latitude, Longitude and Altitude 
- Bank and Heading angles 
- Time (in seconds since trajectory started) 
- Calibrated and True Airspeed (CAS and TAS), Vertical Speed (VS) and 
Acceleration 
- Fuel Consumption and Thrust (based on the performance of the selected 
aircraft used for the simulation) 
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Figure 3-10 RTV GUI and results (DWint, 2013). 
 
The trajectory parameters are recorded every 5 seconds in level flight, while the time 
step is reduced during manoeuvres; however, the APPATT also includes a function 
that linearly interpolates the data in order to have a user defined time step between 
WPs that have a time interval higher than the one sets by the user (e.g. 1 second, like 
the update frequency of GNSS position estimation). Additionally, as an input 
parameter, the user can set a flight starting time, expressed in days, hours, minutes 
and seconds since the beginning of the week (the YUMA almanacs are provided 
weekly with starting time on Monday 12:00 am), allowing the user to select the 
preferred or expected starting day and time. 
The main limitation of the RVT output file is that, regarding the aircraft attitude, it 
only provides the bank and heading angles; for this reason, the following hypotheses 
have been considered: 
 Bank angle = Roll angle 
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 Heading angle = Yaw angle 
 Ramp angle = Pitch angle 
The first and second hypotheses are valid if there is “no wind” or “no trim” condition 
during the flight. The third is a worst-case approximation, since the RVT software 
doesn’t provide the ramp angle. In the APPATT, the ramp angle is taken as equal to 
the angle between the aircraft local horizon and the trajectory between two 
waypoints (Figure 3-11) (ramp angle = pitch angle, not always true since the altitude 
of the airplane can change even if the pitch angle is null or it can be constant even if 
the pitch angle is not zero). 
 
Figure 3-11 Ramp Angle. 
 
3.4.4. ENVIRONMENT DATABASE 
 
The surrounding environment along the flight path is extracted from the high-
resolution topographic data generated from NASA’s Space Shuttle Radar Topography 
Mission (SRTM) (NASA, 2000b).  
The SRTM was developed through an international collaboration with the objective 
of obtaining the most complete high-resolution digital topographic database of Earth 
on a near-global scale from 56° S to 60° N. In February 2000, the Space Shuttle 
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Endeavour carried the special radar system, a modified version of the Spaceborne 
Imaging Radar-C/X-band Synthetic Aperture Radar (SIR-C/X-SAR) already used in a 
previous mission to acquire topographic data. The payload consisted of two radar 
antennas, one located in the Shuttle's payload bay, the other on the end of a 60-
meter mast extended from the payload bay.  
 
Figure 3-12 Measurement Pattern of the Space Shuttle Radar Topography Mission 
(NASA, 2007). 
 
The elevation data are organised into tiles, each covering one degree of latitude 
and one degree of longitude. The resolution of the raw data is one arcsecond (30 m) 
over United States territory and three arcseconds (90 m) for the rest of the world.  
The arcsecond tiles have 3,601 rows, each consisting of 3,601 16-bit bigendian cells, 
while the three arcsecond tiles have 1201 rows and 1201 columns. Originally, the 
WGS84 ellipsoid was used as a reference for the elevation model, but lately the 
EGM96 geoid separation values were also introduced to facilitate the conversion of 
the related products.  
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Figure 3-13 Map of the Covered Areas by SRTM (NASA, 2001a). 
 
 
 
Figure 3-14 Example of 3D Terrain Reconstruction using SRTM data (NASA, 2000a). 
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3.4.5. INPUT ELABORATION AND INTEGRATION 
 
The previous section presented the main inputs that the APPATT tool takes and uses 
to evaluate the integrity performance of the provided aircraft trajectory. In this 
section, it is presented how the different inputs are elaborated and integrated (for 
the orbit propagation method and coordinate transformation the user can refer to 
the text by Curtis (2013)). 
 
A. SATELLITE POSITION AND PROPAGATION ON THE ORBIT: COMPUTATION OF THE 
TRUE ANOMALY, THE STATE VECTOR IN THE PERIFOCAL AND ECEF REFERENCE 
FRAMES  
 
The YUMA almanac provides all the required information to define the position of 
the GNSS satellites at a specific time (TOA). Given the Mean anomaly, it is necessary 
to compute the true anomaly (ν), through the Eccentric anomaly (E), following an 
iterative procedure, due to the fact that the relation between Mean and Eccentric 
anomaly is non-linear: 
𝑀 = 𝐸 − 𝑒 sin 𝐸     (3.10) 
Newton’s method is one of the methods that could be used to find the root of the 
equation using the following equation: 
𝐸𝑖+1 = 𝐸𝑖 −
𝑓(𝐸𝑖)
𝑓′(𝐸𝑖)
     (3.11) 
Where: 
𝑓(𝐸𝑖) = 𝐸𝑖 − 𝑒 sin𝐸𝑖 −𝑀    (3.12) 
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𝑓′(𝐸𝑖) = 1 − 𝑒 cos 𝐸𝑖     (3.13) 
Using as initial estimate for the Eccentric anomaly: 
- If M < π, E0 = M + e/2 
- If M > π, E0 = M – e/2 
The iterative process stops when the ratio f(Ei)/f
′(Ei) is less than the set tolerance 
(e.g. 10-8). 
Once the Eccentric anomaly is obtained, the true anomaly is computed using the 
following equation: 
tan
𝜈
2
= √
1+𝑒
1−𝑒
tan
𝐸
2
     (3.14) 
From the true anomaly, it is straightforward to define the satellite state vector in the 
perifocal reference frame (position [x, y, z] and velocity [vx, vy, vz]): 
{𝑟}𝑥 = {
𝑥
𝑦
𝑧
} = 𝑎(1 − 𝑒 cos𝐸) {
cos 𝜈
sin 𝜈
0
}   (3.15) 
{𝑣}𝑥 = {
𝑣𝑥
𝑣𝑦
𝑣𝑧
} =
𝜇
√𝑎𝜇(1−𝑒2)
{
−sin 𝜈
𝑒 + cos 𝜈
0
}    (3.16) 
Where μ is the gravitational constant of Earth and a is the semi-major axis of the 
orbit. 
At this point, the satellite state vector is expressed in the orbital perifocal frame and 
a sequence of three rotations is required to transform its components in the ECEF 
reference frame (Figure 3-15). Given the definition of the two reference frames and 
the coordinate transformation given in Section 1093.2, the sequence starts with a 
rotation around the ?̂? of an angle equal to the argument of perigee ω that brings the 
𝑖̂ axis in the Earth equatorial (XY) plane, in the position 𝑖̂′ along the node line, the 𝑗̂ 
axis in 𝑗̂′, and the associated orthogonal transformation matrix is: 
135 
 
𝐴3(ω) = [
cosω sin𝜔 0
−sin𝜔 cosω 0
0 0 1
]    (3.17) 
 
Figure 3-15 Change of Reference Frame: from Orbital to ECEF. 
 
The second rotation is around the new î′ axis, through the orbit inclination angle i, 
bringing the orbital plane parallel to the equatorial plane (ĵ′ becomes ĵ′′ in the XY 
plane) and aligning the perifocal k̂ axis with the ECEF K̂. The related rotation matrix 
is: 
𝐴1(i) = [
1 0 0
0 cos i sin 𝑖
0 −sin 𝑖 cos i
]    (3.18) 
The final rotation is again around the k̂ through the right ascension angle Ω that will 
eventually align the î′  and ĵ′′  axes with Î and Ĵ. The correspondent transformation 
matrix is: 
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𝐴3(Ω) = [
cosΩ sinΩ 0
−sinΩ cosΩ 0
0 0 1
]    (3.19) 
The final transformation matrix from xyz to XYZ is given by the product of the three 
rotation matrices: 
𝐴𝑥𝑋 = 𝐴3(Ω)𝐴1(i)𝐴3(ω) = 
=
[
cosΩ cosω − sinΩ sinω cos i − cosΩ sinω − sinΩ cos i cosω sinΩ sin i
sinΩ cosω + cosΩ cos i sinω −sinΩ sinω + cosΩ cos 𝑖 cos𝜔 −cosΩ sin i
sin𝜔 sin i sin i cosω cos i
]
(3.20) 
The satellite state vector in the ECEF reference frame is given then by: 
𝑟𝑋 = 𝐴𝑥𝑋𝑟𝑥   𝑣𝑋 = 𝐴𝑥𝑋𝑣𝑥   (3.21) 
 
The algorithm presented above is also used to propagate the satellite position along 
the orbit with some additional steps. Given the Δt respect to a specific time in which 
the satellite position is known (e.g. the YUMA Time of Applicability), it is possible to 
compute the Mean anomaly (M) through the Mean motion (n) given by: 
𝑛 =  
2𝜋
𝑇
= √
𝜇
𝑎3
     (3.22) 
Where T is the period of the orbit. 
Then the Mean anomaly is: 
 𝑀 = 𝑀0 + 𝑛Δ𝑡    (3.23) 
Where: 
- M0 is the input of the YUMA almanac 
And: 
𝜟𝒕 =  𝒕𝒓𝒆𝒔 + 𝒕𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒋 − 𝑻𝑶𝑨    (3.24) 
137 
 
defines the time respect to the beginning of the YUMA week in which: 
- tres is the time between the beginning of the week and the trajectory starting 
time, expressed in the input function in days, hours, minutes and seconds and 
all converted in seconds. 
- ttraj is the time since the beginning of the trajectory; the tool analyses one 
waypoint at a time, each with its own time stamp. 
- TOA is one of the parameters provided in the YUMA almanacs representing 
the time between the beginning of the week. 
Given the new Mean anomaly, it is possible to compute the true anomaly following 
the steps presented before to compute the state vector in the perifocal frame, but 
before projecting the state vector into the ECEF reference frame, it is necessary to 
update the right ascension of the node by using its rate (Ω̇): 
Ω𝑖 = Ω0 + (Ω̇ − Ω̇𝐸)𝜟𝒕 − Ω̇𝐸𝑚𝑜𝑑 (
𝑇𝑂𝐴
604800
)  (3.25) 
Where: 
- TOA is the Time of Applicability 
- Ω0 is the Right Ascension at Time of Almanac 
- Ω̇ is the Rate of Right Ascension 
- Ω̇E is the Earth's angular velocity 
- mod returns the remainder after the division of TOA and 604800 (number of 
seconds in a week). 
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B. FLIGHT PATH WAYPOINTS TRANSFORMATION AND COMPUTATION OF THE LINE OF 
SIGHT 
 
As it was introduced in the previous sections, the trajectory file describes the flight 
path in terms of geodetic latitude, longitude and altitude, however, in order to 
compute the line of sights, the geographical coordinates [ϕ, λ, h] (latitude, longitude 
and altitude) need to be converted in the ECEF reference frame [X,Y,Z]. The 
transformation is given by the following relations: 
 
𝑋 = (𝑅𝑁 + ℎ) cos𝜑 cos 𝜆
𝑌 = (𝑅𝑁 + ℎ) cos𝜑 sin 𝜆
𝑍 = [𝑅𝑁 + (1 − 𝑒
2)ℎ] sin𝜑
    (3.26) 
Where: 
𝑅𝑁 =
𝑅𝑒
√1−𝑒2 sin2𝜑
     (3.27) 
𝑒2 = 2𝑓 − 𝑓2     (3.28) 
- e is the WGS-84 first eccentricity 
- Re is the equatorial radius = 6378137.0 [m] 
- f is the Earth Flattering, which inverse value is 1 f⁄ = 298.257223563 
At this step, both satellites and aircraft positions are expressed in the ECEF 
reference system and it is now possible to compute the line of sight (LoS) between 
each aircraft position and all the satellites of the different constellations included in 
the analysis. The lines of sight are computed and stored in a matrix in terms of 
components of the unit vector between each pair of points: 
𝐿𝑜𝑆𝑖𝑗 =
[𝑋𝑗−𝑋𝑖 𝑌𝑗−𝑌𝑖 𝑍𝑗−𝑍𝑖]
√(𝑋𝑗−𝑋𝑖)
2
+(𝑌𝑗−𝑌𝑖)
2
+(𝑍𝑗−𝑍𝑖)
2
    (3.29) 
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Where  
- 1 < i <  n_waypoints, the number of position of the aircraft along the 
trajectory 
- [𝑋𝑖 𝑌𝑖 𝑍𝑖] waypoint coordinates in the ECEF 
- 1 <  j < n_sat, the total number of satellites included in the computation 
- [Xj Yj Zj]  satellite coordinates in the ECEF 
The stored unit vectors include all the LoS of the considered satellites, however, not 
all of them are effectively in view from the GNSS receiver point of view. A screening 
criterion needs to be implemented in order to discard the satellites that are below 
the receiver’s local horizon, for this reason, the LoSs have to be transformed in the 
aircraft body reference frame using the transformation matrix presented in Section 
3.4.5 . The components of the unit vectors need to be transformed three times: 
a) From ECEF to ENU reference frame. Figure 3-3 shows the relative position 
between the ENU reference frame and the ECEF; a counter-clock rotation of 
(90° + λ) along the Z axis is required to align the X and East axes and a 
counter-clock rotation of (90° - ϕ) along the new X-axis is required to align 
the Z to the Up axis. The final transformation matrix is: 
𝐿𝑜?̂?𝐸𝑁𝑈 = 𝐴𝐸𝐶𝐸𝐹−𝐸𝑁𝑈𝐿𝑜?̂?𝐸𝐶𝐸𝐹 = 𝐴1[𝜋 2⁄ − 𝜑]𝐴3[𝜋 2⁄ + 𝜆]𝐿𝑜?̂?𝐸𝐶𝐸𝐹  
=  (
− sin 𝜆 cos 𝜆 0
− cos 𝜆 sin𝜑 −sin 𝜆 sin𝜑 cos𝜑
cos 𝜆 cos𝜑 sin 𝜆 cos𝜑 sin 𝜑
) 𝐿𝑜?̂?𝐸𝐶𝐸𝐹  (3.30) 
b) From ENU to NED reference frame. Fig. shows the relative position between 
the ENU and NED reference frames. The two systems have a fixed relative 
position that doesn’t depend on the geographical coordinates, in which the 
East direction corresponds to the x-axis in ENU and the y-axis in the NED, the 
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North direction corresponds to the y-axis in ENU and the x-axis in the NED, 
while the z-axis corresponds to the Up direction in ENU and Down direction 
for the NED reference. There are two fixed rotations that transforms the 
ENU in NED, a 90° rotation around the Up direction, that leads x-axis in the 
North direction and the y-axis in the West direction, and a 180° degrees 
rotation around the x-axis, that leads the y-axis to point in the East direction 
and the z-axis in the Down direction. Another difference between the 
reference frame is the positive direction of the heading angle (the angle 
between the direction of motion and the North direction, represented as the 
East direction in Figure 3-16) that is measured clockwise in the NED 
reference frame and counter-clockwise in the ENU. 
 
Figure 3-16 Difference between ENU and NED Reference Frames.  
 
The equation that transforms the LoS from the ENU to the NED reference point is: 
𝐿𝑜?̂?𝑁𝐸𝐷 = 𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑈−𝑁𝐸𝐷𝐿𝑜?̂?𝐸𝑁𝑈 = 𝐴1[𝜋]𝐴3[
𝜋
2⁄ ]𝐿𝑜?̂?𝐸𝑁𝑈  
= (
− sin 𝜆 cos 𝜆 0
− cos 𝜆 sin𝜑 −sin 𝜆 sin𝜑 cos𝜑
cos 𝜆 cos𝜑 sin 𝜆 cos 𝜑 sin 𝜑
) 𝐿𝑜?̂?𝐸𝑁𝑈   (3.31) 
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c) From NED to Body reference frame. The final transformation brings the LoS 
from the NED reference frame to the Body reference frame, which attitude 
is defined by the three angles roll, pitch and yaw. Therefore, in this case, 
three rotations are required 
- Along the NED Z axis of an angle equal to the yaw angle, in order to align the 
NED X axis with the Body x-axis along the same direction. 
- Along the NED Y axis of an angle equal to the pitch angle, in order to fully 
align the NED X and Z axes with the Body x and z axes. 
- Along the NED X-axis of an angle equal to the roll angle, to complete the 
alignment of the axes of the two reference frames. 
The last transformation matrix is then expressed by: 
𝐿𝑜?̂?𝐵𝑂𝐷𝑌 = 𝐴𝑁𝐸𝐷−𝐵𝑂𝐷𝑌𝐿𝑜?̂?𝑁𝐸𝐷 = 𝐴1[𝜙]𝐴2[𝜃]𝐴3[𝜓]𝐿𝑜?̂?𝑁𝐸𝐷 = 
 (
cos 𝜃 cos𝜓 cos 𝜃 sin𝜓 −sin 𝜃
sinϕ sin 𝜃 cos𝜓 − cos𝜙 sin𝜓 sinϕ sin 𝜃 sin𝜓 + cos𝜙 cos𝜓 sin𝜙 cos 𝜃
cos𝜙 sin 𝜃 cos𝜓 + sin𝜙 sin𝜓 cos𝜙 sin 𝜃 sin𝜓−sin𝜙 cos𝜓 cos𝜙 cos 𝜃
)𝐿𝑜?̂?𝑁𝐸𝐷
    (3.32) 
 
3.4.6. COMPUTATION OF THE SHADOWING EFFECT OF THE AIRCRAFT ATTITUDE  
 
The APPATT algorithm uses the waypoints coordinates, the time information and the 
orbital elements provided by the YUMA almanacs to compute the aircraft and 
satellites positions respect to the Earth Centered Earth Fixed (ECEF) reference 
system, as described in Section 3.4.5. Afterwards, it computes the Line-of-Sight (LoS) 
unit vectors between each aircraft position and all the satellites of the considered 
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constellations. Then the LoS unit vectors are then converted in the local East, North 
and Up (ENU) reference frame for each location and the satellites below the horizon 
(with the z component of the LoS being negative) are removed from the computation, 
since they are below the local horizon. In order to evaluate the effect of the attitude 
of the aircraft, the LoSs are assessed in the NED (North-East-Down) and Body 
reference frame (Roll, Pitch and Yaw axes). NED coordinates to describe observations 
made from an aircraft are normally given relative to its intrinsic axes, but normally 
using as positive the coordinate pointing downwards, where the interesting points 
are located. At each change of reference frame, the algorithm computes and uses the 
corresponding rotation matrix to transform the LoS unit vectors. 
Once the LoSs are expressed in the Body reference frame, the same filter used to 
remove from the computation the satellites below the local horizon in the ECEF filter 
is applied, but this time all the LoS with z components positive are removed, due to 
the fact that the z-axis in the Body reference frame is pointing downward (considering 
a standard attitude for commercial airplane and not acrobatic or jetfighters).  
Figure 3-17 shows an example of the result of a specific point of the trajectory of an 
aircraft with banking angle of 20 degrees; there are the three different reference 
systems presented in Section 3.2, blue is the ENU, yellow the NED and magenta is the 
Body reference system. The red dots are the satellite in view in the ENU reference 
system, while the green circle is the aircraft horizontal plane (x-y or roll-pitch plane) 
and on the right side of the picture it is easy to see that there are three satellites 
below the GNSS receiver’s field of view, reducing the number of satellites in view and 
affecting the ARAIM performance as will be shown in the following chapters. 
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Figure 3-17 Example of Shadowing Effect due to the Aircraft Attitude. 
 
 
3.4.7. COMPUTATION OF THE SHADOWING EFFECT OF THE SURROUNDING 
ENVIRONMENT  
 
The APPATT reads and loads a txt file, generated from the conversion of the 
SRTM data, containing the geographical information (latitude, longitude and altitude) 
of the terrain surrounding the trajectory.  
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Figure 3-18 SRTM Data Tiles over the Map of Europe (NASA, 2001b). 
 
Figure 3-18 shows that the SRTM data is organized per tiles of dimension 1°latitude x 
1° longitude containing around 1.4 million sample points and for each point in the 
dataset, latitude, longitude and altitude is stored. 
Then, the data passes through a series of filters and checks in order reduce the 
computational load and with the main objective of finding the satellites that are 
shadowed by the terrain. 
 Figure 3-19 shows an example of a horizon mask, a 2D representation of the 
local skyline view; the circle centre is the local zenith and each circle is the elevation 
angle with respect to the local horizon represented by the external circumference. 
The spokes are the directions (also defined as azimuth or heading angles) with 
respect to the North direction. The red line and dots are the local terrain profile that 
could shadow one or more satellites.  
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Figure 3-19 Example of Horizon Mask with Satellite in Shadow. 
 
The objective of the terrain shadowing function is to evaluate which satellite lays 
behind the local skyline and its algorithm is quite straightforward and performs the 
following steps and checks: 
 Remove all the terrain points with altitude hterr   lower than the aircraft 
haircraft (an approximation that does not consider the Earth curvature). 
𝑖𝑓 ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟,𝑖 < ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑡 
         Terrain point i is discarded 
 
 Compute the LoS of the points left for each aircraft position and compute their 
elevation and heading angles with respect to the ENU reference system. 
- Compute LoS in the ENU reference frame using Eqs. (3.29) and (3.30). 
- Compute elevation (α) and azimuth (ψ, that correspond to the heading angle) 
of the LoS as: 
𝛼 = sin−1(𝐿𝑜𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑈,𝑧)    (3.33) 
𝜓 = tan−1 (
𝐿𝑜𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑈,𝑥
𝐿𝑜𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑈,𝑦
)    (3.34) 
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 Remove from the computation the satellites with elevation angles higher than 
the highest elevation angle of the sample points (it further reduces the number of 
satellites to check) 
𝑖𝑓 𝛼𝑠𝑎𝑡,𝑖 > 𝛼𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛   (3.35) 
             Satellite i is removed 
 
 Find the terrain points that have elevation angle higher than the lowest 
satellite elevation. 
𝑖𝑓 𝛼𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛,𝑖 < 𝛼𝑚𝑖𝑛,𝑠𝑎𝑡   (3.36) 
             Terrain i is removed 
 
The following steps are repeated for each of remaining satellites: 
 Find the terrain points that have the heading angles within a predefined range 
𝛽 (Figure 3-20). 
𝜓𝑠𝑎𝑡,𝑖 − 𝛽 ≤ 𝜓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛,𝑖 ≤ 𝜓𝑠𝑎𝑡,𝑖 + 𝛽  (3.37) 
 
Figure 3-20 Filtered Terrain Data in the Satellite Direction. 
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 For each point that passed the filter, the algorithm takes the eight adjacent 
points and checks for each pair of points (central + one of the adjacent) if the 
LoS between aircraft and satellite lays in between (comparing the azimuth 
angles) (Figure 3-21). 
𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝜓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛,𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 − 𝜓𝑠𝑎𝑡) = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝜓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛,𝑖 − 𝜓𝑠𝑎𝑡)  (3.38) 
             Terrain i is removed 
 
Figure 3-21 Points number 1, 2, 3 and 4 satisfy the filter condition. 
 
 For the remaining pairs, the algorithm interpolates the elevation values 
between the main central point and the adjacent ones to create a profile of the 
terrain data and compares the elevation value of the point that has the same 
azimuth angle of the satellite (Figure 3-22).  
𝛼𝑖𝑛𝑡 =
(𝜓𝑠𝑎𝑡−𝜓𝑖)(𝛼𝐶−𝛼𝑖)
(𝜓𝐶−𝜓𝑖)
+ 𝛼𝑖   (3.39) 
148 
 
 
Figure 3-22 Interpolation between Pair of Terrain Data. 
 
 If the elevation angle of the interpolated point is higher than the satellite, the 
satellite is declared shadowed and the algorithm repeats the previous steps for 
the remaining satellites. 
 If the elevation angle of the interpolated point is not higher than the satellite, 
the algorithm continues to check all the pair of points. 
 If none of the pairs satisfies the criteria, the algorithm selects the next central 
point from the list of the points that satisfied the condition (3.37) until it checks 
all the points for all the satellite that satisfied the condition (3.35). 
 
One of the limits of this algorithm is that the detection capability is strictly related 
to the resolution of the terrain data; higher is the resolution better will be the 
capability of the algorithm of identifying shadowed satellites and avoiding erroneous 
configurations, while at the same time a higher resolution also increases the 
computational effort. 
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Figure 3-23 Possible configuration with higher resolution data. 
 
Figure 3-24 shows an approach and related missed approach flight path integrated in 
the terrain data of the Alps area around Innsbruck airport, Austria, one of the airports 
selected for the ARAIM performance analysis in this research for its peculiar position 
within the mountains, a perfect scenario to test the algorithm capabilities and the 
effect of the terrain. 
 
Figure 3-24 Graphical View of an Approach and Missed Approach Trajectory 
Integrated in the Terrain Data. 
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3.4.8. OUTPUT 
 
At this stage, the algorithm has all the required input to analyse the integrity 
performances of the ARAIM algorithm described in Section 2.4.4 based on the 
remaining satellite in view. 
The APPATT tool provides as output for each trajectory waypoint: 
 Predicted ARAIM Performance with respect to the East North Up (ENU) 
reference frame (no shadow effect included, full view of the sky) 
 Predicted ARAIM Performance with respect to the aircraft body reference 
frame (both attitude and environment shadowing effect included) 
 Number of satellites in view in the two reference systems 
 Number of satellites lost due to the shadowing effects. 
In this chapter, a full overview of the APPATT algorithm has been provided, with a 
particular focus on the description of the shadowing effect functions. In the next 
chapter, the selected scenarios, parameters and configurations will be presented 
together with the results of the analysis of the integrity performances. 
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 INTEGRITY ANALYSIS OF SIMULATED AIRCRAFT 
TRAJECTORIES 
As it has been presented in the previous chapters, the current  RAIM technique is an 
approved civil aviation navigation system for Lateral Navigation (LNAV) in the En-
route, Terminal and Non-precision approach flight phases and RAIM prediction is 
required if GPS is to be used to solely satisfy the RNAV requirements (FAA, 2007a). 
The main drawbacks of the RAIM technique are: 
- uses a single constellation 
- uses a single frequency 
- detects a single fault, 
and these factors dramatically limit the performance.  
However, the new advanced version aims to become an approved navigation system 
down to the LPV-200 approach level in order to reduce the ground systems effort, to 
increase air traffic in minor airports and to allow curved and parallel approaches with 
reduced or limited visibility. The main strengths of ARAIM are  
- use multiple GNSS constellations 
- use dual frequency data 
- multiple fault detection capability 
For these reasons, one of the aims and main objectives of this research is to develop 
a system that satisfies the future needs of civil aviation.  
In this chapter, ARAIM performance are evaluated in simulated operational 
configurations: aircraft flights can last for hours and on-board receivers don’t always 
have a full view of the sky, attitude changes from manoeuvres, obscuration by the 
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aircraft body and shadowing from the surrounding environment could all affect the 
incoming signal from the GNSS constellations, leading to configurations that could 
adversely affect the real performance. For this reason, the main objective of the 
algorithm developed in this research project is to analyse these shadowing effects 
and compute the performance of the ARAIM technique when integrated with a 
predicted flight path using different combinations of three constellations (GPS, 
GLONASS and Galileo), considered as fully operational, since previous ARAIM 
performance analysis was mostly performed on selected points on the Earth’s 
surface, with full view of the sky, showing the potential of Advanced RAIM 
architectures to provide the Required Navigation Performance and achieve a global 
coverage of LPV-200 using, at least, two constellations. 
 
 CURRENT STATUS OF ARAIM PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS  
 
Figure 4-1 and Figure 4-2 show an example of the analyses performed by Stanford 
University with the MATLAB Algorithm Availability Simulation Tool (MAAST) 
considering a single constellation configuration (Galileo) and dual-constellation (GPS 
and Galileo) (Standford, 2014). In Figure 4-1 map there are the average Vertical 
Protection Levels in a 24-hour time interval using a single constellation configuration, 
in this case, Galileo in the 27 satellites configuration. The light green areas present a 
VPL value close to 35 m, the requirements for the LPV-200 approach, while the yellow 
areas have an average VPL of around 40 m, above the alert limit. Figure 4-2 instead 
represents the LPV-200 approach availability around the world using a dual 
constellation configuration (GPS and Galileo). Violet areas represent an availability of 
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more than 99.9%, in which the 99,9th VPL percentile means that for each location 
the VPL has been selected in order to have 99,9% of availability for the selected 
simulation time (Blanch et al., 2011).  
 
Figure 4-1 99.9th VPL percentile for ARAIM using the 27SV Galileo Constellation 
(Blanch et al., 2011). 
 
 
Figure 4-2 Combined Availability for GPS + Galileo (Blanch et al., 2011). 
 
However, in a real configuration, the aircraft attitude and the terrain and objects in 
the surrounding environment could shadow a certain number of satellites (Figure 
4-3), especially during a safety critical phase (take-off, maneuverings and landing 
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phases), leading to a possible degradation of the integrity performance of the ARAIM 
algorithm. 
 
Figure 4-3 Attitude shadowing effect. 
 
None of the previous analysis considered and integrated into the system the effects 
of these two factors, only Rippl et al. (2014) noticed an effect on the ARAIM 
performance during flight tests. 
This research has extended this requirement for a generic situation, analysing ARAIM 
performance prediction for different approach routes in several airports around the 
World in order to prove the concept. For the purpose of this research, the MAAST has 
been selected and modified in order to analyse ARAIM performance along aircraft 
trajectories considering the shadowing effect of the aircraft attitude and surrounding 
environments. The newly developed algorithm, named APPATT (ARAIM Performance 
on Predicted Trajectories Tool) and described in the previous chapter, has the main 
objective of computing the four parameter indices of the reliability of the navigation 
solution provided by GNSS. 
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 APPATT SHORT-TERM (ST) ALGORITHM AND SCENARIOS 
 
The APPATT algorithm presented in the previous chapter has been designed to 
analyse the integrity performance along aircraft trajectories considering the 
shadowing effect of the aircraft attitude and surrounding environments (if enabled 
in the tool).  
The newly developed algorithm has the same objective as the MAAST, to compute 
the four parameters indices of the reliability of the navigation solution provided by 
GNSS but with two main differences: 
- The tool compares the integrity parameters computed including and not 
including the shadowing effects of the aircraft attitude and the surrounding 
environment, with the main purpose of highlighting the impact of the loss of 
satellites on the performances. 
- The predicted parameters are valid for that specific trajectory and time that 
completely defines the configuration of the satellites constellations together with 
their expected signal errors and bias characterisation (see  
Table 4-2).  
For the purpose of this research, three different RNAV (RNP) approach procedures 
have been selected for the ARAIM prediction analysis: 
 Fairbanks (Alaska) (Figure 4-5) and Cairns (Australia) (Figure 4-6) due 
to their positions in areas of low ARAIM performance according to the 
analysis computed by the University of Stanford using a single 
constellation configuration (Figure 4-4). 
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 Innsbruck (Austria) (Figure 4-7) due to its peculiar location, where the 
environment shadowing effect could increase the number of the 
satellites not available. 
 
Figure 4-4 Selected Airport Locations. 
 
 
Figure 4-5 Fairbanks Approach Procedure. 
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Figure 4-6 Cairns Approach Procedure. 
 
Figure 4-7 Innsbruck Approach Procedure. 
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The other main advantage of these three approaches is that they include a wide 
variety of manoeuvres (90, 180 and 270 degrees manoeuvres). 
The three trajectories have been defined using the details provided in the approach 
charts and inserted in the RVT software (Figure 4-8), that generates as output a txt 
file (Figure 4-9) with the information required for the ARAIM analysis (coordinates, 
time and attitude). The generated trajectories also include the missed approach 
manoeuvre that the aircrafts are expected to execute in case the landing is aborted. 
Additionally, for the simulation it has been selected as aircraft an Airbus A320, the 
software allows to select the aircraft category and model since the characterisation 
of the trajectory depends on the aircraft performances. All the manoeuvres along the 
trajectories satisfy the standard limitations imposed by the regulations for 
commercial flights that are (values depend on the aircraft model and approach type): 
- Max bank angle between 25-33° 
- Max pitch angles: 15-20° positive pitch (take-off) and 5° negative pitch 
(landing). 
The Innsbruck missed approach is of particular interest, it is a 270° manoeuvre above 
a valley surrounded by mountains that brings the aircraft to fly again over the runway 
before leaving the airport area in the North-East direction. Innsbruck airport is a 
perfect example of how a reliable and accurate navigation system could make the 
difference in a location in which aircrafts can proceed on only one route, limiting the 
airport capabilities and driving the safety requirements. 
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Figure 4-8 Trajectory definition in the RVT software. 
 
 
Figure 4-9 Extract of the RVT trajectory output. 
 
  RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
The three trajectories have been analysed in different scenarios (single, dual and tri-
constellation), combining the different constellations: GPS, Galileo (24 and 27 
satellites nominal configuration) and GLONASS (23 satellites nominal configuration).  
The tool takes as input: 
- Trajectory and environment files 
- Satellites mask angle; receivers automatically screen-out (mask) the satellites 
that are below a defined elevation angle (e.g. 5°). In this research, different 
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mask angles have been used to evaluate if the inclusion of masked satellites 
could improve the performances. 
- Integrity parameters  
- Signal error and bias characterization. 
- Reset time. Trajectory starting time respect to the GPS week time 
- YUMA Almanacs 
The tool provides as output several graphs: 
 Aircraft attitude along the trajectory: Roll, Pitch and Yaw angles. 
 Number of satellites in view in the ENU and Body reference system, 
distinguishing the one. Satellites are removed from the computation 
following the criteria described in Section 3.4.6 and Section 3.4.7. 
 Horizontal and Vertical Protection Level (HPL and VPL), Accuracy and Effective 
Monitoring Threshold in the ENU and Body reference frame respect to the 
Alert Limit. 
Table 4-1 and  
Table 4-2 summarises the values used by Stanford University for the integrity 
parameters and used as reference for the trajectory analysis, but tests using different 
values for the signal errors, bias characterisation and probability of 
satellite/constellation failure are going to be presented as well. 
Table 4-1 Parameter Definitions. 
Name Description Value 
Psat Probability of satellite failure of the single 
satellite 
10-5 
Pconst Probability of constellation failure 10-4 
161 
 
Name Description Value 
PHMI  Total integrity budget  10-7 
PHMIVERT  Integrity budget for the vertical component  9.8x10-8 
PHMIHOR  Integrity budget for the horizontal component  2x10-9 
PFA  Continuity budget allocated to disruptions 
due to false alert.  
4x10-6 
PFA_VERT  Continuity budget allocated to the vertical 
mode  
3.9x10-6 
PFA_HOR  Continuity budget allocated to the horizontal 
mode  
9x10-8 
PEMT Probability used for the calculation of the 
Effective Monitor Threshold 
10-5 
 
Table 4-2 Signal Errors and Bias Characterisation.  
 GPS Galileo GLONASS 
URA (m) 1 1 0.75 
URE (m) 0.5 0.5 0.5 
bnom (m) 0 0 0 
bint (m) 0.75 0.75 0.75 
 
4.3.1. INNSBRUCK AIRPORT 
 
This section is dedicated to the analysis of the integrity performance of the RNAV 
(RNP) approach procedure (including the missed approach phase) for the airport of 
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Innsbruck. The trajectory is going to be analysed using different combinations of 
three GNSS constellations (GPS, Galileo in the 24SV and 27SV configuration and 
GLONASS) and mask angles. The terrain data included in the computation covers the 
area between 47-48° latitude and 11-13° longitude. 
Figure 4-10 shows the aircraft attitude along the trajectory expressed in terms of Roll 
(red), Pitch (green) and Yaw (blue) angles; on the X-axis there are the waypoints along 
the trajectory and on the Y axis the values of the attitude angles in degrees. It is easy 
to reconstruct the different phases of the flight from the values of the angles: 
- Between WPs 100 and 550 the final descent to the runway (pitch angle 
negative) 
- Between WPs 550 and 850 the initial phase of the missed approach with the 
aircraft gaining altitude (pitch angle positive) and following the valley 
- Between WP 850 and 1000 the 250° manoeuvre to go back in the direction of 
the airport 
- Between WP 1000 and 1800, the aircraft follows the valley and flies over the 
runaway going back on the same path travelled in the first phase (to be 
noticed in particular the symmetry between WP 1100-1800 and WP 0-550). 
The aircraft attitude angles, in particular the bank and pitch angles, respect the 
standard values  
 
163 
 
 
Figure 4-10 Aircraft Attitude along the trajectory: Roll (red), Pitch (green) and Yaw 
(blue) angles. 
 
A. SINGLE CONSTELLATION CONFIGURATION 
- Single constellation GPS: Yuma almanac week 703 (TOA 319488s), reset time 
[0d 0h 0m 0s], mask angle 5° 
 
Figure 4-11 Number of Satellites in view in the ENU (red) and Body (blue) 
Reference Frames along the Trajectory. 
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Figure 4-12 Number of Shadowed Satellites by Aircraft Attitude (blue) and Terrain 
(red). 
 
Figure 4-11 shows the number of satellites in view along the trajectory in the two 
reference frames (Body and ENU), while Figure 4-12 shows the number of satellites 
that have been shadowed by the aircraft attitude and by the surrounding 
environment (to be noticed that the two numbers in the graph are cumulative, for 
example at WP 500 one satellite is shadowed by the terrain, in red, and one by the 
aircraft attitude, in blue, for a total of two loss of LoS). Another thing to be noticed is 
that in Figure 4-12 and in all the subsequent graphs, the environmental shadowing 
effect is mainly affecting the system between WP400 and WP600, in this section of 
the trajectory the aircraft altitude is low enough to be affected by the mountains 
surrounding the area around Innsbruck airport. 
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Figure 4-13 Satellites in View Skyplot in the ENU Reference Frame. 
 
  
Figure 4-14 Satellites Elevation.  Figure 4-15 Satellites visibility by PRN. 
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Figure 4-13 shows the sky view of the path and the number of the GPS satellites in 
view in the ENU reference frame. 
Figure 4-14 shows the elevation angle of all the satellites along the path. This figure 
makes easy to identify which satellites were lost due to the shadowing effect or 
because it set below the horizon, e.g. satellite number 24 (the grey descending line 
on the bottom left side of the picture) sets below the horizon between WP 300 and 
400, reducing the number of satellite in view. 
Figure 4-14 instead shows the visibility of the satellites, ordered by PRN number on 
the y-axis, along the trajectory in the body reference frame. Each gap in the line 
represents a waypoint in which that specific satellite was lost due to the shadowing 
effect of the aircraft during the manoeuvre or due to the shadowing effect of the 
surrounding environment. 
Figure 4-10 shows that along the 250° turn of the missed approach phase, the aircraft 
heading angle goes from almost 300° to around 50° with a roll angle of 25°. Along 
these part of the trajectory, the GNSS receiver loses three satellites, as displayed in 
Figure 4-11 and by comparing Figure 4-13, Figure 4-14 and Figure 4-14, it is easy to 
define that the GPS satellites with PRN 14, 21 and 30 are the one below the receiver’s 
local horizon and the following graphs show the impact on the integrity 
performances. 
 
 
 
 
167 
 
 
 
Figure 4-16 HPL in the ENU (green) 
and Body (blue) Reference Frames 
compared with the Alert Level (red). 
 
Figure 4-17 VPL in the ENU (green) 
and Body (blue) Reference Frames 
compared with the Alert Level (red). 
 
 
Figure 4-18 Accuracy in the ENU 
(green) and Body (blue) Reference 
Frames compared with the Alert 
Level (red). 
 
Figure 4-19 EMT in the ENU (green) 
and Body (blue) Reference Frames 
compared with the Alert Level (red). 
 
Figure 4-16, Figure 4-17, Figure 4-18 and Figure 4-19 show that with the current 
configuration (single constellation, GPS) and at the current flight time, all the integrity 
parameters overcome the alert of level due to the limited availability of satellites in 
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view at around WP 977 (969 for accuracy). Table 4-3 shows the max values that each 
parameter reaches and in which WP for both the reference frame (ENU and body) 
and the value that the parameters reach in the ENU reference frame in 
correspondence of the WP in which the body reference frame reaches the max 
values. The values below the Alert level (last column on the right) are highlighted in 
green, the values close but below the AL in yellow and in red are highlighted the 
values above the AL. 
Table 4-4 shows the difference in percentage between the maximum values in the 
body reference frame and the correspondent values in the ENU reference frame 
together with the difference in percentage between the Body max values and the 
Alert Level. All the parameters in the Body frame overtake that Alert Levels with a 
minimum of 50% of their values to up to a maximum of 140%. 
Table 4-3 Values Comparison between ENU and Body Reference Frames. 
Performance 
Parameter 
MaxENU WPMax_ENU MaxBody WPMax_Body 
ENU at 
WPMax_Body 
AL 
HPL (m) 30.1 1 79.31 977 13.58 40 
VPL (m) 29.5 130 79.02 977 12.56 35 
EMT (m) 13.35 158 36.08 977 4.54 15 
Accuracy (m) 1.5 1 2.84 969 1.17 1.87 
 
Table 4-4 Percentage Differences between Max Values in Body Reference Frame, 
related ENU values and Alert Level. 
Performance 
Parameter 
Δ% between Body and 
ENU at WPMax_Body 
Δ% between 
MaxBody and AL 
HPL (m) 484.01 98.27 
VPL (m) 528.87 125.78 
EMT (m) 694.83 140.55 
Accuracy (m) 143.21 51.75 
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- Single constellation GPS: Yuma almanac week 703 (TOA 319488s), reset time 
[0d 0h 0m 0s], mask angle 2° 
For this case, there is only a slight variation respect to the previous scenario. 
The constellation considered is still GPS, what is changed is the mask angle that 
has been reduced to 2° in order to evaluate that effects generate the 
introduction of new satellites in the configuration, even though their elevation 
angle is very low and so having bigger biases.  
 
Figure 4-20 Number of Satellites in view in the ENU (red) and Body (blue) 
Reference Frames along the Trajectory. 
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Figure 4-21 Number of Shadowed Satellites by Aircraft Attitude (blue) and Terrain 
(red) 
 
By comparing Figure 4-20 and Figure 4-11, it is already clear how the reduction of the 
mask angle has changed the scenario along the flight path, in particular in the first 
part, in which the number of satellites in view has increased from 6 to 11, due to the 
fact that 5 satellites are below the 5° degree elevation angle, that are satellite 4, 10, 
21, 24 and 29. By checking Figure 4-23 it is clear that the elevation angles of satellites 
4 and 24 are decreasing and eventually fall below the 2° mask angle around WP 400, 
while for satellites 10, 21 and 29, the elevation angle is increasing but starting from a 
very low value and for this reason filtered out in the previous case. 
200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800
Waypoint
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
Nu
m
be
r o
f S
at
el
lite
s
Difference of Satellite ENU and Body and Terrain Shadowed satellites
diff-ENU/Body
Terr shad sat
171 
 
 
Figure 4-22 Satellites in View Skyplot in the ENU reference frame. 
 
 
Figure 4-23 Satellites Elevation.  Figure 4-24 Satellites visibility by PRN. 
 
Figure 4-20 and Figure 4-21 also show that decreasing the mask angle has increased 
the occurrences of LoSs since each manoeuvre performed by the aircraft and the 
surrounding environment easily shadow the satellites with low elevation. 
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Figure 4-25 HPL in the ENU (green) and 
Body (blue) Reference Frames 
compared with the Alert Level (red). 
 
Figure 4-26 VPL in the ENU (green) 
and Body (blue) Reference Frames 
compared with the Alert Level 
(red). 
 
Figure 4-27 Accuracy in the ENU 
(green) and Body (blue) Reference 
Frames compared with the Alert Level 
(red). 
 
Figure 4-28 EMT in the ENU (green) 
and Body (blue) Reference Frames 
compared with the Alert Level (red). 
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1000, the number of satellite in view dropped to five, limiting the redundancy in the 
system and bringing the integrity parameters above the alert levels. With the reduced 
mask angle, the number of satellites in view for this specific location and scenario has 
increased to seven, positively affecting the results. 
 
Table 4-5 Values Comparison between ENU and Body Reference Frames. 
Performance 
Parameter 
MaxENU WPMax_ENU MaxBody WPMax_Body 
ENU at 
WPMax_Body 
AL 
HPL (m) 13.98 337 34.97 1001 12.73 40 
VPL (m) 11.09 337 29.29 467 10.96 35 
EMT (m) 3.85 337 13.37 467 3.8 15 
Accuracy (m) 1.21 337 2.4 969 1.09 1.87 
 
Table 4-6 Percentage Differences between Max Values in Body Reference Frame, 
related ENU values and Alert Level. 
Performance 
Parameter 
Δ% between Body and 
ENU at WPMax_Body 
Δ% between 
MaxBody and AL 
HPL (m) 174.63 -12.58 
VPL (m) 138.61 -16.3 
EMT (m) 214.63 -10.85 
Accuracy (m) 119.73 28.08 
 
Table 4-5 and Table 4-6 confirm that the integrity parameters improved with the 
addition of new redundant satellites (as expected) aside for the accuracy that is still 
above the alert level and the other PLs are very close to the ALs (10-16% lower), giving 
limited margin in case of a sudden increase or change in the values of signal errors 
and biases. For completeness of the analysis, in Appendix D it has been included the 
single constellation configuration (GPS) with receiver’s mask angle equal to 0°. 
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- Single constellation Galileo 24SV: Yuma almanac provided with MAAST, 
reset time [0d 0h 0m 0s], mask angle 5° 
For this case, the single constellation using the Galileo configuration with 24 
satellites has been considered together with the mask angle of 5°. 
 
Figure 4-29 Number of Satellites in view in the ENU (red) and Body (blue) 
Reference Frames along the Trajectory. 
 
 
Figure 4-30 Number of Shadowed Satellites by Aircraft Attitude (blue) and Terrain 
(red). 
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Figure 4-29, Figure 4-30 and Figure 4-31 show that in this particular configuration, 
there are few satellites that are shadowed along the flight path and none of them 
Galileo satellites is shadowed by the surrounding environments but only by the 
attitude of the aircraft. Due to the reduced size of the picture, it is not easy to spot in 
Figure 4-32 that the satellite lost three times along the trajectory in three different 
WP is the PRN n. 76, between WP 600-700, around 1000 and between 1200-1300. In 
these three manoeuvres the aircraft is banking with an angle of 20-25° in a direction 
that generates a mask on satellite 76. 
 
Figure 4-31 Satellites in View Skyplot in the ENU reference frame. 
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Figure 4-32 Satellites Elevation. Figure 4-33 Satellites visibility by PRN. 
 
Figure 4-34 to Figure 4-37 show that each event of a loss of a satellite generates a 
peak in the integrity parameters, in particular due to the fact that each satellite lost 
reduces the number of available ones to five, limiting the redundancy of the system 
and affecting the performances of the technique. The only parameter that remains 
within the Alert Level is the accuracy. 
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Figure 4-34 HPL in the ENU (green) 
and Body (blue) Reference Frames 
compared with the Alert Level (red). 
 
Figure 4-35 VPL in the ENU (green) 
and Body (blue) Reference Frames 
compared with the Alert Level (red). 
 
Figure 4-36 Accuracy in the ENU 
(green) and Body (blue) Reference 
Frames compared with the Alert 
Level (red). 
 
Figure 4-37 EMT in the ENU (green) 
and Body (blue) Reference Frames 
compared with the Alert Level (red). 
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Table 4-7 Values Comparison between ENU and Body Reference Frames. 
Performance 
Parameter 
MaxENU WPMax_ENU MaxBody WPMax_Body 
ENU at 
WPMax_Body 
AL 
HPL (m) 19.39 399 187.54 655 18.96 40 
VPL (m) 19.55 399 609.43 655 19.06 35 
EMT (m) 7.36 399 255.16 655 7.05 15 
Accuracy (m) 1.23 399 1.65 655 1.22 1.87 
 
Table 4-8 Percentage Differences between Max Values in Body Reference 
Frame, related ENU values and Alert Level. 
Performance 
Parameter 
Δ% between Body and 
ENU at WPMax_Body 
Δ% between 
MaxBody and AL 
HPL (m) 889.34 368.86 
VPL (m) 3097.7 1641.2 
EMT (m) 3518.2 1601.1 
Accuracy (m) 35.77 -11.65 
 
- Single constellation Galileo 27SV: Yuma almanac provided with MAAST, 
reset time [0d 0h 0m 0s], mask angle 5° 
The main difference of this scenario respect to the previous one is that analyses 
the Galileo constellation configuration with 27 satellites in orbit. 
 
Figure 4-38 Number of Satellites in view in the ENU (red) and Body (blue) 
Reference Frames along the Trajectory. 
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Figure 4-39 Number of Shadowed Satellites by Aircraft Attitude (blue) and Terrain 
(red). 
 
Figure 4-38 Number of Satellites in view in the ENU (red) and Body (blue) Reference 
Frames along the Trajectory. and Figure 4-39 show that the overall shadowing effect 
hasn’t changed respect to the 24SV configuration, but the increase on number of 
satellite in orbit has actually helped this particular scenario, since the number of total 
satellite in view has increased of one unity, bringing the minimum number reached 
in the body reference frame to six and providing support to the integrity 
performances. By comparing Figure 4-31 Satellites in View Skyplot in the ENU 
reference frame. with Figure 4-40 Satellites in View Skyplot in the ENU reference 
frame.it is easy to define that the added satellite is PRN 101, that having a high 
elevation angle in this specific scenario, it remains visible for the whole trajectory.  
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Figure 4-40 Satellites in View Skyplot in the ENU reference frame. 
 
 
Figure 4-41 Satellites Elevation. Figure 4-42 Satellites visibility by PRN. 
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Figure 4-43 HPL in the ENU (green) 
and Body (blue) Reference Frames 
compared with the Alert Level (red). 
 
Figure 4-44 VPL in the ENU (green) 
and Body (blue) Reference Frames 
compared with the Alert Level (red). 
 
Figure 4-45 Accuracy in the ENU 
(green) and Body (blue) Reference 
Frames compared with the Alert 
Level (red). 
 
Figure 4-46 EMT in the ENU (green) 
and Body (blue) Reference Frames 
compared with the Alert Level (red). 
Figure 4-43 to Figure 4-46 show that even the addition of a single satellite can 
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used in this simulation that these parameters could generate an integrity outage (that 
in this case is already triggered by the HPL).  
Table 4-9 and Table 4-10 show the values reached by the different parameters. The 
latter one in particular shows that VPL, EMT and accuracy are few percentages below 
the alert levels. 
Table 4-9 Values Comparison between ENU and Body Reference Frames. 
Performance 
Parameter 
MaxENU WPMax_ENU MaxBody WPMax_Body 
ENU at 
WPMax_Body 
AL 
HPL (m) 18.86 399 50.18 1258 17.75 40 
VPL (m) 16.69 400 34.82 655 16.63 35 
EMT (m) 5.69 399 13.69 655 5.6 15 
Accuracy (m) 1.20 399 1.62 655 1.18 1.87 
 
Table 4-10 Percentage Differences between Max Values in Body Reference Frame, 
related ENU values and Alert Level. 
Performance 
Parameter 
Δ% between Body and 
ENU at WPMax_Body 
Δ% between 
MaxBody and AL 
HPL (m) 182.71 25.45 
VPL (m) 109.4 -0.53 
EMT (m) 144.39 -8.71 
Accuracy (m) 36.08 -13.55 
 
This case clearly shows the difference between having a full operational Galileo 
constellation (27SV) and a quasi-full operational constellation (24SV). In this 
configuration, the aircraft has an additional satellite in view along the trajectory that 
allows keeping some of the parameters below the alert levels, the only exception is 
the HPL 
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- Single constellation GLONASS: Yuma almanac provided with MAAST, reset 
time [0d 0h 0m 0s], mask angle 5° 
After having analysed the performances of the single constellation with GPS and 
Galileo (with two different configuration), it is worth to analyse the 
performances of the Russian constellation, due to its particular configuration, in 
particular of the orbit. The almanac used in this research considers the GLONASS 
constellation with 23 operational satellite. 
 
Figure 4-47 Number of Satellites in view in the ENU (red) and Body (blue) 
Reference Frames along the Trajectory. 
 
 
Figure 4-48 Number of Shadowed Satellites by Aircraft Attitude (blue) and Terrain 
(red). 
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Figure 4-49 shows that in this particular simulation, the GLONASS constellation 
presents several satellites with low elevation angle, in particular in the second half of 
the trajectory, as it can be seen in the bottom right part of Figure 4-50, making them 
much easier to be shadowed. Figure 4-47, Figure 4-48 confirm this concern and the 
aircraft loses the LoS with the satellites multiple times along the trajectory and losing 
up to a maximum of four satellites around WP900. 
 
 
Figure 4-49 Satellites in View Skyplot in the ENU reference frame. 
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Figure 4-50 Satellites Elevation. Figure 4-51 Satellites visibility by PRN. 
 
 
 
Figure 4-52 HPL in the ENU (green) 
and Body (blue) Reference Frames 
compared with the Alert Level (red). 
 
Figure 4-53 VPL in the ENU (green) 
and Body (blue) Reference Frames 
compared with the Alert Level (red). 
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Figure 4-54 Accuracy in the ENU 
(green) and Body (blue) Reference 
Frames compared with the Alert 
Level (red). 
 
Figure 4-55 EMT in the ENU (green) 
and Body (blue) Reference Frames 
compared with the Alert Level (red). 
 
Figure 4-52 to Figure 4-55 confirm the behaviour seen in the previous cases, with the 
parameters reaching very high values in particular when the number of satellite in 
view drop below 6 (around WP900 and WP1100). 
Table 4-11 and Table 4-12 show that maximum values in the body reference frame 
reach values as little as 30% higher than the alert level (accuracy) to up to a maximum 
of 10 times (VPL and EMT) 
 
Table 4-11 Values Comparison between ENU and Body Reference Frames. 
Performance 
Parameter 
MaxENU WPMax_ENU MaxBody WPMax_Body 
ENU at 
WPMax_Body 
AL 
HPL (m) 16.9 1195 83.09 924 14.3 40 
VPL (m) 15.09 1 324.43 1101 14.79 35 
EMT (m) 6.19 1195 153.32 1101 6.18 15 
Accuracy (m) 1.33 1753 2.43 1101 1.28 1.87 
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Table 4-12 Percentage Differences between Max Values in Body Reference Frame, 
related ENU values and Alert Level. 
Performance 
Parameter 
Δ% between Body and 
ENU at WPMax_Body 
Δ% between 
MaxBody and AL 
HPL (m) 480.85 107.72 
VPL (m) 2093 826.93 
EMT (m) 2379.7 922.15 
Accuracy (m) 89.12 30.04 
 
The single constellation scenarios analysed so far show that overall the algorithm 
performs very well if the shadowing effect is not taken into account, all the values in 
the ENU reference frame are within the alert levels since the satellite geometry is 
good enough to keep the values low. However, the implemented shadowing effect 
shows that the loss a satellite generates a peak in the parameters that could lead to 
an integrity outage, depending on the satellite geometry and the number of satellites 
in view left.  
The above analyses seem to confirm the necessity of integrating more than one 
constellation, in order to avoid at least cases in which the number of satellites in view 
drops below six. 
In the next section, the different combination of dual-constellation configuration will 
be analysed. 
 
B. DUAL-CONSTELLATION CONFIGURATION 
In this section, different combinations of the three constellations, taken two by two, 
are analysed.  
- GPS and Galileo 24SV 
- GPS and Galileo 27SV 
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- GPS and GLONASS 
- Galileo 24SV and GLONASS 
- Galileo 27SV and GLONASS 
 
- Dual-constellation GPS and Galileo 24SV: Yuma almanac week 703 for GPS, 
provided with MAAST for Galileo, reset time [0d 0h 0m 0s], mask angle 5° 
 
Figure 4-56 Number of Satellites in view in the ENU (red) and Body (blue) 
Reference Frames along the Trajectory. 
 
 
Figure 4-57 Number of Shadowed Satellites by Aircraft Attitude (blue) and Terrain 
(red). 
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Figure 4-58 Satellites in View Skyplot in the ENU reference frame (GPS in 
red and Galileo in green). 
 
Figure 4-56 and Figure 4-57 show that the implementation of a dual-constellation 
system has obviously increased the average number of satellite in view as well as the 
number of loss of LoS. Figure 4-58 shows in red the GPS satellites and in green the 
Galileo ones and how the combination of the two constellations improve the variety 
of positions and geometry, confirmed by Figure 4-59 in which it is possible to see that 
many ranges of elevation angles are covered along the trajectory 
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Figure 4-59 Satellites Elevation. Figure 4-60 Satellites visibility by PRN. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-61 HPL in the ENU (green) 
and Body (blue) Reference Frames 
compared with the Alert Level (red). 
 
Figure 4-62 VPL in the ENU (green) 
and Body (blue) Reference Frames 
compared with the Alert Level (red). 
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Figure 4-63 Accuracy in the ENU 
(green) and Body (blue) Reference 
Frames compared with the Alert 
Level (red). 
 
Figure 4-64 EMT in the ENU (green) 
and Body (blue) Reference Frames 
compared with the Alert Level (red). 
 
Figure 4-61 to Figure 4-64 confirm that using two different constellations enhances 
the capabilities of the ARAIM technique, all the parameters that in the previous 
single-constellation cases were overtaking the limit (at least one of them), in this case 
all of them stayed within the alert limits. It has to be noticed, however, that for the 
VPL and the EMT, the values are close to the limits (only 5-10% below as shown in  
Table 4-14). 
 
 
Table 4-13 Values Comparison between ENU and Body Reference Frames. 
Performance 
Parameter 
MaxENU WPMax_ENU MaxBody WPMax_Body 
ENU at 
WPMax_Body 
AL 
HPL (m) 15.95 158 28.53 969 14.05 40 
VPL (m) 16.7 1 33 969 15.86 35 
EMT (m) 6.45 1 13.6 969 5.43 15 
Accuracy (m) 0.87 399 1.3 971 0.83 1.87 
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Table 4-14 Percentage Differences between Max Values in Body Reference Frame, 
related ENU values and Alert Level. 
Performance 
Parameter 
Δ% between Body and 
ENU at WPMax_Body 
Δ% between 
MaxBody and AL 
HPL (m) 103.03 -28.67 
VPL (m) 107.82 -5.81 
EMT (m) 150.39 -9.4 
Accuracy (m) 56.98 -30.52 
 
- Dual-constellation GPS and Galileo 27SV: Yuma almanac week 703 for GPS, 
provided with MAAST for Galileo, reset time [0d 0h 0m 0s], mask angle 5° 
As for the single constellation, also for the dual configuration the Galileo 27SV is 
considered. As in the previous exanimated cases, the introduction of the 27SV 
configuration adds only one more satellite to the simulation, as it can be noticed by 
comparing Figure 4-65 with Figure 4-47 (max number is seventeen in this former 
picture, against the sixteen of the latter). But considering that the added satellite, 
number 101, has a high elevation angle, nothing has changed in the number of 
satellite lost. 
 
Figure 4-65 Number of Satellites in view in the ENU (red) and Body (blue) 
Reference Frames along the Trajectory. 
Waypoint
200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800
Nu
mb
er 
of 
Sa
tell
ites
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
Number of Satellite in View
ref-ENU
ref-Body
193 
 
 
Figure 4-66 Number of Shadowed Satellites by Aircraft Attitude (blue) and Terrain 
(red). 
 
 
Figure 4-67 Satellites in View Skyplot in the ENU reference frame (GPS in 
red and Galileo in green). 
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Figure 4-68 Satellites Elevation. Figure 4-69 Satellites visibility by PRN. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-70 HPL in the ENU (green) 
and Body (blue) Reference Frames 
compared with the Alert Level (red). 
 
Figure 4-71 VPL in the ENU (green) 
and Body (blue) Reference Frames 
compared with the Alert Level (red). 
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Figure 4-72 Accuracy in the ENU 
(green) and Body (blue) Reference 
Frames compared with the Alert 
Level (red). 
 
Figure 4-73 EMT in the ENU (green) and 
Body (blue) Reference Frames compared 
with the Alert Level (red). 
 
Despite the increase in the number of satellite available, Figure 4-70 to Figure 4-73 
and Table 4-15 and Table 4-16 show that almost nothing has changed from the 
performances point of view, probably due to the fact that the added satellite is in a 
position in the sky where there is already another satellite and so not bringing  a 
variation in the overall geometry of the scenario, or at least nothing has changed in 
the geometry of the worst subset . 
Table 4-15 Values Comparison between ENU and Body Reference Frames. 
Performance 
Parameter 
MaxENU WPMax_ENU MaxBody WPMax_Body 
ENU at 
WPMax_Body 
AL 
HPL (m) 15.73 158 28.65 969 13.52 40 
VPL (m) 16.8 1 33.08 969 15.59 35 
EMT (m) 6.51 1 13.64 969 5.21 15 
Accuracy (m) 0.87 399 1.29 971 0.82 1.87 
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Table 4-16 Percentage Differences between Max Values in Body Reference Frame, 
related ENU values and Alert Level. 
Performance 
Parameter 
Δ% between Body and 
ENU at WPMax_Body 
Δ% between 
MaxBody and AL 
HPL (m) 111.9 -28.36 
VPL (m) 112.15 -5.48 
EMT (m) 161.77 -9.03 
Accuracy (m) 56.85 -30.9 
 
- Dual-constellation GPS and GLONASS: Yuma almanac week 703 for GPS and 
provided with MAAST for GLONASS, reset time [0d 0h 0m 0s], mask angle 5° 
The next case includes the combination of the American and Russian systems. 
Figure 4-74 shows that the satellites available in this scenario ranges between 12 
and 20, so between 2-3 times the average values in the single constellation 
scenarios.  
 
Figure 4-74 Number of Satellites in view in the ENU (red) and Body (blue) 
Reference Frames along the Trajectory. 
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Figure 4-75 Number of Shadowed Satellites by Aircraft Attitude (blue) and Terrain 
(red). 
 
Figure 4-75 and Figure 4-76 shows as for the previous case that the number of loss of 
LoS has increased due to the increased number of satellites available and the 
increased variety and range of their locations and elevations, in particular for 
elevation below 25° and Figure 4-77 confirms that half of them is in that range. 
 
Figure 4-76 Satellites in View Skyplot in the ENU reference frame (GPS in red and 
GLONASS in blue). 
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Figure 4-77 Satellites Elevation. Figure 4-78 Satellites visibility by PRN. 
 
Figure 4-79 to Figure 4-82 shows as for the previous case that the use of two 
constellations provides enough redundancy to reduce the impact on the 
performances. None of the integrity parameters exceeds the alert level, but two of 
them (VPL and EMT) are close to the alert levels, they are only 4-6% below (see Table 
4-17 and Table 4-18 for further details). This means that a slight change in the biases 
or probabilities that characterise the system could generate an outage. 
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Figure 4-79 HPL in the ENU (green) 
and Body (blue) Reference Frames 
compared with the Alert Level (red). 
 
Figure 4-80 VPL in the ENU (green) 
and Body (blue) Reference Frames 
compared with the Alert Level (red). 
 
Figure 4-81 Accuracy in the ENU 
(green) and Body (blue) Reference 
Frames compared with the Alert 
Level (red). 
 
Figure 4-82 EMT in the ENU (green) 
and Body (blue) Reference Frames 
compared with the Alert Level (red). 
 
Table 4-17 Values Comparison between ENU and Body Reference Frames. 
Performance 
Parameter 
MaxENU WPMax_ENU MaxBody WPMax_Body 
ENU at 
WPMax_Body 
AL 
HPL (m) 15.97 158 28.74 976 13.3 40 
VPL (m) 16.55 1 33.52 976 12.64 35 
EMT (m) 6.26 1 14.02 976 4.65 15 
Accuracy (m) 0.95 1 1.17 975 0.82 1.87 
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Table 4-18 Percentage Differences between Max Values in Body Reference Frame, 
related ENU values and Alert Level. 
Performance 
Parameter 
Δ% between Body and 
ENU at WPMax_Body 
Δ% between 
MaxBody and AL 
HPL (m) 116.1 -28.16 
VPL (m) 165.2 -4.23 
EMT (m) 201.91 -6.5 
Accuracy (m) 43.01 -37.23 
 
- Dual-constellation Galileo 24SV and GLONASS: Yuma almanac provided with 
MAAST, reset time [0d 0h 0m 0s], mask angle 5° 
It is now the turn to analyse the combination of the European and Russian systems. 
As for the GPS-GLONASS case, Figure 4-83 and Figure 4-84 show the number of 
satellite in view along the trajectory and the ones lost, while Figure 4-85 and Figure 
4-86 show the location and elevation of the satellites. To be noticed that respect to 
the previous case, there a less homogeneous distribution of the satellites along the 
range of elevation values, leaving a gap between 25° and 40°. 
 
Figure 4-83 Number of Satellites in view in the ENU (red) and Body (blue) 
Reference Frames along the Trajectory. 
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Figure 4-84 Number of Shadowed Satellites by Aircraft Attitude (blue) and Terrain 
(red). 
 
 
Figure 4-85 Satellites in View Skyplot in the ENU reference frame 
(GLONASS in blue and Galileo in green). 
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Figure 4-86 Satellites Elevation. Figure 4-87 Satellites visibility by PRN. 
 
Figure 4-88 to Figure 4-91 show the results of this particular scenario that combines 
the Galileo 24SV constellation and GLONASS has better performances compared to 
the GPS-GLONASS and GPS-Galileo. Values of the parameters are far from the alert 
levels, all the values are actually 50% less than them. 
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Figure 4-88 HPL in the ENU (green) 
and Body (blue) Reference Frames 
compared with the Alert Level (red). 
 
Figure 4-89 VPL in the ENU (green) 
and Body (blue) Reference Frames 
compared with the Alert Level (red). 
 
Figure 4-90 Accuracy in the ENU 
(green) and Body (blue) Reference 
Frames compared with the Alert 
Level (red). 
 
Figure 4-91 EMT in the ENU (green) 
and Body (blue) Reference Frames 
compared with the Alert Level (red). 
 
Table 4-19 Values Comparison between ENU and Body Reference Frames. 
Performance 
Parameter 
MaxENU WPMax_ENU MaxBody WPMax_Body 
ENU at 
WPMax_Body 
AL 
HPL (m) 11.73 158 20.16 976 10.31 40 
VPL (m) 10.54 1 17.32 976 10.09 35 
EMT (m) 3.77 1753 6.48 976 3.34 15 
Accuracy (m) 0.71 399 0.95 975 0.68 1.87 
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Table 4-20 Percentage Differences between Max Values in Body Reference Frame, 
related ENU values and Alert Level. 
Performance 
Parameter 
Δ% between Body and 
ENU at WPMax_Body 
Δ% between 
MaxBody and AL 
HPL (m) 95.61 -49.59 
VPL (m) 71.56 -50.51 
EMT (m) 94 -56.8 
Accuracy (m) 38.41 -49.44 
 
- Dual-constellation Galileo 27SV and GLONASS: Yuma almanac provided with 
MAAST, reset time [0d 0h 0m 0s], mask angle 5° 
As for the previous cases, implementing the 27SV configuration introduces one more 
satellite in view, as it can be easily seen by comparing Figure 4-92 and Figure 4-83. 
However, results presented in Figure 4-97 to Figure 4-100 show that the addition of 
one satellite it actually degrades the integrity of the performances. Respect to the 
previous case, the percentage difference between the performances computed in the 
body reference frame and the alert level has increased by 10-20%. 
 
Figure 4-92 Number of Satellites in view in the ENU (red) and Body (blue) 
Reference Frames along the Trajectory. 
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Figure 4-93 Number of Shadowed Satellites by Aircraft Attitude (blue) and Terrain 
(red). 
 
 
Figure 4-94 Satellites in View Skyplot in the ENU reference frame (GLONASS in 
blue and Galileo in green). 
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Figure 4-95 Satellites Elevation. Figure 4-96 Satellites visibility by PRN. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-97 HPL in the ENU (green) 
and Body (blue) Reference Frames 
compared with the Alert Level (red). 
 
Figure 4-98 VPL in the ENU (green) 
and Body (blue) Reference Frames 
compared with the Alert Level (red). 
Waypoint
200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800
E
l 
(d
e
g
)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Satellites Elevation angles
38
39
43
45
50
51
52
53
56
59
60
76
77
78
79
93
94
95
Waypoint
0 500 1000 1500 2000
P
R
N
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
Satellites in View in Body Frame
 38
 39
 43
 45
 50
 51
 52
 53
 56
 59
 60
 76
 77
 78
 79
 93
 94
 95
101
0 500 1000 1500 2000
Waypoint
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
VP
L 
(m
)
Vertical Protection Level
ref-ENU
ref-Body
Alert-Level
Waypoint
0 500 1000 1500 2000
HP
L 
(m
)
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Horizontal Protection Level
ref-ENU
ref-Body
Alert-Level
Waypoint
0 500 1000 1500 2000
VP
L 
(m
)
10
15
20
25
30
35
Vertical Protection Level
ref-ENU
ref-Body
Alert-Level
207 
 
 
Figure 4-99 Accuracy in the ENU 
(green) and Body (blue) Reference 
Frames compared with the Alert 
Level (red). 
 
Figure 4-100 EMT in the ENU (green) 
and Body (blue) Reference Frames 
compared with the Alert Level (red). 
 
Table 4-21 Values Comparison between ENU and Body Reference Frames. 
Performance 
Parameter 
MaxENU WPMax_ENU MaxBody WPMax_Body 
ENU at 
WPMax_Body 
AL 
HPL (m) 13.41 1601 18.62 1101 12.93 40 
VPL (m) 16.09 1602 23.45 1101 15.85 35 
EMT (m) 5.63 1602 9.79 1101 5.47 15 
Accuracy (m) 0.87 1753 1.13 997 0.86 1.87 
 
Table 4-22 Percentage Differences between Max Values in Body Reference Frame, 
related ENU values and Alert Level. 
Performance 
Parameter 
Δ% between Body and 
ENU at WPMax_Body 
Δ% between 
MaxBody and AL 
HPL (m) 44.02 -53.44 
VPL (m) 47.97 -32.99 
EMT (m) 79.01 -34.68 
Accuracy (m) 32.27 -39.5 
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The combination of two constellations has increased the number of satellites in view, 
improving the performances of the integrity parameters. None of the analysed 
configurations presents an outage, however, in some cases, the protection levels are 
close to the alert levels (less than 20%) leaving short margins to a sudden change in 
the nominal values used for the characterisation of the signal errors and biases. 
Additionally, it is interesting to notice how the loss or addition of a satellite can 
generate an effect that is opposite to the expected. Examples are the two 
combinations that use the two different Galileo configurations (24SV and 27SV, for 
which the only difference is the addition of the satellite n.101), both the GPS and 
GLONASS present better performances for some of the parameters when they are 
combined with the 24SV configuration (e.g. the VPL goes from 17m in the 
GLONASS+Galileo 24SV to 23m in the GLONASS+Galileo 27SV, while the difference 
between the combinations GPS+Galileo 24SV and GPS+Galileo 27SV is much less 
relevant, only 0.08m), the same effect is found in the tri-constellation configuration 
(see next section). At the same time, the loss of a satellite in all the combinations that 
involve the Galileo constellation sometimes generates an improvement in the 
performances; for examples in Figure 4-71 VPL in the ENU (green) and Body (blue) 
Reference Frames compared with the Alert Level (red) of the GPS+Galileo 27SV case, 
around WP-500, the performances (mainly VPL and EMT) in the ENU reference frame 
(green line) is above the one from the Body reference frame (blue line). In this part 
of the trajectory, satellite n. 30 (a GPS satellite) has just arisen from the horizon 
(Figure 4-68) and above the mask angle in the ENU reference point, but due to the 
aircraft manoeuvre (banking and pitching) the satellite is not visible in the Body 
reference frame until it is ended.  
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A similar situation can be seen in the GLONASS+Galileo 27SV at around WP-600, in 
which the satellite n. 52 (a GLONASS satellite) is on the way to set below the local 
horizon and due to the aircraft manoeuvre, this satellite is shadowed and missing in 
the Body reference. In this case as well, the VPL and EMT values in the Body reference 
frames are below the ones in the ENU reference frame. It is believed that cause of 
this unexpected behaviour resides in the satellites geometry that influences the value 
of S0 in eq. (2.30), a variable that depends from the geometry G and the weight matrix 
W, that in cascades determines the values of T (Eq. 2.31) σss (Eq. 2.34) and then HPL 
and VPL.  
 
C. TRI-CONSTELLATION CONFIGURATION 
This section analyses the effect of the simultaneous integration of the three GNSS 
constellation in the receiver. Two different configurations are considered: 
- GPS, Galileo 24SV and GLONASS 
- GPS, Galileo 27SV and GLONASS 
 
- Tri-constellation GPS, Galileo 24SV and GLONASS: Yuma almanac week 703 
for GPS and provided with MAAST for Galileo and GLONASS, reset time [0d 
0h 0m 0s], mask angle 5° 
With a tri constellation configuration, the total number of satellites in view reaches 
the maximum value of 26 units, while the minimum does not go below 17. This 
implementation presents optimal performances, with values that stay below by 50% 
of the alert limits (as shown in Table 4-23 and Table 4-24). 
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Figure 4-101 Number of Satellites in view in the ENU (red) and Body (blue) 
Reference Frames along the Trajectory. 
 
 
Figure 4-102 Number of Shadowed Satellites by Aircraft Attitude (blue) and 
Terrain (red). 
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Figure 4-103 Satellites in View Skyplot in the ENU reference frame (GPS in 
red, GLONASS in blue and Galileo in green). 
 
  
Figure 4-104 Satellites Elevation. Figure 4-105 Satellites visibility by PRN. 
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Figure 4-106 HPL in the ENU (green) 
and Body (blue) Reference Frames 
compared with the Alert Level (red). 
 
Figure 4-107 VPL in the ENU 
(green) and Body (blue) Reference 
Frames compared with the Alert 
Level (red). 
 
Figure 4-108 Accuracy in the ENU 
(green) and Body (blue) Reference 
Frames compared with the Alert 
Level (red). 
 
Figure 4-109 EMT in the ENU (green) 
and Body (blue) Reference Frames 
compared with the Alert Level (red). 
 
Table 4-23 Values Comparison between ENU and Body Reference Frames. 
Performance 
Parameter 
MaxENU WPMax_ENU MaxBody WPMax_Body 
ENU at 
WPMax_Body 
AL 
HPL (m) 11.73 158 20.16 976 10.31 40 
VPL (m) 10.54 1 17.32 976 10.1 35 
EMT (m) 3.77 1753 6.48 976 3.34 15 
Accuracy (m) 0.71 399 0.95 975 0.68 1.87 
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Table 4-24 Percentage Differences between Max Values in Body Reference Frame, 
related ENU values and Alert Level. 
Performance 
Parameter 
Δ% between Body and 
ENU at WPMax_Body 
Δ% between 
MaxBody and AL 
HPL (m) 95.61 -49.59 
VPL (m) 71.56 -50.51 
EMT (m) 94 -56.8 
Accuracy (m) 38.41 -49.44 
 
 
- Tri-constellation GPS, Galileo 27SV and GLONASS: Yuma almanac week 703 
for GPS and provided with MAAST for Galileo and GLONASS, reset time [0d 
0h 0m 0s], mask angle 5° 
 
Figure 4-110 Number of Satellites in view in the ENU (red) and Body (blue) 
Reference Frames along the Trajectory. 
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Figure 4-111 Number of Shadowed Satellites by Aircraft Attitude (blue) and 
Terrain (red). 
 
 
Figure 4-112 Satellites in View Skyplot in the ENU reference frame, (GPS in 
red, GLONASS in blue and Galileo in green). 
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Figure 4-113 Satellites Elevation. Figure 4-114 Satellites visibility by PRN. 
 
 
 
Figure 4-115 HPL in the ENU (green) 
and Body (blue) Reference Frames 
compared with the Alert Level (red). 
 
Figure 4-116 VPL in the ENU 
(green) and Body (blue) Reference 
Frames compared with the Alert 
Level (red). 
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Figure 4-117 Accuracy in the ENU 
(green) and Body (blue) Reference 
Frames compared with the Alert Level 
(red). 
 
Figure 4-118 EMT in the ENU (green) 
and Body (blue) Reference Frames 
compared with the Alert Level (red). 
 
Table 4-25 Values Comparison between ENU and Body Reference Frames. 
Performance 
Parameter 
MaxENU WPMax_ENU MaxBody WPMax_Body 
ENU at 
WPMax_Body 
AL 
HPL (m) 11.66 158 20.17 976 10.05 40 
VPL (m) 10.59 1 17.36 976 10.11 35 
EMT (m) 3.63 1 6.45 976 3.33 15 
Accuracy (m) 0.7 399 0.94 975 0.67 1.87 
 
Table 4-26 Percentage Differences between Max Values in Body Reference Frame, 
related ENU values and Alert Level. 
Performance 
Parameter 
Δ% between Body and 
ENU at WPMax_Body 
Δ% between 
MaxBody and AL 
HPL (m) 100.65 -49.57 
VPL (m) 71.64 -50.4 
EMT (m) 93.45 -57 
Accuracy (m) 39.11 -49.51 
 
Using three constellations further improves the capabilities of the ARAIM algorithm 
of satisfying the required navigation performance for the LPV-200. All the PLs are well 
below the ALs with a margin of around 50%. 
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4.3.2. CAIRNS AND FAIRBANKS AIRPORTS 
 
In this section, a quick overview of the other selected airports is presented, since the 
results are comparable with what has been already presented in the previous section 
related to the Innsbruck airport. Figure 4-5 and Figure 4-6 showed the chosen 
approach procedures and Figure 4-119 and Figure 4-120 the aircraft angles along the 
trajectories. 
 
Figure 4-119 Aircraft Attitude Angles along the Approach Procedure for Cairns 
Airport. 
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Figure 4-120 Aircraft Attitude Angles along the Approach Procedure for Fairbanks 
Airport. 
 
As for Innsbruck airport, the performance parameters are analysed in different 
configurations and combinations of the three constellations, but they are 
summarised in tables and graphs for few cases to show that comparable results are 
found for other approach procedures. 
 
- Single Constellation GPS: Yuma almanac week 703 for GPS, reset time [0d 
1h 0m 0s] for Cairns and [0d 3h 0m 0s] for Fairbanks, mask angle 5° 
 
Figure 4-121 Number of Satellites in view (left) and difference (right) in the ENU 
(red) and Body (blue) Reference Frames for the Approach Procedure to the Airport 
of Cairns. 
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Figure 4-122 PLs in the ENU (green) and Body (blue) Reference Frames compared 
with the Alert Level (red) for the Approach Procedure to the Airport of Cairns. 
 
Figure 4-123 Number of Satellites in view (left) and difference (right) in the ENU 
(red) and Body (blue) Reference Frames for the Approach Procedure to the Airport 
of Fairbanks. 
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Figure 4-124 PLs in the ENU (green) and Body (blue) Reference Frames compared 
with the Alert Level (red) for the Approach Procedure to the Airport of Fairbanks. 
 
Table 4-27 Values Comparison and Percentage Differences between ENU and Body 
Reference Frames for Cairns and Fairbanks Airports. 
 
Performance 
Parameters 
Location 
Max 
Body 
ENU 
value 
ΔBody-
ENU% 
ΔAL% AL 
HPL (m) 
Cairns 14.2 10.8 31.8 -64.4 
40 
Fairbanks 15.6 10.1 54.5 -61.1 
VPL (m) 
Cairns 17.4 13.2 31.9 -50.2 
35 
Fairbanks 31.84 13.8 131.4 -9.0 
EMT (m) 
Cairns 7.1 5.2 35.7 -52.7 
15 
Fairbanks 14.97 5.1 191.7 -0.2 
Acc (m) 
Cairns 1.53 1.5 0.02 -18.3 
1.87 
Fairbanks 2.11 1.4 48.2 12.6 
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- Single Constellation Galileo 24SV: Yuma almanac week 703 for GPS, reset 
time [0d 1h 0m 0s] for Cairns and [0d 3h 0m 0s] for Fairbanks, mask angle 5° 
-  
Table 4-28 Values Comparison and Percentage Differences between ENU and Body 
Reference Frames for Cairns and Fairbanks Airports. 
Performance 
Parameters 
Location 
Max 
Body 
ENU 
value 
ΔBody-
ENU% 
ΔAL% AL 
HPL (m) 
Cairns 14.6 8.6 68.9 -63.6 
40 
Fairbanks 16.4 10.9 47.7 -59.9 
VPL (m) 
Cairns 23.1 13.6 70.0 -34.0 
35 
Fairbanks 14.4 12.7 13.8 -58.8 
EMT (m) 
Cairns 9.0 5.1 75.5 -40.1 
15 
Fairbanks 5.5 4.8 14.1 -63.6 
Acc (m) 
Cairns 1.92 1.3 52.6 2.5 
1.87 
Fairbanks 1.2 1.1 5.9 -38.0 
 
 
 
- Single Constellation Galileo 27SV: Yuma almanac week 703 for GPS, reset 
time [0d 1h 0m 0s] for Cairns and [0d 3h 0m 0s] for Fairbanks, mask angle 5° 
 
Table 4-29 Values Comparison and Percentage Differences between ENU and Body 
Reference Frames for Cairns and Fairbanks Airports. 
Performance 
Parameters 
Location 
Max 
Body 
ENU 
value 
ΔBody-
ENU% 
ΔAL% AL 
HPL (m) 
Cairns 14.6 8.6 68.9 -63.6 
40 
Fairbanks 14.4 10.3 39.9 -63.9 
VPL (m) 
Cairns 23.1 13.6 70.0 -34.0 
35 
Fairbanks 13.5 12.3 9.2 -61.6 
EMT (m) 
Cairns 9.0 5.1 75.5 -40.1 
15 
Fairbanks 5.7 4.7 10.9 -64.9 
Acc (m) 
Cairns 1.92 1.3 52.6 2.5 
1.87 
Fairbanks 1.1 1.1 0.0 -41.0 
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- Single Constellation GLONASS: Yuma almanac week 703 for GPS, reset time 
[0d 1h 0m 0s] for Cairns and [0d 3h 0m 0s] for Fairbanks, mask angle 5° 
 
Table 4-30 Values Comparison and Percentage Differences between ENU and Body 
Reference Frames for Cairns and Fairbanks Airports. 
Performance 
Parameters 
Location 
Max 
Body 
ENU 
value 
ΔBody-
ENU% 
ΔAL% AL 
HPL (m) 
Cairns 26.1 26.1 0.0 -34.8 
40 
Fairbanks 18.6 11.7 58.5 -53.6 
VPL (m) 
Cairns 36.3 36.3 0.0 3.7 
35 
Fairbanks 14.8 19.4 31.5 -44.5 
EMT (m) 
Cairns 16.6 11.5 43.8 10.5 
15 
Fairbanks 9.2 6.0 52.3 -38.6 
Acc (m) 
Cairns 3.2 3.2 0.0 67.8 
1.87 
Fairbanks 1.6 1.4 14.6 -13.9 
 
- Dual-Constellation GPS + Galileo 24SV: Yuma almanac week 703 for GPS and 
provided with MAAST for Galileo, reset time [0d 1h 0m 0s] for Cairns and [0d 
3h 0m 0s] for Fairbanks, mask angle 5° 
 
Figure 4-125 Number of Satellites in view (left) and difference (right) in the ENU 
(red) and Body (blue) Reference Frames for the Approach Procedure to the Airport 
of Cairns. 
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Figure 4-126 PLs in the ENU (green) and Body (blue) Reference Frames compared 
with the Alert Level (red) for the Approach Procedure to the Airport of Cairns. 
 
Figure 4-127 Number of Satellites in view (left) and difference (right) in the ENU 
(red) and Body (blue) Reference Frames for the Approach Procedure to the Airport 
of Fairbanks. 
 
224 
 
 
Figure 4-128 PLs in the ENU (green) and Body (blue) Reference Frames compared 
with the Alert Level (red) for the Approach Procedure to the Airport of Fairbanks. 
 
Table 4-31 Values Comparison and Percentage Differences between ENU and Body 
Reference Frames for Cairns and Fairbanks Airports. 
Performance 
Parameters 
Location 
Max 
Body 
ENU 
value 
ΔBody-
ENU% 
ΔAL% AL 
HPL (m) 
Cairns 12.3 10.3 19.3 -69.3 
40 
Fairbanks 13.4 12.5 7.5 -66.4 
VPL (m) 
Cairns 21.4 13.1 63.2 -38.8 
35 
Fairbanks 22.4 13.8 62.4 -36.0 
EMT (m) 
Cairns 8.6 4.8 79.7 -42.9 
15 
Fairbanks 9.5 5.4 76.5 -37.0 
Acc (m) 
Cairns 1.1 0.9 19.6 -42.8 
1.87 
Fairbanks 1.0 0.9 15.0 -46.9 
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- Dual-Constellation GPS + Galileo 27SV: Yuma almanac week 703 for GPS and 
provided with MAAST for Galileo, reset time [0d 1h 0m 0s] for Cairns and [0d 
3h 0m 0s] for Fairbanks, mask angle 5° 
 
Table 4-32 Values Comparison and Percentage Differences between ENU and Body 
Reference Frames for Cairns and Fairbanks Airports. 
Performance 
Parameters 
Location 
Max 
Body 
ENU 
value 
ΔBody-
ENU% 
ΔAL% AL 
HPL (m) 
Cairns 12.3 10.3 19.3 -69.3 
40 
Fairbanks 13.5 12.2 10.1 -66.3 
VPL (m) 
Cairns 21.4 13.1 63.2 -38.8 
35 
Fairbanks 22.6 14.0 61.4 -35.5 
EMT (m) 
Cairns 8.6 4.8 79.7 -42.9 
15 
Fairbanks 9.6 5.5 74.4 -36.3 
Acc (m) 
Cairns 0.9 1.07 19.6 -42.8 
1.87 
Fairbanks 1.0 0.8 14.0 -48.4 
 
 
- Dual-Constellation GPS + GLONASS: Yuma almanac week 703 for GPS and 
provided with MAAST for Galileo, reset time [0d 1h 0m 0s] for Cairns and [0d 
3h 0m 0s] for Fairbanks, mask angle 5° 
 
Table 4-33 Values Comparison and Percentage Differences between ENU and Body 
Reference Frames for Cairns and Fairbanks Airports. 
Performance 
Parameters 
Location 
Max 
Body 
ENU 
value 
ΔBody-
ENU% 
ΔAL% AL 
HPL (m) 
Cairns 11.8 11.1 6.3 -70.5 
40 
Fairbanks 14.9 12.9 15.5 -62.8 
VPL (m) 
Cairns 29.5 29.5 0.0 -15.8 
35 
Fairbanks 21.9 14.5 51.4 -37.4 
EMT (m) 
Cairns 13.2 13.2 0.0 -12.8 
15 
Fairbanks 9.0 5.6 62.2 -39.9 
Acc (m) 
Cairns 1.3 1.1 10.3 -32.7 
1.87 
Fairbanks 1.2 1.0 24.9 -36.2 
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- Dual-Constellation Galileo 24SV + GLONASS: Yuma almanac week 703 for 
GPS and provided with MAAST for Galileo, reset time [0d 1h 0m 0s] for Cairns 
and [0d 3h 0m 0s] for Fairbanks, mask angle 5° 
 
Table 4-34 Values Comparison and Percentage Differences between ENU and Body 
Reference Frames for Cairns and Fairbanks Airports. 
Performance 
Parameters 
Location 
Max 
Body 
ENU 
value 
ΔBody-
ENU% 
ΔAL% AL 
HPL (m) 
Cairns 11.5 11.5 0.0 -71.2 
40 
Fairbanks 12.7 11.0 14.4 -68.2 
VPL (m) 
Cairns 29.3 29.3 0.0 -16.4 
35 
Fairbanks 15.9 13.9 14.4 -54.7 
EMT (m) 
Cairns 13.1 13.1 0.0 -13.0 
15 
Fairbanks 6.5 5.3 21.5 -56.7 
Acc (m) 
Cairns 1.5 1.1 35.3 -18.3 
1.87 
Fairbanks 0.92 0.9 7.5 -50.5 
- Dual-Constellation Galileo 27SV + GLONASS: Yuma almanac week 703 for 
GPS and provided with MAAST for Galileo, reset time [0d 1h 0m 0s] for Cairns 
and [0d 3h 0m 0s] for Fairbanks, mask angle 5° 
 
Table 4-35 Values Comparison and Percentage Differences between ENU and Body 
Reference Frames for Cairns and Fairbanks Airports. 
Performance 
Parameters 
Location 
Max 
Body 
ENU 
value 
ΔBody-
ENU% 
ΔAL% AL 
HPL (m) 
Cairns 11.5 11.5 0.0 -71.2 
40 
Fairbanks 12.7 11.0 14.4 -68.2 
VPL (m) 
Cairns 29.3 29.3 0.0 -16.4 
35 
Fairbanks 15.9 13.9 14.4 -54.7 
EMT (m) 
Cairns 13.1 13.1 0.0 -13.0 
15 
Fairbanks 6.5 5.3 21.5 -56.7 
Acc (m) 
Cairns 1.5 1.1 35.3 -18.3 
1.87 
Fairbanks 0.9 0.8 8.0 -51.9 
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- Tri-constellation GPS, Galileo 24SV and GLONASS: Yuma almanac week 703 
for GPS and provided with MAAST for Galileo and GLONASS, reset time [0d 
1h 0m 0s] for Cairns and [0d 3h 0m 0s] for Fairbanks, mask angle 5° 
 
Figure 4-129 Number of Satellites in view (left) and difference (right) in the ENU 
(red) and Body (blue) Reference Frames for the Approach Procedure to the Airport 
of Cairns. 
 
 
 
Figure 4-130 PLs in the ENU (green) and Body (blue) Reference Frames compared 
with the Alert Level (red) for the Approach Procedure to the Airport of Cairns. 
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Figure 4-131 Number of Satellites in view (left) and difference (right) in the ENU 
(red) and Body (blue) Reference Frames for the Approach Procedure to the Airport 
of Fairbanks. 
 
 
Figure 4-132 PLs in the ENU (green) and Body (blue) Reference Frames compared 
with the Alert Level (red) for the Approach Procedure to the Airport of Fairbanks. 
  
229 
 
Table 4-36 Values Comparison and Percentage Differences between ENU and 
Body Reference Frames for Cairns and Fairbanks Airports. 
Performance 
Parameters 
Location 
Max 
Body 
ENU 
value 
ΔBody-
ENU% 
ΔAL% AL 
HPL (m) 
Cairns 9.2 7.7 19.5 -77.0 
40 
Fairbanks 11.1 9.7 15.1 -72.2 
VPL (m) 
Cairns 17.3 12.0 44.3 -50.5 
35 
Fairbanks 12.5 9.7 29.6 -64.3 
EMT (m) 
Cairns 6.9 4.5 51.6 -54.0 
15 
Fairbanks 4.8 3.1 50.8 -68.4 
Acc (m) 
Cairns 1.0 0.8 18.5 -46.8 
1.87 
Fairbanks 0.8 0.7 14.2 -55.8 
 
 
 
- Tri-constellation GPS, Galileo 27SV and GLONASS: Yuma almanac week 703 
for GPS and provided with MAAST for Galileo and GLONASS, reset time [0d 
1h 0m 0s] for Cairns and [0d 3h 0m 0s] for Fairbanks, mask angle 5° 
 
Table 4-37 Values Comparison and Percentage Differences between ENU and Body 
Reference Frames for Cairns and Fairbanks Airports. 
Performance 
Parameters 
Location 
Max 
Body 
ENU 
value 
ΔBody-
ENU% 
ΔAL% AL 
HPL (m) 
Cairns 9.2 7.7 19.5 -77.0 
40 
Fairbanks 11.4 9.7 15.3 -72.2 
VPL (m) 
Cairns 17.3 12.0 44.3 -50.5 
35 
Fairbanks 12.6 9.6 31.4 -63.9 
EMT (m) 
Cairns 6.9 4.5 51.6 -54.0 
15 
Fairbanks 4.9 3.3 47.7 -67.5 
Acc (m) 
Cairns 1.0 0.8 18.5 -46.8 
1.87 
Fairbanks 0.8 0.7 13.6 -56.7 
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4.3.3. FINAL COMMENTS AND REMARKS 
 
It is clear from the graphs and the tables that the aircraft attitude and the surrounding 
environment affect the performance of the ARAIM algorithm; each satellite lost 
generates a peak in the performance parameters that depends on the total number 
of satellites in view, their relative geometry and on the number of satellites lost at 
the same time. The single GPS constellation configuration could not be enough to 
comply with the necessary requirements for LPV-200 approaches (the same results 
were obtained with GLONASS and Galileo individually). The dual constellation 
configuration seems to satisfy the requirements, but in some cases with limited 
margin with respect to the thresholds, which means that even a small variation in the 
nominal conditions could trigger an alarm. The main outcome of this research is the 
identification that the ideal scenario would be to have a tri-constellation system that 
provides at the same time high redundancy, reliability and increased safety margin. 
However, further analysis showed that a single constellation could sometimes satisfy 
the LPV-200 RNP, since the performances are strongly dependent on both the 
satellite geometry, as one can easily deduce, and the models which are used to 
estimate signal errors and biases (e.g. ionospheric and tropospheric delays). 
Consequently, even the same trajectory, performed with a different starting time, 
could lead to completely different results. At the same, it has been highlighted that 
in some cases the loss of a satellite could, to a lesser extent, lead to a lower values in 
the PLs, indicating the need of an additional strategy of selecting the set of satellites 
that provides the best performances, as it has been proposed and discussed in 
(InsideGNSS, 2016). 
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In general, these results show that a dedicated system, that evaluates the effects of 
the attitude and the surrounding environment in an operational configuration, needs 
to be developed and integrated into the flight management system if the ARAIM 
technique is to be used as an on-board system for integrity monitoring. The 
integration of such system could support the pilots, together with the ATM, in the 
pre-flight operations for the definition of the path to be followed to reach the arrival 
location. The system could highlight possible outages along the trajectory, giving the 
possibility to the pilots to define a mitigation strategy, such as selecting an alternative 
approach procedure or requesting the support of other navigation systems, if 
available. 
Moreover, the results show that a dual-constellation GNSS receiver might not be 
sufficient for all the possible scenarios, supporting the need for an international 
collaboration for the development of multi-GNSS applications. 
 
 APPATT LONG-TERM (LT) ALGORITHM AND SCENARIOS 
 
The second algorithm is a variation of the APPATT ST that analyses the trend of the 
integrity parameters along the aircraft trajectory, showing their fluctuations within a 
predefined time interval. The objective is to provide the approach designers with 
innovative equipment for the evaluation of the availability of new procedures, 
together with their limits and safety. The tool enables the user to set the time 
interval, allowing the analysis of the expected trajectory during the selected time 
frame, such as the repeat pattern of the different GNSS constellations (1 day for GPS, 
10 days for Galileo and 8 days for GLONASS). Currently, only a 90 degrees turn 
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manoeuvre (Figure 4-133 90° turn manoeuvre used for the APPAT LT tool) with 25 
degrees bank angle from a STAR procedure for the airport of Cairns has been analysed 
and results show that also a tri-constellation configuration cannot fully satisfy the 
LPV-200 approach requirements all the time. However, the tool is designed to help 
procedures designers to define manoeuvre attitude constraints or ATM and Airlines 
to schedule the flights in a timeframe that do not present integrity outages. 
The curved path is generated using the algorithm that is presented in the next 
chapter, the Flight Path Generator (FPG), that takes as input a list of waypoints of the 
selected approach procedure and based on the category of the points (fly-by or turn 
point), the trajectory parameters (e.g. aircraft speed, bank angle and turn radius or 
rate of turn) and it generates the possible path (further details on the algorithm are 
provided in the next chapter). 
It has been selected a simple 90° turn manoeuvre and not the full flight path 
for two main reasons: 
- The computational load required for the computation. The analysis of a short 
part of the trajectory for 2 days with the current algorithm could requires 
from several days to up to a month, depending on the number of 
constellations considered, since the tool is analysing it for a long period time 
and with a very short time step (1 second, the standard update rate of GNSS 
receivers) 
- It has been highlighted in the previous sections that the manoeuvres are the 
most critical part of a trajectory. 
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However, with the support of an enhanced and optimised algorithm, the 
performances of the tool could be improved, enabling the possibility of analysing the 
full trajectory and reducing the simulation time. 
 
Figure 4-133 90° turn manoeuvre used for the APPAT LT tool. 
 
 
  RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
As for the analyses performed for the APPATT ST, different cases and combinations 
of the three constellations are considered in this research. Due to the high 
computational load, the cases presented span a timeframe of 2 days. 
Figure 4-134 to Figure 4-137 show the results of the trajectory using the APPAT ST 
tool 
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Figure 4-134 Satellites in View 
Skyplot in the ENU reference 
frame. 
 
Figure 4-135 Number of Satellites in 
view in the ENU (red) and Body (blue) 
Reference Frames along the Trajectory. 
 
Figure 4-136 Aircraft Attitude Angles along the Approach Procedure for 
Cairns Airport. 
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Figure 4-137 PLs in the ENU (green) and Body (blue) Reference Frames compared 
with the Alert Level (red) for the 90° turn manoeuvre in the short term. 
 
- Single Constellation GPS 
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Figure 4-138 PLs in the ENU Reference Frames (no attitude effect) compared with 
the Alert Level (red) for the 90° turn manoeuvre in the long term (2 days) for the 
single constellation configuration (GPS). 
 
  
  
Figure 4-139 PLs in the Body Reference Frames (with attitude effect) compared with 
the Alert Level (red) for the 90° turn manoeuvre in the long term (2 days) for the 
single constellation configuration (GPS). Each colour represents a single WP. 
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As we may expect, for each waypoint, represented by a different colour, the integrity 
parameters behave in the same manner, since they benefit from the same number 
of satellite in view for the entire time interval. However, the single constellation 
configuration in the ENU reference frame already presents situations in which the 
RNP for LPV-200 are not satisfied, in particular the accuracy overtakes the protection 
level (red dashed line). 
In the Body reference frame, all the parameters repeatedly overtake the limits, 
confirming their high time dependency found in the previous results with the APPATT 
ST and that a single constellation configuration does not always satisfy the LPV-200 
requirements even in nominal conditions (no faults or failure). 
 
- Dual Constellation GPS-Galileo 24SV 
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Figure 4-140 PLs in the ENU Reference Frames (no attitude effect) compared with 
the Alert Level (red) for the 90° turn manoeuvre in the long term (2 days) for the 
dual constellation configuration (GPS+Galileo 24SV). 
 
  
  
Figure 4-141 PLs in the Body Reference Frames (with attitude effect) compared with 
the Alert Level (red) for the 90° turn manoeuvre in the long term (2 days) for the 
single constellation configuration (GPS). Each colour represents a single WP. 
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- Dual Constellation GPS-GLONASS 
  
  
Figure 4-142 PLs in the ENU Reference Frames (no attitude effect) compared with 
the Alert Level (red) for the 90° turn manoeuvre in the long term (2 days) for the 
dual constellation configuration (GPS+Galileo 24SV). 
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Figure 4-143 PLs in the Body Reference Frames (with attitude effect) compared with 
the Alert Level (red) for the 90° turn manoeuvre in the long term (2 days) for the 
single constellation configuration (GPS). Each colour represents a single WP. 
 
Figure 4-140 to Figure 4-143 show that the introduction of a second constellation 
reduces drastically the average values and the number of peaks that break the alert 
levels, but it is still evident that a duel-constellation integrity monitoring system does 
still not guarantee full reliability. 
 
- Tri-Constellation GPS-GLONASS-Galileo 24SV 
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Figure 4-144 PLs in the ENU Reference Frames (no attitude effect) compared with 
the Alert Level (red) for the 90° turn manoeuvre in the long term (2 days) for the 
dual constellation configuration (GPS+Galileo 24SV). 
 
  
  
Figure 4-145 PLs in the Body Reference Frames (with attitude effect) compared with 
the Alert Level (red) for the 90° turn manoeuvre in the long term (2 days) for the 
single constellation configuration (GPS). Each colour represents a single WP. 
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The graphs in Figure 4-145 show how effective is the integration of three 
constellations in a GNSS receiver, almost all the peaks in the protection levels are 
mitigated with the few exceptions of two peaks in the HPL at around 22h and 42h.  
In particular, analysing the first peak with the APPATT ST tool, it is possible to 
investigate the reason behind the integrity outage; Figure 4-146 to Figure 4-154 
present the results as already seen in the APPAT ST and they show that the integrity 
outage is determinate by the loss in the body reference frame of the 8 satellites with 
low elevation angle (below 25°) and in the range of 0°-180° azimuth angle (8 is the 
maximum number of satellite lost between WP 60 and 65). To be noticed that in the 
HPL, the peak is generated by the loss of satellite n. 3 between WP 58 and WP 59, 
while the loss of the satellite n.40 brings back the HPL value below the HAL, showing 
a behaviour already examined in the previous section. The same sequence of satellite 
loss doesn’t have the same effect on the other integrity parameters, that instead 
have a double sudden increase between WP58-60. 
 
 
Figure 4-146 Number of Satellites in view in the ENU (red) and Body (blue) 
Reference Frames along the Trajectory. 
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Figure 4-147 Number of Shadowed Satellites by Aircraft Attitude (blue) and 
Terrain (red). 
 
 
Figure 4-148 Satellites in View Skyplot in the ENU reference frame, (GPS in 
red, GLONASS in blue and Galileo in green). 
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Figure 4-149 Satellites Elevation. Figure 4-150 Satellites visibility by PRN. 
 
 
 
Figure 4-151 HPL in the ENU (green) 
and Body (blue) Reference Frames 
compared with the Alert Level (red). 
 
Figure 4-152 VPL in the ENU 
(green) and Body (blue) Reference 
Frames compared with the Alert 
Level (red). 
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Figure 4-153 Accuracy in the ENU 
(green) and Body (blue) Reference 
Frames compared with the Alert Level 
(red). 
 
Figure 4-154 EMT in the ENU (green) 
and Body (blue) Reference Frames 
compared with the Alert Level (red). 
 
Table 4-38 Values Comparison between ENU and Body Reference Frames. 
Performance 
Parameter 
MaxENU WPMax_ENU MaxBody WPMax_Body 
ENU at 
WPMax_Body 
AL 
HPL (m) 8.98 80 67.69 59 8.97 40 
VPL (m) 13.86 1 26.40 66 13.82 35 
EMT (m) 5.42 1 10.95 66 5.40 15 
Accuracy (m) 0.75 80 1.13 60 0.75 1.87 
 
 
Table 4-39 Percentage Differences between Max Values in Body Reference Frame, 
related ENU values and Alert Level. 
Performance 
Parameter 
Δ% between Body and 
ENU at WPMax_Body 
Δ% between 
MaxBody and AL 
HPL (m) 654.47 69.57 
VPL (m) 91 -24.55 
EMT (m) 102.86 -27 
Accuracy (m) 49.33 -39.81 
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The results of the LT version confirm that a dual-constellation GNSS receiver might 
not be sufficient for all the possible scenarios, supporting the need for an 
international collaboration for the development of multi-GNSS applications. 
The implementation of these new algorithms may allow the users to assess the 
benefits and limits of a selected or new procedure whether they are procedures’ 
designer, tester or pilots. 
Both the results of the APPATT ST and LT tools demonstrate that dedicated systems, 
that predicts the effects of the attitude and the surrounding environment, need to 
be developed and implemented into the current processes and operations, such as 
integrated into the flight management system of the aircraft, if the ARAIM technique 
is going to be used as main on-board system for integrity monitoring. 
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 AIRCRAFT TRAJECTORY MODIFIER 
 
The Flight Path Generator and Modifier tools are introduced in this chapter; the 
concept behind these new functions is to introduce the integrity as a new parameter 
in the design and optimisation of flight path. 
These two functions are designed to generate a trajectory based on the inputs 
provided by the user (a list of waypoints that defines the expected flight path), to 
analyse the integrity parameters using the APPATT ST and to attempt to modify the 
trajectory in order to satisfy the integrity requirements for the selected procedure. 
These two functions can be used as an intermediate step between the current 
procedures development and testing process, in which trajectories design is based 
on fixed waypoints where terrestrial navigational aids (NAVAIDs) may be located, and 
the introduction of GNSS based procedures, in which the trajectories will not be any 
longer based on static procedures but a more dynamic and flexible process might be 
introduced that could further optimise them on a multi-aspects base (such as costs, 
environmental impact, safety and integrity). 
 
 THE FUTURE CONCEPT 
 
One of the main concept pursued and analysed within the SESAR project is the 
Trajectory Based Operations (TBO) that has the objective of enabling the 
management of performance-based 4D trajectories (3D position + time) by fully 
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sharing information related to the trajectories between all the ATM actors (SESAR, 
2014).  
In the future, ATM will work on a time-based system, rather than a radar-surveillance 
system, in which aircrafts will be required to reach a specific point of the path at a 
specific time with the main objective of optimising trajectories, improving safety and 
efficiency and reducing distances and environmental footprint. In a world where 
airports are getting increasingly congested, time optimization is strictly related to 
high-quality trajectory prediction and to an adequate description of the status of the 
aircraft (attitude and velocity), a crucial input for the prediction and resolution of 
possible conflicts along the numerous trajectories. 
Currently, different trajectories for the same flight can be computed by various 
entities that use different constraints and sources of information, however, due to a 
lack of coordination, these trajectories co-exist in different locations and they are not 
conveyed and integrated in a single product, limiting the possibility of improving the 
traffic management efficiency in the execution phase. The Air Traffic Management 
Requirements and Performance Panel (ATMRPP) analysed a possible architecture for 
trajectory information sharing and listed the entities that generate the predicted 
trajectories (ATMRPP, 2014): 
- The Flight Operation Centre (FOC) generates an optimal trajectory using 
information and constraints coming from Meteorological model, aircraft type 
and specification and airline rules, but without using local constraints applied 
by the Air Traffic Management (ATM). The trajectory optimisation is based on 
a cost index that satisfies all the economic criteria. 
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- The aircraft Flight Management System (FMS) generates an optimal trajectory 
just using a limited set of information and constraints and as for the FOC, the 
initial estimate usually does not consider downstream information and 
constraints coming from the ATM that are usually implemented at a later 
stage. 
- The ATM generates a trajectory using the local conditions and constraints. 
The objective for the future is to define a process that integrates and standardises 
all the processes, sources of information and to enable pilots and dispatchers to 
select their own flight path that is then transmitted and shared with all the parties 
involved. The TBO concept enhances the interoperability between the different 
actors while maintaining a dynamic process, since not all the constraints can be 
identified upfront and so often new ones need to be integrated and assessed in 
real time.  
The ATMRPP listed some of the constraints that need to be considered and 
implemented in the trajectory optimisation and sharing process: 
- Minimum and maximum Estimated Arrival Time (ETA) 
- Cost index and speed regime 
- Operational Constraints linked to ATC 
- No-fly airspace (e.g. due to Military areas/operations) 
- Weather conditions 
- Noise abatement procedures 
- Traffic synchronization 
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In this chapter, a basic concept of trajectory modification is introduced to cope with 
what we believe could be an additional constraint in the future: GNSS integrity along 
the flight path. 
 
 
  INTRODUCTION TO FLIGHT PROCEDURES 
 
Flight procedures are defined as the planned routes from take-off to touchdown used 
by pilots and ATC to manage the air traffic and ensure the safety and integrity of the 
operations, while satisfying constraints (such as minimum clearance towards terrain, 
obstacles and other traffic) and meeting criteria (such as performances and 
environments limitation). 
 The design and review of flight procedures is a difficult and highly regulated process. 
Conditions and configurations (e.g. routes, runways, navigation aids…) in the airports 
around the world are in continuous evolution, for these reasons it is required to 
constantly review and update the procedure; the review of existing procedures is 
performed every 28 days following the Aeronautical Information Regulation and 
Control (AIRAC) cycle and then are re-distributed to the utilization entities (fleets and 
ATCs). 
The development of a new instrument approach at a given airport can greatly 
enhance the airport’s value to the aviation community by increasing the variety of 
aircraft which can use the airport, or the conditions in which it can operate. 
Historically, most instrument approaches have been based on terrestrial navigational 
aids (NAVAIDs) requiring a considerable investment in equipment and resources.  
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However, with the proliferation of GNSS technologies, the infrastructure required to 
support traditional ground-based facilities may no longer be necessary in order to 
obtain an instrument approach. 
GNSS can be used to shorten routes, save time and fuel, reduce traffic delays, 
increase capacity, and permit controllers to monitor and manage aircraft with 
increased safety.  
Although GNSS has the potential to support instrument flight procedures at hundreds 
of facilities, the development and implementation of a new approach are far from a 
simple undertaking; it is a complex, multi-disciplinary effort requiring the 
collaboration of many professionals within the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). 
The proposal of a new procedure must first undergo the scrutiny of a cost/benefit 
analysis before its development will be considered. In addition, the development of 
an instrument approach procedure must consider factors such as obstruction 
evaluations, airport requirements/capacity, compatibility with the existing airport 
master plan, noise and environmental issues, impact to the Air Traffic Control (ATC) 
system, airspace change, effects on other instrument approaches, and location of 
existing and proposed NAVAIDs and their limitations. 
One of the main phases of the evaluation process for an instrument approach is the 
flight inspection, where criteria such as signal availability, integrity, and accuracy are 
all validated. Once this has been passed, the instrument flight procedure is forwarded 
for publication. 
In this research, an algorithm has been developed with integrated ARAIM function 
that could be used to reduce the time, effort and cost of the flight inspection phase 
and help the procedures’ designer and tester to assess the benefits and limits respect 
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to the integrity point of you. It can also help in increasing the automation in the 
design of possible alternative routes or improvements to the existing routes. 
 
 MERCATOR MAP PROJECTION 
 
It is a set of mathematical-geometrical rules that transform a 3D model of the Earth 
in a plane representation. It is usually used to design atlas and navigation charts that 
are much handier to use than a globe and the computation of the route is simpler on 
a flat surface rather than a curved one. However, these projections are not able to 
fully represents the reality, distorting some part of the maps, but one of the main 
advantages is that courses can be represented as straight segments with constant 
angles with respect to the meridians, that corresponds to have a path with a constant 
bearing angle (also called rhumb lines). 
Map projections are divided in groups depending on the surfaces used for the 
projection (plane, cone or cylinder), if they are tangential or secant to the Earth 
surface (Figure 5-1 and Figure 5-2) and from the relative direction of their axes 
respect to the Earth (normal, transverse or oblique, Figure 5-3).  
 
Figure 5-1 Tangential Projection Surfaces (Moore, 1992). 
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Figure 5-2 Secant Projection Surfaces (Moore, 1992). 
 
 
Figure 5-3 Attitude of Projection Surface (Moore, 1992). 
 
Additionally, depending on the scale of the map to be projected and the accuracy 
needed, a spherical or ellipsoidal model of the Earth can be used. 
The map projection allows transforming ellipsoid/spherical coordinates, usually 
expressed in terms of latitude and longitude, into cartesian coordinates (X, Y), 
directed as the magnetic North and East. 
For the purpose of this research, the cylindrical tangential projection and the ellipsoid 
model have been considered, that are expressed by the followings equations to 
transform from geographical to cartesian (Eqs. 5.1) and vice-versa (Eqs. 5.2): 
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{
𝑋 = 𝑎(𝜆 − 𝜆0)
𝑌 = 𝑎 𝑙𝑛 [𝑡𝑎𝑛 (
𝜋
4
+
𝜙
2
) (
1−𝑒 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝜙
1+𝑒 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝜙
)
𝑒
2⁄
]
   (5.1) 
{
𝜆 =
𝑋
𝑎
+ 𝜆0
𝜙 =
𝜋
2
− 2 𝑡𝑎𝑛−1 [𝑒−
𝑌
𝑎⁄ (
1−𝑒 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝜙
1+𝑒 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝜙
)
𝑒
2⁄
]
   (5.2) 
Where: 
- ϕ is the geodetic latitude 
- λ is the geodetic longitude 
- λ0 is the longitude of an arbitrary central meridian (usually Greenwich) 
- a is the sum of the equatorial radius of the ellipsoid and the altitude of the 
considered point above the surface. 
- e eccentricity of the reference ellipsoid 
In the inverse Eqs. (5.2), the computation of the geodetic latitude is not 
straightforward, but an iterative process is required until the difference 
between the previous and current values is lower than a predefined value (n): 
Initial value:        𝜙0 =
𝜋
2
− 2 tan−1 𝑒−
𝑌
𝑎⁄     (5.3) 
accuracy:            (𝜙𝑘+1 − 𝜙𝑘) ≤ 𝑛     (5.4) 
 
  FLIGHT PATH GENERATOR AND FLIGHT PATH MODIFIER ALGORITHM 
DESCRIPTION 
 
As described in the previous chapters, aircraft routes are divided in different phases, 
each with its own requirements, predefined through a series of waypoints (Figure 
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5-4) and, as mentioned before, RAIM prediction is required if GPS is to be used to 
solely satisfy the RNAV requirements. 
 
Figure 5-4 Trajectory in terms of waypoints. 
 
 
In the pre-flight operations, the pilots prepare the expected route and related 
procedures to follow based on the constraints and the aircraft capabilities, this 
process can be performed using the avionics if the aircraft is equipped with the Flight 
Management System (FMS), that integrates the data coming from sensors, receivers, 
computers and the database, through the display of the FMS by selecting the 
waypoints along the desired flight path. 
Waypoints are predefined geographical locations characterised by the coordinates 
(latitude and longitude), that can be a simple named point or located where a navaids 
is available to support the navigation. They are usually located in correspondence of 
a change, that can be in terms of direction, speed or altitude and they are mainly of 
two types: 
- Fly-by WP: the aircraft can start the turn manoeuvre before reaching the WP 
- Fly-over WP: the aircraft has to pass this type of WP before changing course. 
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Figure 5-5 Difference Between Fly-By and Fly-Over Waypoints (FAA, 2006). 
 
In RNAV procedures, Waypoints are then in turn connected by Legs that represent 
the desired path between WPs, the list in Appendix B summarises the different types 
(UASC, 2014). 
In this chapter, a new algorithm is introduced that analyses the list of waypoints 
selected for the route, generates the expected trajectory, evaluates the integrity 
parameters along it using the APPATT ST tool and, in case of integrity outages, 
suggests a possible deviation from the current route in order to satisfy the 
requirements. 
For the generation of the trajectory, the algorithm refers to the basic model provided 
in the Procedure Design Manual by ICAO (2009), in which ICAO described design 
criteria to aid states in the implementation of RNP operational procedures, for the 
determination of manoeuvres based on two parameters: speed and bank angle.  
The new algorithm is divided in two main functions:  the Flight Path Generator (FPG), 
that generates the trajectory, and the Flight Path Modifier (FPM), that generates a 
suggested modification of the trajectory. 
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5.4.1. FLIGHT PATH GENERATOR FUNCTION (FPG) 
 
The Flight Path Generator function takes as input a text file containing the list of 
waypoints of the selected procedure. For each point are specified: 
- Name 
- Latitude, Longitude and Altitude 
- Type of WP (start of the procedure, check WP, turn WP, end of 
procedure WP) 
- Turn type, if applicable (clockwise or counter-clockwise) 
- Preferred heading angles to next point (in some cases two consecutive 
WPs are not directly connected by a straight line but an intermediate 
turn manoeuvre is required, even though no intermediate turn WP is 
provided). 
It has been assumed that aircrafts perform only a specific type of manoeuvre to 
change direction: fly-by turns.  
The algorithm approximates the flight path to a series of adjoined lines and arcs in 
the 3D space using basic geometrical and kinematic equations.  
As first step, the algorithm transforms the list of WPs from geographical to Cartesian 
coordinates using the equations for the Mercator Map Projections presented in the 
previous section (Eqs. 5.1 to Eqs. 5.4) and computes geometrically the heading angles 
between each two consecutive point in the list as the angle between the line 
adjoining the two WPs and the North direction. 
𝑚𝑘+1,𝑘 = 
(𝑦𝑘+1−𝑦𝑘)
(𝑥𝑘+1−𝑥𝑘)
      (5.5) 
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Ψ𝑘+1,𝑘 =
{
 
 
 
 
0    𝑖𝑓 𝑥𝑘+1 = 𝑥𝑘  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑦𝑘+1 > 𝑦𝑘
𝜋    𝑖𝑓 𝑥𝑘+1 = 𝑥𝑘  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑦𝑘+1 < 𝑦𝑘 
π
2
− tan−1𝑚𝑘+1,𝑘      𝑖𝑓 𝑥𝑘+1 > 𝑥𝑘
3
2
π − tan−1𝑚𝑘+1,𝑘      𝑖𝑓 𝑥𝑘+1 < 𝑥𝑘
    (5.6) 
Where: 
- k is the number of the waypoint  
- xk and yk are the k-th cartesian coordinates of the waypoints 
- m is the angular coefficient of the line that passes through the two 
waypoints 
- Ψk+1,k is the heading angle between two consecutive waypoints. The 
computation of the heading angles depends on the mutual position of the 
two WPs (since the same line can have two different heading angles) and on 
the direction of motion. 
Before the FPG starts to compute the trajectory, it performs two main steps: 
1) Evaluates if additional turn points are required by checking if any point in 
the list requires a preferred heading angle that does not allow the proceed 
directly to the following WP.  
Figure 5-6 shows an example in which WPk and WPk+1 are two consecutive 
WPs, on the left side Ψk-k+1 is the direct angle between the two points and 
Ψf is the final heading angle (in this case WP k+1 is a turn point that leads to 
the next leg with a predefined heading angle), while on the right side the 
requirements is that the aircraft has to pass through WPk with a specific 
heading angle (Ψp) and, in order to reach the following WP and the final 
direction angle, an intermediate waypoint (WPadd) is required, given by 
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the intersection of the two directions, computed by the tool using 
cartesian formulation. 
Given the heading angles, it is possible to find the angular coefficients m 
of the two lines passing through WPk+1 and WPk by inverting Eqs. (5.6). 
Once the values are known, it is possible to determine the equations of 
the two lines as: 
𝑥 − 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑚𝑖(𝑦 − 𝑦𝑖)   (5.7) 
Where i is k and k+1. The solution of the system of the two equations of 
Eqs. (5.7) gives as output the coordinates of the additional waypoint 
(WPadd). 
 
Figure 5-6 Difference between direct route between WPs (left) and a route 
with intermediate WP (right). 
 
2)  Then, for each turn point (WPk = WPturn) the algorithm determines an 
initial (WPs) and end turn points (WPe) that are located between the 
considered turn point and the previous (WPk-1) and following (WPk+1) 
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waypoints,  defined by the Distance of Turn Anticipation (DTA) used in the 
model described by ICAO (2009). 
 
 
To compute the DTA, other two main inputs are required (defined by the user): the 
aircraft speed and the bank angle.  
The aircraft avionics provides the Indicated Airspeed (IAS) that needs to be firstly 
converted in True Airspeed (TAS) using the following standard equation (SI units): 
𝑇𝐴𝑆 = 𝐼𝐴𝑆 ∗ 171233 ∗
√(288+𝑉𝐴𝑅−0.00198∗𝐻)
(288−0.006496∗𝐻)2.628
 (5.8) 
Where: 
- VAR = variation from international standard atmosphere (ISA) (standard value 
+15) or local data for 95% high temperature, if available 
- H = altitude (m) 
However, a different speed (V) is required to compute the turn radius, given by: 
𝑉 = 𝑇𝐴𝑆 + 𝑇𝑊𝐷    (5.9) 
Where TWD is the assumed tailwind (see Appendix 0). 
Then, the rate of turn (R) in degrees/second can be computed as: 
𝑅 =
6355 tan𝛼
𝜋𝑉
     (5.10) 
 
Where α is the bank angle.  
Consequently, the turn radius is given by: 
 
𝑟 =
𝑉
20𝜋𝑅
     (5.11) 
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Knowing the radius of turn, it is possible to compute the minimum distance from the 
turn WP at which the aircraft needs to start the turn manoeuvre, known as Distance 
of Turn Anticipation (DTA, Figure 5-7), given by: 
 
𝐷𝑇𝐴 = 𝑟 tan
𝐴
2
     (5.12) 
 
Where A is the turn angle, the change of angle between the initial and final heading 
(ψk-k+1 - ψf in Figure 5-6). 
 
Figure 5-7 Graphical View of the Distance of Turn Anticipation (DTA) (FAA, 2007b). 
 
From the DTA it is possible to geometrically find the coordinates of the starting and 
ending point of the turn manoeuvre using again cartesian formulas and the solutions 
obtained from two systems of two equations, the generic formula of a line given two 
points and the formula of the distance between two points: 
{
(𝑦𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 − 𝑦𝑠/𝑒) = 𝑚(𝑥𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 − 𝑥𝑠/𝑒)
(𝑥𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 − 𝑥𝑠/𝑒)
2
+ (𝑦𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 − 𝑦𝑠/𝑒)
2
= 𝐷𝑇𝐴2
   (5.13) 
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Where s/e indicates that in one system is used to compute the coordinates of the 
starting point, while the other for the ending point. 
However, the systems of Eqs. (5.13) generate two solutions for each point (starting 
and ending turn point), so it is required a check on which solution satisfy the expected 
geometry. The tool checks that the distance between the starting and turn waypoint 
is smaller than the distance between the turn point (WPk) and the previous waypoint 
(WPk-1) (same for the turn ending point and the following waypoint WPk+1). If none of 
the two solutions satisfies this condition, this means that the trajectory cannot be 
performed with the current parameters (e.g. bank angle and/or velocity) and that the 
aircraft is supposed to start the manoeuvre before reaching WPk-1; in this case, the 
tool warns the user that there is an incompatibility in the trajectory that needs to be 
reviewed.  
After the first two steps, the original list of WPs might have been modified with the 
addition of other turn points and the starting and ending points of each turn point 
(blue dots in Figure 5-8) and the tool automatically updates the list and converts all 
the cartesian coordinates in geodetical (see Eqs. (5.2).  
Starting from the last WP (WPk+1), the algorithm builds up the trajectory from the end 
to the beginning analysing two pairs of WPs at a time. For each pair, the tool 
evaluates what type of leg is required to connect them and the following two cases 
are the ones implemented in the tool: 
a) Straight line (e.g. between two aligned checkpoints, a checkpoint and an 
initial turn point, an end turn point and a checkpoint). The tool generates 
the trajectory using basic cinematic equations of uniform motion (v=v0) (at 
the current state of the algorithm only this simple case has been 
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implemented, but more complex dynamics could be easily included). The 
computation of the new WPs is performed in the Cartesian system and 
divided along the two different axes. First of all, the tool evaluates the 
distance between the two points and estimates the time required to travel 
it (to simplify the model, only a two-dimensional problem has been 
considered): 
{
𝑠𝑖,𝑖+1 = √(𝑥𝑖+1−𝑥𝑖)2 + (𝑦𝑖+1−𝑦𝑖)2
𝑡𝑖,𝑖+1 =
𝑠𝑖,𝑖+1
𝑣0⁄
  (5.14) 
Where: 
- i is the i-th WP of the list 
- si,i+1 is the distance between the two WPs under analysis 
- ti,i+1 is the time to travel from i to i+1 with constant velocity v0. 
From the time it is possible to compute the number of intermediate WPs 
between WPk and WPk+1 using the update rate (tupdate) defined by the user: 
𝑛𝑊𝑃 =
𝑡𝑖,𝑖+1
𝑡𝑢𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒
⁄     (5.15) 
in this research, an interval of one second has been considered between two 
subsequent points, equivalent to the GNSS update rate. The cartesian 
coordinates of these new points are given by: 
{
𝑥𝑗 = 𝑣0𝑘 cos 𝛼 + 𝑥0
𝑦𝑗 = 𝑣0𝑘 sin 𝛼 + 𝑦0
    (5.16) 
Where 
- j is the index of the intermediate WPs 
- k is an integer number that goes from 1 to ti,i+1 (rounded down) 
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- α is the angle of the direction of the line connecting i and i+1 and the x-axis, 
given by the inverse of the tangent function of the angular coefficient (Eq. 
5.5) 
𝛼 = tan−1𝑚    (5.17) 
 
b) Curved path. This situation is activated when the tool detects that the pair 
is composed by a turn point and an end turn point. In this case, the tool takes 
the full triad of points (start-turn-end) and it automatically starts from the 
start point. The curved path is approximated to an arc of a circle with the 
radius given by Eq. 5.11 generated considering the aircraft moving in a 
uniform circular motion. The tool computes the centre of the circle using 
cartesian formulations and solving the following system: 
{
 
 
 
 
𝑥2 + 𝑦2 + 𝑎𝑥 + 𝑏𝑦 + 𝑐 = 0
(𝑥, 𝑦) = (𝑥𝑠, 𝑦𝑠)
(𝑥, 𝑦) = (𝑥𝑒 , 𝑦𝑒)
√(
𝑎
2
)
2
+ (
𝑏
2
)
2
− 𝑐 = 𝑟
   (5.18) 
- Where the first equation is the general equation of a circle in the bi-
dimensional cartesian system. 
- a, b and c are the coefficients that need to be found through the system to 
define the circle. 
Once the coefficients are known, it is possible to find the centre of the circle as: 
(𝑥𝑐, 𝑦𝑐) = (−
𝑎
2
, −
𝑏
2
)    (5.19) 
At this stage, to simplify the computation of the intermediate points, a new reference 
system is used (Ot) and the circle is translated and centred in it by using the following 
relations: 
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{
(𝑥𝑐_𝑡, 𝑦𝑐_𝑡) = (0,0)
(𝑥𝑠_𝑡 , 𝑦𝑠_𝑡) = (𝑥𝑠 − 𝑥𝑐, 𝑦𝑠 − 𝑦𝑐)
(𝑥𝑒_𝑡, 𝑦𝑒_𝑡) = (𝑥𝑒 − 𝑥𝑐, 𝑦𝑒 − 𝑦𝑐)
   (5.20) 
Where the subscript represents the new coordinates in the translated reference 
system centred in the centre of the circle. 
From the new coordinates of the start and end point of the turn, it is possible to 
evaluate the change of direction θ that the aircraft will perform along the trajectory 
as the difference of the heading angles: 
𝜃𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 = 𝜓𝑒 − 𝜓𝑠    (5.21) 
To fully define the intermediate points, it is then necessary to compute the time 
required to perform the turn, given by: 
𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 =
𝜃𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛
𝑅
     (5.22) 
Based on the update rate set by the user, the tool will compute the number of new 
waypoints from which the trajectory will be generated: 
𝑛𝑊𝑃 =
𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛
𝑡𝑢𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒⁄
    (5.23) 
Where nWP is rounded down. 
The coordinates of the new waypoints are given by: 
{
𝑥𝑗 = 𝑟 cos 𝜃𝑗 + 𝑥𝑐
𝑦𝑗 = 𝑟 sin 𝜃𝑗 + 𝑦𝑐
    (5.24) 
Where: 
- j is the index that goes from 1 to nWP 
- xc and yc are the coordinates of the centre of the manoeuvre, that summed 
to the first element it translates the final coordinates xj and yj in the original 
reference frame (O). 
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- 𝜃𝑗   is the angular position of the j-th WP in the translated circle and it is 
given by: 
𝜃𝑗 = 𝜃𝑠 + 𝑗 ∗ 𝑅    (5.25) 
 
 
Figure 5-8 Example of initial and end turn points (blue dots) generated by the FPG 
tool for each turn point (green dots). The red dots are the precedent and following 
WPs (WPk-1 and WPk+1). The DTA of each point is the same, even though in the 
picture seem different due to a different scale factor in the axis. 
 
 The generated path (an example in Figure 5-9)  describes the aircraft trajectory in 
terms of position in the Cartesian reference frame (X,Y,Z) that is then transformed 
back in geographical (latitude, longitude and altitude) including attitude (roll, pitch 
and yaw angles) in time within a user-defined time step (e.g. 1s). In particular, the 
function monitors that the roll angle is always within the aircraft standard limits 
(commercial flights standard value is between 25-33°). 
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Figure 5-9 Example of a Section of the Flight Path generated by the FPG. 
 
The trajectory is then analysed by APPATT ST with the objective of evaluating the 
integrity performance of the trajectory considering the attitude. if it doesn’t satisfy 
the required navigation performance and it presents one or more integrity outages, 
the Flight Path Modifier (FPM) function is activated. 
 
5.4.2. FLIGHT PATH MODIFIER FUNCTION (FPM) 
 
In case of activation of the FPM function, the tool tries to modify the trajectory in 
order to remove the integrity outages and satisfy the required navigation 
performance. The algorithm behind the FPM function is quite simple and 
straightforward, it analyses the trajectory backwards from the final to the starting 
WP, examining which sections need to be modified. If the section presents an outage, 
the FPM performs the following steps: 
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- The function analyses the satellite lost due to the attitude shadowing 
effect; if more than one satellite is not in view, it selects the satellite with the 
highest elevation angle and forces the aircraft to perform the manoeuvre with 
a bank angle smaller than the elevation angle. In this way, the satellite is again 
in the GNSS receiver field of view.  
- Forcing the bank angle to a defined value modifies the values of the 
turn radius (r), the rate of turn (R) and the distance of turn anticipation (DTA). 
The function checks that the rate of turn stays within the standard values (for 
commercial flights R ≈ 3 deg/sec) and generates the new trajectory arc using 
the new values. 
- Checks that the new segment is compatible with the adjacent ones, 
otherwise the FPM attempts to modify the next section. An example of 
incompatibility is when there are two consecutive turns and the end turn 
point of one is located after the start point of the following turn, this means 
that the aircraft can’t finish one turn that must start the next. 
- Complete the analysis of the following sections and, if no 
compatibilities occur, the new trajectory is analysed again by APPATT. If the 
integrity outage is not removed and other satellites are still not in view, it 
selects the second highest elevation angle and repeats the previous steps. 
If an incompatibility occurs, the tool warns the user that with the current 
configuration the trajectory can’t be modified in order to meet the required 
navigation performance. 
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 SCENARIOS AND RESULTS 
 
The following results have been obtained analysing the RNAV STAR procedure Sunny 
Four Papa Arrival from KONDA of the International Airport of Cairns, Australia, in a 
single constellation configuration (GPS) (Figure 5-10).   
 
Figure 5-10 RNAV STAR procedure Sunny Three Arrival chart of the International 
Airport of Cairns, Australia. 
 
Figure 5-11 shows the nominal trajectory generated by the FPG with a banking angle 
of 25° for each turn manoeuvre, while Figure 5-12 shows the aircraft attitude and 
Figure 5-13 to Figure 5-16 the ARAIM performance parameters along the trajectory 
computed through the APPATT ST tool.  
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Figure 5-11 Nominal trajectory. 
 
 
Figure 5-12 Aircraft Attitude Angles. 
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Figure 5-13 HPL in the ENU (green) and 
Body (blue) Reference Frames 
compared with the Alert Level (red). 
 
Figure 5-14 VPL in the ENU (green) 
and Body (blue) Reference Frames 
compared with the Alert Level (red). 
 
Figure 5-15 Accuracy in the ENU 
(green) and Body (blue) Reference 
Frames compared with the Alert Level 
(red). 
 
Figure 5-16 EMT in the ENU (green) 
and Body (blue) Reference Frames 
compared with the Alert Level (red). 
 
It is clear that each turn generates a peak, due to the loss of one satellite, GPS 
Pseudorandom noise (PRN) 25 for the first turn, PRN 26 for the second and PRN 16 
for the last turn. In this configuration, the accuracy only is severely affected in the 
first and second turn. Figure 5-18 shows the difference in satellites in view between 
the ENU and body reference frames. 
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Figure 5-17 Skyplot of the constellation configuration. 
 
 
Figure 5-18 Satellite in view in the ENU (red) and body (blue) reference frames in 
the nominal trajectory. 
 
 
 
 
At this point the FPM is activated and analyses the single sections of the trajectory 
and checks that no incompatibilities occur and tries to generate the new one.  
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Figure 5-19 Trajectory incompatibility detection graph, 0 = no 
incompatibility, 1 = incompatibility detected. 
 
 
Figure 5-20 Nominal trajectory (red line) and modified trajectory (blue line). 
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Figure 5-21 Aircraft attitude in the modified trajectory. 
 
 
Figure 5-22 Focus on the modified roll angles. 
 
Figure 5-20 shows that the tool successfully modified the first two turns using 
different values of bank angle (Figure 5-22) and the new trajectory does not present 
any incompatibility (Figure 5-19), while the third one is unchanged since the integrity 
parameters stay within the alert levels. 
 
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350
-50
0
50
100
150
200
Aircraft Attitude
Waypoint
An
gle
s 
(d
eg
)
 
 
Roll
Pitch
Yaw
200 250 300 350
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
Aircraft Attitude
Waypoint
An
gle
s 
(d
eg
)
 
 
Roll
Pitch
Yaw
275 
 
Figure 5-24 to Figure 5-27 show the number of satellites in view and the integrity 
parameters for the new trajectory. 
 
Figure 5-23 Satellites in view in the ENU (red) and body (blue) reference frames in 
the modified trajectory. 
 
 
Figure 5-24 HPL in the ENU (green) 
and Body (blue) Reference Frames 
compared with the Alert Level (red). 
 
Figure 5-25 VPL in the ENU (green) 
and Body (blue) Reference Frames 
compared with the Alert Level (red). 
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Figure 5-26 Accuracy in the ENU 
(green) and Body (blue) Reference 
Frames compared with the Alert 
Level (red). 
 
Figure 5-27 EMT in the ENU (green) 
and Body (blue) Reference Frames 
compared with the Alert Level (red). 
 
The previous graphs show that the modified trajectory does not present integrity 
outages, making the expected flight path safe in GPS nominal conditions. 
 
 CONCLUSIONS 
 
The results show that the algorithm allows the user to assess the benefits and limits 
of a selected procedure whether they are a procedure designer and tester or a pilot, 
while at the same time it gives the possibility of analysing alternative trajectories that 
are a slight modification of the nominal. 
 The analysis performed is far from the more complex concept of trajectory 
optimisation, since it doesn’t include several determinants factors involved in the 
computation of the optimal trajectory, however it stresses out the importance of 
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including the integrity of GNSS into the process, due to the fact of the increasing 
involvement of GNSS as main navigation system in the future of civil aviation. 
Another challenge of this concept is the reality: flown trajectories might differ from 
the ones predicted in simulations due to several factors, that can be within the 
simulation, such as the implemented models and assumptions, or related to events 
and situations of the real world, such as wind and pilot skills in following the expected 
route. The implemented path generator uses a very simple model that builds up flight 
paths as consecutive straight and curved segments, but aircraft trajectories can be 
far more complex. However, I believe that thanks to the technological advancement 
in computational capabilities and control systems, future systems will be capable of 
reducing deviations between the flown and the reference trajectory.  
The proposed tool could be used as an additional tool during the transition phase 
between the current procedures and navigation technologies and the introduction of 
GNSS as primary navigation system once enhanced with further functions, such as 
no-fly zones and obstacle clearance controls, with the objective of providing a 
solution that oversees several problematic issues of an aircraft trajectory. 
Increased awareness and better pre-flight planning could ultimately improve the 
safety of flights and contribute to the safe introduction of GNSS as a viable positioning 
method for instrument approach. 
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 INTEGRATION OF ARAIM TECHNIQUE IN A PHYSICAL 
DEMONSTRATOR  
 
This chapter presents and summarise the challenges of the integration of different 
technologies and explains the final objectives of the WP4 Physical Demonstrator, 
developed in collaboration with other two INNOVATE researchers, and its research 
contribution to the INNOVATE WP5.  
The physical demonstrator integrates three technology/system demonstrators 
covering different areas of the operations related to the civil aviation field, such as: 
- Integration of ARAIM as new avionics system that supports pilots in safety 
critical phase of flight by providing near real-time integrity performance 
prediction (the Near-Real-Time ARAIM Performance Prediction Tool or (NRT 
APPT)). Previous chapters demonstrated the integrity availability prediction 
capability of this new technique that could be integrated in support of 
functions and tasks such as the pilots in the pre-flight operations, designers in 
procedure development and testing and ATMs in the flight planning 
processes. The aim of the algorithm presented in this chapter is to make use 
of this prediction capability not only for off-line activities but also for real time 
operations in support of pilots to assess the flight status and possible or 
expected risks along the path.    
- Optimisation of the ground movement operations before take-off and after 
landing that could reduce delays and related costs that could affect airports 
with high level of flight traffic 
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- Analysis of human performances and psychophysical status of subjects ((e.g. 
pilots and ATCs) using physiology parameters (e.g. temperature and hearth 
rate) to identify their level of tiredness and stress. 
The final objective of the physical demonstrator would be to integrate and 
implement different new technologies and assess their impact on the tasks of the 
users. The physical demonstrator has been built and is at disposition of the 
University of Nottingham, ready to be tested on subjects. Due to the lack of time, 
these tests could not be performed in this research project time frame. 
In this chapter, the sections dedicated to the other research projects have been 
provided by the other researchers, for additional information please refers to the 
PhD Theses of Marinescu (2017) and Stergianos (2017). 
 
  INTRODUCTION TO THE INNOVATE PHYSICAL DEMONSTRATOR PROJECT 
 
A key objective of the Marie Curie Innovative Doctoral Program (IDP) is to develop an 
integrated air transport engineering vision and to train the next generation of 
research leaders to be well versed in the notion of integration. 
The various individual research projects are clearly multidisciplinary in nature and 
therefore involve supervision teams to nurture the desired integrated systems 
approach. 
At the core of the present IDP there are two concepts:  
(i) Technology innovation across aircraft and operation systems  
(ii) the integration of the new technologies to deliver a new air transport 
demonstrator and instil a new multidisciplinary approach to air transport 
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engineering. A series of key scientific challenges have been worked out to 
provide a holistic technological approach to improving the efficiency of air 
transport and reducing its impact on the surrounding environment. 
Until now air transport has, at best, been considered along two separate strands, 
aircraft and air transportation systems and even in the case of aircraft engineering 
the integration of various technological components is not yet ideally executed: “[…] 
the entire aircraft should be viewed as a system, and systems architecting and 
engineering methods applied to its definition, design, production, operation and 
maintenance. This still tends to be the case more for military than commercial 
aircraft.” In fact, this is still so much the case that “in some aircraft companies, the 
words ‘systems engineering’ is [only] applied to […] subsystems such as flight control, 
hydraulic, etc.” (MIT, 2007). In our team of ESRs, we challenged that insular view and 
eventually propose the blueprint for an integrated system addressing key challenges 
and wishes identified and expressed by leading European industrialists and decisions 
makers (Airbus, 2013, UK.Gov, 2012, EC, 2011). This goes beyond leading existing 
programs such as the one at the MIT from which some of the previous quotes have 
been extracted. 
 We have therefore integrated our technological advances into physical 
demonstrators, thus formalising our apprenticeship of multi-disciplinary 
requirements. To do so we have: 
- Drafted joint specification of requirements (SoR) as part of our joint session 
with the coordinator. These SoR has been reviewed and approved by 
members of the supervisory board, including industrial and training partners, 
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who have monitored progress on each project leading to the physical 
demonstrator.  
- Proposed a preliminary system design to be reviewed by all the academics at 
Nottingham in a first instance, before being put out for consultation with the 
supervisory board and presented as part of a second review gate. 
- Proposed and executed a complete system integration and physical 
demonstrators presented to the broader community (workshops, 
conferences, visits). 
 
 WORK PACKAGE 4 PHYSICAL DEMONSTRATOR DESCRIPTION 
 
Work Package 4 Physical Demonstrator integrates the technologies developed by ESR 
12 (myself) related to Advanced RAIM technique, ESR 13 (Adrian Marinescu) related 
to Human Performance Evaluation and ESR 10 (Christofas Stergianos), related to 
Ground Operations Optimization. The main aim is to integrate and test the Navigation 
and Ground Operations algorithms and techniques developed by ESR 12 and ESR 10 
and to assess human performance using physiological measurements techniques 
outputted by ESR 13.  
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6.2.1. CHALLENGES 
 
A.  ESR 12 - ADVANCED RECEIVER AUTONOMOUS INTEGRITY MONITORING 
(ARAIM) 
In the previous chapters, the proposed ARAIM-based algorithms have been used to 
analyse the integrity performances in advance respect to the execution phase of the 
planned flight with the main objective support the pre-flight operations, procedure 
development and testing and flight planning processes.  
However, these configurations differ from another main application for ARAIM in 
Civil Aviation, that is intended to be used in real time for the analysis of the integrity 
parameters in nominal conditions and for the detection and exclusion of faulty 
measurements that could lead to a not reliable solution. The main drawback of this 
type of application is that the analysis is performed in parallel with the navigation 
solution computation and if a fault occurs, the system is supposed to warn the user 
within a defined time (Time-to-Alert). This means that the actual warning can be 
provided after that the solution has been “used”. 
The aim and challenge of the algorithm proposed in this chapter is to partially 
compensate the lack of capability of the standard ARAIM concepts of providing timely 
warning to the user in case of integrity outages, partially because due to the 
unpredictable nature of the faults, only the problem of the degradation of the 
performance due to an adverse satellite configuration can be addressed. 
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B. ESR 13 – HUMAN PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
The near future air transport challenges such as increased air traffic, the need for 
more efficient routes, free flight, and single pilot operations raise new issues from 
the human factors perspective. New technologies, including the ones developed by 
ESR 10 and ESR 12, will impact the performance by influencing the level of mental 
workload the pilots are subjected to, their situational awareness and the level of 
stress. 
The output of ESR 13 will provide a way of assessing the impact that these 
technologies have on the pilot, in an objective way, by measuring their physiological 
parameters, such as heart rate data and facial thermography. The Flight Simulator 
will serve as a means of exploring the human physiological reaction during different 
flight scenarios in both normal classical instrument configuration and other 
configurations containing newly developed instruments. 
 
C.  ESR 10 – GROUND OPERATION OPTIMIZATION 
With the constant increase in air traffic, airports are facing capacity problems. 
Optimisation methods for specific airport processes are starting to be increasingly 
utilised by many large airports. However, many processes happen in parallel and a 
more complex optimisation model is required, which can consider multiple processes 
simultaneously.  
Having an accurate model for the pushback process is important for this and 
identifying all of the delays that may occur can lead to more accurate and realistic 
models that can be used in the decision-making process for ground movement 
operations. After testing a model with a more detailed pushback process we found 
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that a lot of the delays are not predicted if the process is not explicitly modelled. 
Having a more precise model with accurate movements of aircraft is highly important 
for an integrated model and will allow ground movement models to be used for more 
reliable integrated decision-making systems on airports. Minimising these delays can 
help airports increase their capacity and become more environmentally friendly. 
 
6.2.2. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
 
The three ESRs agreed that the physical demonstrator needed to validate the 
concepts should be a Flight Simulator Cockpit. 
In order to mitigate and/or eliminate the challenges mentioned above, a number of 
solutions are being investigated: 
 
A. ESR 12 – ARAIM NEAR REAL-TIME ON-BOARD PREDICTION SYSTEM 
The results presented in the previous chapters show that a dedicated system that 
evaluates the effects of the attitude and the surrounding environment in real time, 
needs to be developed to support the pilots during the flight. The reason behind is 
that often the flown trajectory differs from the simulated, this also includes the 
timing of the trajectory, due to delays or other factors.  
A different version of the ARAIM algorithm, named Near Real-Time APPT (NRT APPT) 
is integrated in the aircraft simulator as a new avionics system. The algorithm takes 
as input position and attitude of the aircraft, integrates in time the dynamics and 
estimates position, attitude and protection levels (PL), in order to evaluate if the 
current aircraft dynamics could lead to a safety critical configuration and provide 
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timely caution or warning flags to the users, depending on whether or not the critical 
condition can be avoided in time (the most critical flight phases requires a maximum 
Time-To-Alert of 6 seconds). The objective of this process is to develop a system that 
can be integrated into the Flight Management System or the Avionics of an 
aircraft/UAV and can provide timely warning to the user/pilot whenever the current 
aircraft configuration could lead to a dangerous situation. 
 
B. ESR 13 – PHYSIOLOGICAL MONITORING 
The flight simulator will have attached an infra-red and a visual field camera while 
the person flying the plane will be wearing a BioHarness monitoring his heart rate, 
breathing rate and posture. One of the main objectives is to use the data to compare 
the physiological reaction of the pilot while flying in different scenarios and using 
different technologies. The other major objective is to build an algorithm that will be 
capable of predicting a drop in the performance of the pilot so that measures could 
be taken before the situation could get worst. 
 
C.  ESR 10 – MODELLING GROUND MOVEMENTS 
The flight simulator will be an excellent opportunity to test how the pilot can use 
instruction from a screen for manoeuvring the aircraft rather than following the 
instructions from the tower. With the physical demonstrator, it will be possible to 
test the results of a more complex optimisation model and to see the results in the 
decision-making process. 
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6.2.3. PHYSICAL DEMONSTRATOR CURRENT STATE 
 
The Flight Simulator is hocked to MATLAB allowing the extraction of the input data 
needed by the tool developed by:  
 
A. ESR 12 
The NRT APPT is integrated and it predicts the integrity, and so the reliability, of the 
navigation solution provided by the GNSS receiver in terms of Protection Levels. The 
protection levels are displayed on supplementary indicators generated by MATLAB in 
order to help the pilot to evaluate the availability and reliability of the GNSS 
navigation solution.  
The algorithm has been successfully connected to a commercial flight simulator 
software, X Plane 10, through a tool, X-Plane Connect, developed by NASA (Teubert, 
2008). The X-Plane Connect (XPC) Toolbox is an open-source research tool used to 
interact with the commercial flight simulator software X-Plane. XPC allows users to 
control aircraft and receive state information from aircraft simulated in X-Plane using 
functions written in C, C++, Java, MATLAB, or Python in real time over the network. 
This research tool has been used to visualize flight paths, test control algorithms, 
simulate an active airspace, or generate out-the-window visuals for in-house flight 
simulation software. Possible applications include active control of an X-Plane 
simulation, flight visualization, and recording states during a flight, or interacting with 
a mission over User Datagram Protocol (UDP). 
For this project, the XPC tool extracts information related to the attitude, position 
and dynamics of the aircraft in real time that is used in the ARAIM tool to compute 
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the current state of the parameters. For each second, the tool integrates in time the 
dynamics of the airplane (Eqs. 6.1 to 6.7) for 6-10 seconds based on the inputs 
extracted from the flight simulator, in order to satisfy the Time-to-Alert (TTA) 
requirement, predicts the ARAIM parameters and displays them on dedicated 
instrument panels, as shown in Figure 6-1, following the layout of the graphs already 
presented in chapter 4. 
 
 
Figure 6-1 Real-time ARAIM computation integrated in the X Plane software. 
 
The tool uses a classical Three Degrees of Freedom (3-DOF) point-and-variable mass 
model. The assumptions are: 
 The Earth shape is approximated as an ellipsoid using World Geodetic System 
1984 (WGS-84) parameters. 
 The atmosphere is considered at rest relative to the Earth. 
 Temperature, pressure and density are modelled with the International 
Standard Atmosphere (ISA). 
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 The aircraft is considered as a rigid body with a vertical plane of symmetry. 
 The mass reduction is due to fuel consumption only. 
 Forces (Thrust, aerodynamic and weight) act on the aircraft Centre of Gravity 
(CoG). 
 The flight is symmetric. 
The 3-DOF scalar equations are: 
𝑚
𝑑𝑉
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑇 cos𝛼 − 𝐷(𝑉, ℎ, 𝐿) − 𝑚𝑔 sin 𝛾  (6.1) 
𝑚
𝑑𝛾
𝑑𝑡
= (𝑇 sin 𝛼 + 𝐿) cos𝜙 −𝑚𝑔 cos 𝛾   (6.2) 
𝑚
𝑑𝜓
𝑑𝑡
=
(𝑇 sin𝛼+𝐿) sin𝜙
cos𝛾
     (6.3) 
𝑑𝑚
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑐(𝑉, ℎ)𝑇      (6.4) 
𝑑𝜃
𝑑𝑡
=
𝑉 cos𝛾 cos𝜓
𝑟𝑀+ℎ
      (6.5) 
𝑑Λ
𝑑𝑡
=
𝑉 cos𝛾 cos𝜓
(𝑟𝑀+ℎ)cosΦ
      (6.6) 
𝑑h
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑉 sin 𝛾      (6.7) 
Where: 
m = aircraft mass [kg] 
V = longitudinal velocity [m/s] 
T = thrust magnitude [N] 
α = angle of attack [rad] 
D = drag magnitude [N] 
h = altitude [m] 
L = lift magnitude [N] 
g = gravity acceleration at sea level [m/s] 
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γ = flight path angle [rad] 
φ = roll or bank angle [rad] 
ψ = heading angle [rad] 
c = specific fuel consumption [kg/s] 
Φ = geodetic longitude [rad] 
rM = meridional radius of curvature [m] 
Λ = geodetic latitude [rad] 
rT = transverse radius of curvature [m] 
 
B. ESR 13  
Test how different scenarios result in changes in human physiology in an attempt to 
predict the variations in performance by using objective physiological monitoring. 
The physiological monitoring will consist of gathering heart rate and face 
thermography data. We have acquired a FLIR A65 thermal camera (Figure 6-2) for 
WP4. ESR 13 is currently working on having the image processing algorithm run in 
real time and extract the temperatures from the tracked areas. A machine learning 
algorithm trained on previously collected data will be used as a starting point for 
classifying multiple levels of mental workload; as more data will be collected, the 
classifier will be updated to provide more accurate results.  
 
Figure 6-2 FLIR Thermal Camera (Marinescu, 2017). 
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C. ESR 10  
A software (Quickest path problem with Time Windows – QPPTW algorithm) will 
calculate the quickest path from gate to runway and vice versa and will take into 
consideration other aircraft that might be moving on the ground.  
 
Figure 6-3 Virtual Representation of Airport (Stergianos, 2017). 
 
Through this software, the user/pilot will be able to have a detailed plan to follow 
that will include instructions on how to manoeuvre in the ground and where to stop 
in order to avoid conflicts. This information will be displayed on a screen that will 
show. 
This will make possible to also monitor the behaviour of a user/pilot when following 
instructions on the ground by a screen and that will help in identifying the feasibility 
and ease of this technology. 
The model will use as input the position of the aircraft from the X-plane software with 
the help of a MATLAB tool.  
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 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This tool proved to be a useful platform to test the ARAIM algorithm in a real-time 
configuration, used as an integrated avionics instrument, allowing to save time and 
avoiding the need of developing an aircraft dynamics simulator. Moreover, it could 
be used as test platform for a real-time trajectory optimizer. Due to a lack of time, a 
caution and warning system hasn’t been implemented, at the current state the tool 
only shows the PLs and it is user’s task to monitor them. 
The tool can be further improved, implementing the above-mentioned caution and 
warning system, introducing user-defined parameters and settings, such as the 
selection of the YUMA almanacs, the number constellations to be included in the 
computation and the Integrity Support Message (ISM).  
As final comment, we believe that the physical demonstrator could represent a 
possible configuration of how the future cockpit will look like, integrating new and 
innovative technology that will allow smoother and safer operations and flights: 
- The ground operation tool will allow to reduce delays in congested airports 
and to directly guide pilots from the gate to the runway.  
- The human physiology model will assess pilots’ conditions and performances 
allowing to identify in advance high level of stress, workload and tiredness 
and ultimately improving the safety of flight. 
- The ARAIM algorithm integrated as new avionics system for near real-time 
performance prediction will support pilots in identifying dangerous and 
hazardous situation from the navigation point of view. 
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Figure 6-4 and Figure 6-5 give an overview of the physical demonstrator output and 
an overview of its current configuration. 
 
Figure 6-4 Overview of the Physical Demonstrator. 
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Figure 6-5 Screenshot (rotated 90° clockwise) of the three algorithms integrated in 
the flight simulator and working in parallel.  Top screen: Ground Operation 
Optimiser. Middle Screen left: Flight Simulator view. Middle Screen right: near-Real 
Time Performance Prediction Tool. Bottom Screen: FLIR Thermal Camera analysing 
in real time pilot’s performances. 
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 CONCLUSIONS 
 
 SUMMARY AND RESULTS 
 
This thesis consisted on an extensive analysis of ARAIM performances in operational 
configurations, considering the shadowing effect of the aircraft attitude and 
surrounding environments and the possible integration of new algorithms in civil 
aviation operation that use the ARAIM prediction capability to further improve the 
situation awareness. A review of the history of integrity monitoring has been 
provided together with an overview of the different techniques developed by the 
scientific community. In particular, a detailed presentation of the algorithm 
developed by Stanford University has been introduced, the MATLAB ARAIM 
Availability Simulation Tool (MAAST) that has been used as basis of the tools 
developed in this research. ARAIM is seen by the aviation community has the way 
forward for a safe introduction of GNSS as primary navigation system and for the 
reduction of ground support and costs. The four new algorithms cover aspects and 
support functions in the field of operations within the civil aviation world that have 
not been considered so far, showing interesting results on how ARAIM could be 
integrated in the daily routines, such us pre-flight operations and flight planning, but 
also as support in the design and assessment of flight procedures. 
At the same time, one of the key word and factor of this research is “integration”, 
since it is part of a more complex project, INNOVATE, that involved other 12 
295 
 
researchers with the objective of integrating technologies from different areas of 
expertise to evaluate the overall improvement of aircraft performances. 
 
A quick overview of the single chapters is now presented highlighting the principal 
aspects and outcome: 
- Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 summarised the integrity monitoring problem and 
the different techniques developed and used until now. 
- Chapter 3 presents the Stanford University ARAIM algorithm (MAAST) 
together with the modified version developed in this research, the APPATT, 
that includes the shadowing effect of the aircraft attitude and of the 
surrounding environment. The main difference between the tool is that the 
MAAST analyses static scenarios, providing global average values of the 
integrity performance parameters and highlighting the availability of a 
specific procedure. The APPATT focuses on the analysis of a specific 
operational scenario, highlighting if a determined route could be affected by 
one or more integrity outages due to unfavourable satellite configuration. 
- Chapter 4 introduces two different versions of the APPATT algorithm, the 
Short-Term (ST) and Long-Term (LT). Both the tools analyse a determined 
trajectory using different combinations of the available satellite constellations 
(GPS, Galileo, GLONASS), however the ST version is intended to be used to 
support pilots in the pre-flight operations in assessing the integrity status of 
the expected route in nominal condition, while the LT version analyses a route 
within a defined time frame (that can be from few hours to several days) and 
it is intended to support the long-term planning of flights. The main objective 
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of both the tools is to make aware pilots, ATCs and planners of possible 
integrity outages in nominal condition (no faults in the satellite 
measurements) along the expected route and help them in finding alternative 
solution way in advance (e.g. using a different route or the support of another 
navigation system). The results of the two algorithms show that a dual-
constellation GNSS receiver might not be sufficient for all the possible 
scenarios, supporting the need for an international collaboration for the 
development of multi-GNSS applications. 
- Chapter 5 introduces a basic concept that could be integrated in the next 
algorithm for trajectory optimisation. Nowadays, flight paths are defined 
through a series of waypoints that the aircraft is supposed to follow. The 
algorithm presented is a combination of two functions, a path generator, that 
provides as output the expected trajectory based on the list of waypoints 
selected for the route, and a path modifier that analyses the integrity 
performance of the generated trajectory and, in case of an outage, suggests 
an alternative path that satisfies the required navigation performance of the 
procedure. 
- Chapter 6 presents one of the main achievement of the INNOVATE project, 
the integration of different technologies in a physical demonstrator. A near-
real-time performance prediction ARAIM algorithm has been implemented 
together with a ground operation optimiser and a human performance 
evaluator based on physiology parameters into a flight simulator cockpit. The 
physical demonstrator represents a possible example of technologies that will 
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be integrated in the next generation of aircraft to enhance the capabilities 
and improve the safety of the flights. 
 
As final remark, the results show that a dedicated system, that evaluates the effects 
of the attitude and the surrounding environment in an operational configuration, 
needs to be developed and integrated into the flight management system if the 
ARAIM technique is to be used as an on-board system for integrity monitoring. The 
integration of such system could support the pilots, together with the ATM and 
procedure designers, in the pre-flight operations for the definition of the path to be 
followed to reach the arrival location. 
The author of this thesis had contacted representatives of EUROCONTROL and ESA in 
order to get a feedback on the research and analysis performed. 
Both the organizations confirmed that analyses of the performances considering the 
shadowing effect of the aircraft attitude and surrounding environment were never 
performed. 
ESA is currently collaborating with the Working Group-C, and so the EU-US 
commission, by assessing the performances of the Galileo constellation, in order to 
evaluate the capabilities of the European system in supporting the implementation 
of ARAIM in the Civil Aviation systems. The ESA team expressed its concern to the 
commission regarding the fact that no simulations of operational scenarios were 
performed, but until now nothing has been done to address this concern yet. 
The team in EUROCONTROL confirmed that at the current status the organization 
does not have any tool that analyses simulated aircraft trajectories. The main used 
software, named AUGUR, is a grid-based RAIM availability prediction tool with the 
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only feature of varying the masking angle between 0° and 5° (for further information 
the reader can refer to the EUROCONTROL (2018) website of the paper by Ober 
(1998)). 
Additionally, no tool exists or is currently used that attempts to modify/optimise the 
trajectory using the integrity performance parameters as additional drivers in the 
computation.  
The EUROCONTROL team has also stated that in the roadmap of ARAIM 
implementation, developed by GEAS (2016), and in the operational concepts 
presented by ICAO (2018) at the Navigation Panel it is considered the removal of the 
requirement of integrity availability prediction along the flight path, at least for the 
horizontal component while for the vertical component it might still be required, but 
it is currently under discussion pending on the analysis that will be performed in the 
following months. 
Another point that the EUROCONTROL team has highlighted is what the industry is 
currently willing to implement. The approval of the use of a multi-frequency and 
multi-constellation systems that satisfy the ARAIM requirements is going to impact 
the design and development of the currently used hardware, representing a new and 
quite challenging task for the industries, that have expressed their concerns 
regarding the real need of this type of system. 
This research is actually supporting both sides of the debate, since the results show 
that a multi-constellation system is required in order to have a safe and reliable 
integrity monitoring system, but at the same time it has highlighted that the 
computational workload required represents a challenging issue in the 
implementation of the concepts presented. 
299 
 
It is the author opinion that International organizations and industries should start to 
further and deeply analyse the performances of ARAIM in operational scenarios and 
to find a trade-off between safety and complexity.  
  
Figure 7-1 summarises the research and integration effort made in this research, that 
involved different types of tools and information all implemented in different 
algorithms that have the main objective of supporting the introduction of GNSS as 
main navigation system in the civil aviation. 
 
Figure 7-1 Summary Scheme of the Algorithms Developed and the Integration 
Effort. 
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 OTHER REMARKS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
All the algorithms developed in this research represent basic concepts that can be 
further developed due to the highly complex nature of the integrity monitoring 
problem.  
Additionally, the analyses performed within this research project are all based and 
performed considering assumptions and using simplified models, which includes: 
- Use of models for the simulations of trajectories, both for the satellite orbits 
and aircraft flight path and attitude.  
The tools integrate the satellite orbit propagation model based on the use of 
the almanac as main source of input for the orbital parameters. The main limit 
of this model is that the almanacs are not the most up to date product for the 
computation and analysis of the satellite orbits. An error or uncertainty not 
corrected quickly enough could lead at the wrong determination and 
propagation of the satellite positions that in sequence could lead to a wrong 
assessment of the loss of LoS in the body reference frame and the incorrect 
integrity performance prediction. 
Regarding the aircraft flight path and attitude simulation, the tools integrate 
very simple models to define the aircraft position and attitude angles. The 
main drawback of simple models, it is that the accuracy of the predicted 
trajectory might be very low and this could lead to an erroneous 
determination of the satellite in view in the body reference frame and so 
possible impact on the analysis of the integrity performances. In the FPG and 
FPM tools, this could also lead to the definition of a sub-optimal trajectory. 
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- Another approximation is given by the use of the environmental database, 
that has a spatial resolution of 100m. As mentioned in Chapter 5, this could 
lead to the misinterpretation of the scenario and declare a satellite not in view 
while in reality it is (or vice-versa) 
- The developed tools are also based on other approximations, such as the use 
of parameters that are equal for all the constellations and satellites, like the a 
priori probabilities of satellite and constellation failure, biases and error 
distributions. The real implementation of the ARAIM technique is supposed 
to use the Integrity Support Message, that will carry the most updated 
information and estimate of these parameters that will allow a better 
estimate of the integrity performances. 
- This research focused on looking at snapshots of data and locations, to 
analyse at a very coarse level the operational performances of ARAIM and the 
implications and consequences of its implementation in Civil Aviation. 
However, in order to have statistically useful results, further analysis needs to 
be performed that includes different geometries and error distributions. 
 
The APPATT ST and LT algorithms require improvements from the computational 
point of you, the evaluation of the shadowing effect is not very efficient and it could 
be enhanced to reduce the time and computation power required to perform a 
complete simulation. The FPG&FPM could be used and integrated in more complex 
optimisation algorithm, adding a new constraint in the trajectory computation that 
takes into of the integrity requirements. For the Near-Real-Time APPATT, the 
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implementation of a more complex dynamic model could help to better represent 
the reality and have better predictions. 
 
Currently, the international community is working towards the integration of ARAIM 
in Civil Aviation. In 2016, The Working Group-C published the third report that 
includes the proposed Implementation Roadmap for ARAIM Services, the 
consideration of institutional issues and their discussion, as well as the elaborated 
view of ARAIM complementing the services provided by SBAS systems (GEAS, 2016). 
At the same time, international organizations such as ICAO and EUROCONTROL are 
working on draft Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPS) and Dual-
Frequency-Multi-Constellation GNSS Concept of operations (CONOPS) that includes 
ARAIM (ICAO, 2018). These drafts already include general guidelines for the 
standards to be included in the future GNSS systems, such as the use of the iono-free 
technique and the use of at least two constellations. 
The author of this thesis believes that the obtained results and concepts developed 
within this research could be used by the international community and organizations 
in the assessment and definition of these standards that are going to impact the 
future of the Civil Aviation systems.  
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APPENDIX 
A. SUMMARY OF THE THREATS 
Table A-0-1 shows a summary of the threats that need to be considered when 
computing a position error bound. GEAS’s report divides the threats in three different 
categories: 
- First column (Nominal) includes all the errors that are always present and 
whose magnitude is not expected to change or only slowly. The faults in the 
first five rows are bounded by 𝜎𝑈𝑅𝐴  and bnom provided by the Integrity 
Support Message (ISM), while the other ones are modelled in the receiver. 
- Second column (Narrow faults) includes the faults that can affect each 
satellite independently and cause the growth of the pseudorange error 
beyond its nominal behaviour. These faults are described by Psat provided by 
the ISM. 
- Third column (Wide faults) includes the faults that could cause a whole 
constellation to be faulted. These faults are described by Pconst provided by 
the ISM. 
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Table A-0-1 Summary of the threat space. 
 Nominal Narrow Fault Wide Fault 
Clock and 
Ephemeris 
Orbit/clock 
estimation and 
prediction and 
broadcast limits 
 
Includes clock 
runoffs, bad 
ephemeris, unflagged 
manoeuvres 
Erroneous EOPP, 
Inadequate 
manned ops, 
ground-inherent 
failures 
Signal 
Deformation 
Nominal 
differences 
in signals due to 
RF components, 
filters, and 
antennas 
waveform 
distortion 
 
Failures in satellite 
payload signal 
generation 
components. 
Faulted signal model 
as described in ICAO 
N/A 
Code-Carrier 
Incoherence 
e.g. incoherence 
observed in IIF L5 
signal or GEO L1 
signals 
e.g. incoherence 
observed in IIF L5 
signal or GEO L1 
signals 
N/A 
Inter-
Frequency Bias 
(IFB) 
Delay differences 
in satellite 
payload 
signal paths 
Delay differences in 
satellite payload 
signal paths TBC 
N/A 
Satellite 
Antenna Bias 
Look-angle 
dependent biases 
caused at satellite 
antennas 
Look-angle 
dependent biases 
caused at satellite 
antennas 
N/A 
Ionosphere N/A Scintillation Multiple 
scintillations at 
solar storms 
Troposphere Nominal 
troposphere error 
(after applying 
SBAS MOPS 
model for tropo 
correction) 
N/A N/A 
Receiver Noise 
and Multipath 
Nominal noise 
and multipath 
terms in 
airborne model 
(TBC Galileo 
BOC(1,1) and 
L5/E5a)) 
 
e.g.: receiver 
tracking failure or 
multipath from 
onboard reflector. 
TBC 
e.g.: receiver 
tracking 
multiple failures 
or multipath 
from onboard 
reflector. TBC 
 
 
305 
 
B. LEG TYPES 
The following make up the twenty-two leg types that are currently in use: 
Table B-1 Leg Types and related Codes. 
Heading to Altitude VA 
Heading to a DME Distance VD 
Heading to a Next Leg Intercept VI 
Heading to a Manual Termination VM 
Heading to a Radial Termination VR 
Course to an Altitude  CA 
Course to a DME Distance  CD 
Course to a Next Leg Intercept  CI 
Course to a Radial Termination  CR 
Course to a Fix  CF 
Tracking Between Two Fixes  TF 
Direct to a Fix  DF 
Course from a Fix to an Altitude  FA 
Course from a Fix to an Along Track Distance  FC 
Course form a Fix to a DME Distance  FD 
Course from a Fix to a Manual Termination  FM 
Constant DME Arc to a Fix  AF 
Hold to a Fix  HF 
Hold to an Altitude  HA 
Hold to a Manual Termination  HM 
Initial Fix IF 
Procedure Turn to Intercept PI 
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C. TAILWIND VALUES 
  
Table C-1 Tailwind values in function of Height Above the Aerodrome. 
TWC (km/h) for turn calculations 
Turn Height Above Aerodrome (m) Standard Tailwind Component (kph) 
100 40 
500 92 
1000 100 
1500 130 
2000 157 
2500 185 
3000 220 
3500 242 
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D. SINGLE CONSTELLATION CONFIGURATION (GPS) WITH 0° MASK ANGLE  
 
- Single constellation GPS: Yuma almanac week 703 (TOA 319488s), reset time 
[0d 0h 0m 0s], mask angle 0° 
As an extreme case, the receiver mask angle has been set to 0°, the equivalent of 
not setting a mask angle.  
 
Figure D-0-1 Number of Satellites in view in the ENU (red) and Body (blue) 
Reference Frames along the Trajectory. 
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Figure D-0-2 Number of Shadowed Satellites by Aircraft Attitude (blue) and 
Terrain (red). 
 
 
Figure D-0-3 Satellites in View Skyplot in the ENU reference frame. 
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Figure D-0-4 Satellites Elevation. Figure D-0-5 Satellites visibility by PRN. 
 
 
 
 
Figure D-0-6 HPL in the ENU (green) 
and Body (blue) Reference Frames 
compared with the Alert Level (red). 
 
Figure D-0-7 VPL in the ENU (green) 
and Body (blue) Reference Frames 
compared with the Alert Level (red). 
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Figure D-0-8 Accuracy in the ENU 
(green) and Body (blue) Reference 
Frames compared with the Alert 
Level (red). 
 
Figure D-0-9 EMT in the ENU (green) 
and Body (blue) Reference Frames 
compared with the Alert Level (red). 
 
Table D-1 Values Comparison between ENU and Body Reference Frames. 
Performance 
Parameter 
MaxENU WPMax_ENU MaxBody WPMax_Body 
ENU at 
WPMax_Body 
AL 
HPL (m) 13.02 641 34.97 1001 12.73 40 
VPL (m) 10.38 641 29.29 467 9.79 35 
EMT (m) 3.56 641 13.37 467 3.25 15 
Accuracy (m) 1.17 1 2.4 969 1.09 1.87 
 
Table D-2 Percentage Differences between Max Values in Body Reference Frame, 
related ENU values and Alert Level. 
 
Performance 
Parameter 
Δ% between Body and 
ENU at WPMax_Body 
Δ% between 
MaxBody and AL 
HPL (m) 174.63 -12.58 
VPL (m) 199.11 -16.31 
EMT (m) 311.29 -10.85 
Accuracy (m) 119.73 28.08 
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